AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 20972/92

                      by Kaj RANINEN

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on

7 March 1996, the following members being present:

           MM.   S. TRECHSEL, President

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK

                 A. WEITZEL

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 H.G. SCHERMERS

                 F. MARTINEZ

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY

           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 B. MARXER

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 E. KONSTANTINOV

                 D. SVÁBY

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 P. LORENZEN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 11 November 1992

by Kaj Raninen against Finland and registered on 19 November 1992 under

file No. 20972/92;

      Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent

Government on 14 March 1995 and the observations in reply submitted by

the applicant on 31 May 1995;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a Finnish citizen, born in 1967 and resident in

Helsinki. He is a student. Before the Commission he is represented by

Ms. Marjaana Laine, lawyer of the Union of Conscientious Objectors

("Aseistakieltäytyjäliitto") .

      The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be

summarised as follows.

Particular circumstances of the case

      In 1986 the applicant was called up for military service. On

account of his studies he obtained a suspension of his duty to report

for service until 20 March 1992. Prior to this date he had objected in

writing to performing any kind of military or substitute civilian

service.

      On 8 April 1992 the applicant was arrested on suspicion of having

evaded military service and was eventually brought to the Pori Brigade

(Porin Prikaati) at Säkylä, where he should have commenced his service

on 20 March 1992. Having been questioned there on 9 April 1992, he

again objected to carrying out any military duties and his arrest was

prolonged.

      Following a hearing on 11 April 1992 the District Court

(kihlakunnanoikeus, häradsrätten) of Eura ordered the applicant's

detention on remand in the County Prison of Turku. Following a hearing

on 24 April 1992 the District Court convicted him of having evaded

service on 20 March 1992 and of an offence in duty on 9 April 1992. He

was sentenced to 45 days' suspended imprisonment.

      Immediately upon his release from prison on 24 April 1992 the

applicant was accompanied by military staff back to the Pori Brigade.

Having been questioned there, he again objected to carrying out any

military duties and was again arrested.

      On 28 April 1992 a further request for the applicant's detention

on remand was heard by the District Court of Eura. He was again ordered

to be detained on remand in the County Prison of Turku. Following a

hearing on 12 May 1992 the District Court convicted him of an offence

in service on 24 April 1992 and sentenced him to 30 days' imprisonment

to be served later.

      Having been immediately released from prison after the court

hearing on 12 May 1992, the applicant was again accompanied by military

staff back to the Pori Brigade. Having been questioned there, he again

objected to carrying out any military duties and was again arrested.

      On 15 May 1992 a further request for the applicant's detention

on remand was heard by the District Court of Eura. He was again ordered

to be detained on remand in the County Prison of Turku. Following a

hearing on 29 May 1992 the District Court convicted him of an offence

in service on 12 May 1992 and sentenced him to 30 days' imprisonment

to be served later.

      Having been released from prison on 29 May 1992, the applicant

was transported by military police back to the Pori Brigade. Having

been questioned there, he again objected to carrying out any military

duties and was again arrested.

      On 2 June 1992 the applicant was transported back to the County

Prison of Turku in order to serve his sentence. On 9 June 1992 he was

released on parole. Immediately upon his release from prison, he was

accompanied by military police back to the Pori Brigade.  Having been

questioned there, he again objected to carrying out any military duties

and was again arrested.

      On 11 June 1992 a further request for the applicant's detention

on remand was heard by the District Court of Eura. He was again

detained on remand and transported to the County Prison of Turku.

Following a hearing on 18 June 1992 the District Court convicted him

of offences in service on 29 May and 9 June 1992. He was sentenced to

40 days' imprisonment to be served later. His release on parole was

also revoked.

      After the court hearing on 18 June 1992 the applicant was

transported back to the County Prison in order to be released. A

conscripts' police squad waited for him already in the prisoners'

check-out room inside the prison. In the prison courtyard he was

handcuffed and told that he was being apprehended. Outside the prison

gate, where his support group was waiting, he entered the conscripts'

police vehicle. He was then transported by a conscripts' police squad

back to the Pori Brigade at Säkylä. Säkylä is situated some

100-150 kilometres from Turku and normally transportation by car lasts

some two hours. On arrival at the Brigade the applicant did not

explicitly object to being transported to the military hospital. The

handcuffs were taken off in the hospital's entry hall.

      According to the applicant, the measures taken by the conscripts'

police squad were all carried out against his will. According to the

Government, he consented to being transported to the military hospital.

      In the military hospital the applicant was not subjected to any

medical examinations. Having been questioned by military staff on

19 June 1992, he again objected to carrying out any military duties.

Thereupon he was formally arrested at 8.05 hrs.

      On 22 June 1992 a further request for the applicant's detention

on remand was heard by the District Court of Eura. He was again ordered

to be detained on remand in the County Prison of Turku.

      On 26 June 1992 the applicant started serving his aggregated

prison sentence. Following a hearing on 29 June 1992 the District Court

convicted him of an offence in service on 19 June 1992 and sentenced

him to 35 days' imprisonment. It considered that he had been deprived

of his liberty as from 19 June 1992.

      On 20 August 1992 the applicant was released from prison on

parole contrary to his own wish. He was met by a conscripts' police

squad and was asked whether he was aware of his obligation to perform

his military service. He replied in the affirmative and was accompanied

to the Pori Brigade. Having been questioned there, he again objected

to carrying out any military duties and was again arrested.

      On 24 August 1992 a further request for the applicant's detention

on remand was heard by the District Court of Eura. He was again ordered

to be detained on remand in the County Prison of Turku. On

9 September 1992 the District Court convicted him of an offence in

service on 20 August 1992 and sentenced him to 35 days' imprisonment

to be served later. The applicant appealed.

      On 11 September 1992 the applicant reported for military service

of his own motion.

      On 12 September 1992 a further request for the applicant's

detention on remand was heard by the District Court of Eura. He was

again ordered to be detained on remand in the County Prison of Turku.

      On 25 September 1992 the applicant was examined by

Dr. Tomi Lindholm, a specialist in psychiatry. Dr. Lindholm concluded

that the applicant was not suffering from any mental disturbance which

would affect his fitness for military service.

      Following a hearing on 28 September 1992 the District Court

convicted the applicant of unauthorised leave from 9 to

11 September 1992 as well as of an offence in service on

11 September 1992. He was sentenced to 36 days' imprisonment to be

served later. After judgment had been served he was transported back

to the County Prison of Turku for immediate release. On release he was

again met by a conscripts' police squad but again objected to being

accompanied to the Pori Brigade. On this occasion he was apparently not

transported to the Pori Brigade.

      On 2 October 1992 the applicant reported for duty of his own

motion and was again arrested. Having been questioned on

3 October 1992, he again refused to comply with any military duties and

his arrest was prolonged.

      On 5 October 1992 the Chief Physician of the military hospital

of the Pori Brigade proposed that the applicant should be considered

unfit for service pending further examinations. His reasons were, inter

alia, as follows:

      (translation from Finnish)

      "[The applicant] ... is a total objector. His objections

      and ensuing placements in detention have occurred a number

      of times as from April 1992. As a result [he] has been

      imprisoned ... almost without interruptions. In between he

      has been detained ... at the Pori Brigade. During his

      [last-mentioned periods of detention] he has been hunger

      striking.

      It appears that the above described situation will continue

      until [the applicant] turns thirty. At least no other

      solution is at hand, given [his] constant objection [to any

      kind of service].

      [The applicant] has ... a support group. Those at the

      brigade who have had to do with him have suspected that he

      has been under pressure to continue objecting [to any kind

      of service]. In addition, several persons have noted his

      gazing and startling behaviour ...

      On the part of the command of the brigade concerns have

      been expressed ... about the effects possibly resulting

      from [the applicant's] prolonged stay in prison ... . In

      addition, it has been considered that the health care staff

      should take their responsibility ... . It has furthermore

      been questioned why [the applicant's] obligation to

      perform] military service has not been suspended, when

      other conscripts suffering from behavioural disturbances

      caused by socio-economic problems (i.e. illegal absence

      from service) have also been granted such suspension.

      During [his] short examination by a psychiatrist on

      25 September 1992 (lasting about half an hour) ... which I

      attended ... [the applicant] behaved in a calm, determined

      and correct way ... To the psychiatrist's question whether

      he would be willing to spend perhaps five ... years in

      prison in order to have [the legislation concerning] the

      duty to perform military service amended he replied that he

      would be prepared for this in every respect.

      He himself reports having lost some 5-10 kilograms during

      these proceedings.

      [His] indifferent attitude towards his personal hygiene and

      cleanliness ... caught my attention. His hair was long and

      uncared for and had not been washed. His face was filled

      with blackheads and his clothes were dirty. His teeth

      showed signs of caries. This might [be] an indication of

      [his] future mental disturbance, if the present situation

      were to continue.

      Although [the applicant] does not, for the time being, show

      any signs of depression, anxiety or breakdown, a possibly

      five year-long stay in prison ... will create an

      unreasonable strain on [his] health, taking also into

      consideration that this [stay] may not lead to the result

      which [he] wishes to see. ...

      In my opinion it is unreasonable that [the applicant]

      should have to serve a prison sentence until he turns

      thirty on account of his opinions behind which can be seen

      a particular personality structure (since [he] has taken up

      something like this), [i.e.] a certain rigidity.

      As the brigade's physician I am, without in any way wishing

      to make this a psychiatric matter, of the opinion that ...

      measures must be taken in accordance with the Handbook on

      Soldiers' Health Care ... [which refers to] uncertainty

      about the correct fitness classification. Since it is

      possible that ... [the applicant] does not [wish to be

      examined by army staff] or does not trust such

      examinations, they should be carried out [by civilians].

      In any case, considering that [the applicant] has been in

      prison for half a year, he cannot immediately be ordered to

      perform his service, since the prospects of success are bad

      ...

      So as to enable further examinations, I [therefore] propose

      that the fitness classification should be changed into:

      E-class, 1 year, V629A.

      I have discussed this solution with psychiatrist Lindholm

      and the Chief Physician of the Military County ..., who

      have both considered this procedure to be a correct

      solution in this situation.

      Diagnosis: V 629A  An undefined psychosocial problem

      ..."

      On 5 October 1992 the applicant was discharged from his military

service for one year.

      Following a hearing on 30 November 1992 the District Court

convicted the applicant of an offence in service on 3 October 1992 and

unauthorised leave from 28 September to 2 October 1992. He was

sentenced to 36 days' imprisonment to be served later. His release on

parole was also revoked. Both the applicant and the prosecution

appealed to the Court of Appeal (hovioikeus, hovrätten) of Helsinki.

      On 7 December 1992 the Commander in Chief of the Military

District (sotilaspiiri, militärdistriktet) of Helsinki considered that

the applicant was temporarily unfit for service pending a further

examination which was to take place in December 1993. The decision was

based on rule V629A of the Instruction for Medical Examinations.

      On 16 February 1993 the applicant lodged a petition with the

Parliamentary Ombudsman (eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, riksdagens

justitieombudsman; "the Ombudsman"), in particular concerning his

treatment from 18 to 19 June 1992. Heard by the Ombudsman, the General

Staff of the Armed Forces (pääesikunta, huvudstaben) conceded that

neither the applicant's apprehension nor his handcuffing had been

justified.

      On 16 March 1993 the Court of Appeal upheld the District Court's

judgment of 9 September 1992 in so far as it concerned the applicant's

conviction. On 16 March 1993 the Court of Appeal furthermore upheld the

District Court's judgment of 30 November 1992. In this respect the

applicant was later refused leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

      On 13 December 1993 the applicant did not attend his further

call-up and charges were therefore again brought against him.

      In his decision of 20 May 1994 the Ombudsman considered that the

applicant's apprehension on 18 June 1992 had not been legally grounded,

since he had not been asked whether he would persist in his refusal to

perform any military or substitute service. The Ombudsman furthermore

found no justification for the applicant's handcuffing. He noted,

however, that the orders given by professional military personnel to

the commander of the conscripts' police squad had been summary and that

the commander, being inexperienced, had himself believed that he was

acting in compliance with the relevant orders. The Ombudsman found that

more experienced personnel should have been ordered to fetch the

applicant on his release from the County Prison but did not order any

charges to be brought. He also agreed with the criticism of the

unreasonable treatment, according to criminal law, of total objectors

to military service.

      On 1 June 1994 an amendment to section 39 of the 1950 Military

Service Act (asevelvollisuuslaki 452/50, värnpliktslag 452/50; "the

1950 Act") entered into force (see para. 4 of "Relevant domestic law").

      In November 1994 the District Court of Helsinki found that the

applicant should not be convicted for not having attended the call-up

in December 1993. The Court found that it would be unreasonable to

convict him of this particular offence, since on account of his refusal

to perform any military or substitute service he had already served

prison sentences totalling a period exceeding seven months. The Court

noted that this period exceeded the maximum punishment to which a

conscientious objector could be sentenced, if he had first opted for

substitute civilian service (i.e. 197 days).

      On 20 December 1994 the Commander in Chief of the Military

District considered that the applicant was again fit for service. His

reclassification was exclusively based on the applicant's own statement

concerning his state of health.

      On 9 January 1995 the applicant reported for military service at

the Pori Brigade, where he again refused to perform any form of

military or substitute service. He was immediately discharged from

military service on the basis of section 39 of the amended 1950 Act.

      On 20 February 1995 the District Court (käräjäoikeus,

tingsrätten) of Kokemäki convicted the applicant of refusal to carry

out military service in pursuance of section 39 of the amended 1950 Act

and sentenced him to 194 days' imprisonment. The Court observed that

the applicant had previously been convicted of offences which

corresponded to the description in section 39. Since he had already

served 212 days in prison for those offences, the Court considered him

to have fully served the sentence imposed on the basis of section 39.

Relevant domestic law

1.    The duty to perform military service

      According to the 1919 Constitution Act (Suomen hallitusmuoto

94/19, Regeringsform för Finland 94/19), every Finnish citizen is

obliged to participate in the defence of the country or to assist

therein, as further described by law (section 75, subsection 1). Under

the 1950 Act every Finnish male citizen is in principle obliged to

serve in the military (section 1).

2.    Refusal to perform armed military service

      According to the 1950 Act, a conscript who has a serious

conscientious objection against armed military service and who does not

wish to opt for substitute service shall be exempted from armed

military service in peacetime and instead be ordered to perform unarmed

military service (section 36a). The duration of such service is

330 days.

3.    Refusal to perform substitute civilian service

      According to the 1991 Act on Substitute Civilian Service

(siviilipalveluslaki 1723/91, civiltjänstlag 1723/91), a conscript who

declares a serious conscientious objection to any form of military

service shall be exempted from such service in peacetime and instead

perform substitute service (section 1). The duration of this service

is 395 days (section 3). A conscientious objector who refuses to

perform his substitute service only after having been called up to this

end shall be convicted and sentenced to a 197-day prison term intended

to correspond to half the duration of the substitute service. The

obligation to perform substitute service ceases when this prison term

has been served. A conscript refusing to perform substitute service

after having opted for such service can only be convicted once of this

offence (section 26, subsections 1 and 2). The prison sentence shall

be unconditional and the convict shall serve his whole sentence, unless

he later wishes, and is able to, perform substitute civilian service.

In such a case he shall be released on parole for his remaining period

of service (section 28, subsection 1 and section 29, subsections 1

and 2).

4.    Refusal to perform either military or substitute civilian service

      In accordance with the 1889 Penal Code (rikoslaki 39/1889,

strafflag 39/1889; extensively amended) a refusal to perform either

military or substitute civilian service may be considered as an offence

in service punishable with up to one year's imprisonment (Chapter 45,

sections 4 and 15, as amended by Act no. 792/89). Alternatively, the

refusal may be considered as evasion from service or as unauthorised

leave. A punishment imposed for such a refusal does not affect the

convict's liability to perform either military or substitute service

up to the end of the year of his thirtieth birthday, unless he is

exempted from service (section 23, subsection 2 (3) and section 15 of

the 1950 Act).

      In responding to a written question in Parliament the Minister

of Defence, in 1992, stated that her Ministry had considered various

alternative ways of dealing with total objectors. It had been found,

however, that it would be difficult to create a system similar to that

prescribed in the Act on Substitute Civilian Service also for total

objectors, who had already been called up to perform military service.

A distinction between such total objection and desertion was not

clear-cut. It would furthermore be difficult to create a system for

punishing total objectors which would be fair, if compared both with

the system for punishing ordinary desertion and with the system for

convicting those who refuse to perform substitute civilian service

after having opted therefor (Written Question no. 452/92).

      According to an amendment to the 1950 Act which entered into

force on 1 June 1994, a conscript who categorically objects to

performing military service and whose behaviour would not change as a

result of a punishment ordered on the basis of chapter 45 of the Penal

Code shall, provided he does not opt for substitute civilian service,

be convicted for having refused to perform military service. Although

he shall be convicted in pursuance of chapter 45 of the Penal Code, his

punishment shall be governed by the provisions in the Act on Substitute

Civilian Service concerning refusal to perform such service

(section 39, subsection 1 of the 1950 Act, as amended by

Act no. 358/94).

      If someone has previously been convicted of behaviour which

corresponds to that described in the amended section 39 of the 1950

Act, the period during which he has previously been deprived of his

liberty shall be deducted from any further sentence imposed after the

entry into force of the amendment (see the transitional provision in

Act no. 358/94). If such a person has served his whole sentence, he

shall no longer remain liable to perform his military service in

peacetime (section 39, subsection 4, as amended by Act no. 358/94).

5.    Fetching of a conscript failing to report for military service

      According to the 1951 Decree on the Application of the Military

Act (asetus 63/51 asevelvollisuuslain soveltamisesta, förordning 63/51

ang. tillämpning av värnpliktslagen), a conscript who has failed to

report for military service on a fixed day in the absence of a legal

obstacle shall as soon as possible be brought by the police to his

place of service (section 36, as amended by Decree no. 1361/88).

6.    Classification of a conscript's fitness to perform military

      service

      According to the 1950 Act, a decision concerning a conscript's

fitness to perform military service shall always be based on an

"examination" (section 15, as amended by Act no. 1169/88). The

Examination Board set up at every brigade shall consist of the most

senior military physician and two officers (section 66 of the 1951

Decree). No appeal lies against the classification decision

(section 37, subsection 3 of the 1950 Act).

7.    Remedies

      According to the Constitution Act (Suomen hallitusmuoto 94/19,

Regeringsform för Finland 94/19), anyone who has suffered an

infringement of his rights, or damage, through an illegal act or

negligence on the part of a civil servant, is entitled to demand that

the civil servant be convicted and held liable for damages, or to

report him for the purpose of having charges brought against him

(section 93, subsection 2). Under the Tort Liability Act (vahingon-

korvauslaki 412/74, skadeståndslag 412/74) proceedings for damages may

also be instituted against the State for actions taken by civil

servants (chapters 3 and 4). The Ombudsman is empowered to order that

charges be brought against public officials.

      Finally, according to the 1974 Act on Compensation by the State

for the Deprivation of the Liberty of Detained or Convicted Innocent

Persons (laki 422/74 syyttömästi vangitulle tai tuomitulle valtion

varoista vapauden menetyksen johdosta maksettavasta korvauksesta, lag

422/74 om ersättning av statens medel som till följd av frihets-

berövande skall betalas till oskyldigt häktad eller dömd; "the 1974

Act"), compensation may be claimed from the State, provided the

deprivation of liberty has lasted more than 24 hours (section 1 (4)).

COMPLAINTS

      Following the Commission's partial decision on admissibility (see

below; "Proceedings before the Commission"), the applicant's remaining

complaints are as follows:

1.     The applicant complains under Articles 3 and 8 of the Convention

that, on 18 June 1992, he was transported in handcuffs to Pori

Brigade's military hospital. He considers that his handcuffing

constituted degrading treatment and was a disproportionate interference

with his right to privacy.

      Under the same provisions he further complains about the decision

of 7 December 1992 to the effect that he was considered to have "an

undefined psychosocial problem" and thus to be unfit for military

service. He considers that this decision and the effects thereof have

also subjected him to degrading treatment and have constituted a

disproportionate interference with his right to privacy.

2.    The applicant further complains that the deprivation of his

liberty from 18 June 1992, following his release from prison, until the

issuing of the arrest order on 19 June 1992 was in violation of

Article 5 para. 1 of the Convention. Nor was he informed either orally

or in writing of the reasons for that deprivation of his liberty, this

violating Article 5 para. 2.

3.    The applicant furthermore complains that he has been convicted

repeatedly of the same offence, this being in violation of Article 4

of Protocol No. 7.

4.     The applicant also complains that he has been discriminated

against for having consistently refused to perform either military or

substitute service, if compared with conscientious objectors refusing

to perform any kind of service once they have already opted for

substitute civilian service. He invokes Article 14 of the Convention

read in conjunction with Article 9 of the Convention and Article 4 of

Protocol No. 7.

      In his observations of 31 May 1995 he complains that the decision

to consider him unfit for service also discriminated against him. In

this respect he invokes Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention in

conjunction with Article 8.

      In his observations of 31 May 1995 he additionally complains that

he has also been discriminated against, if compared with Jehovah's

Witnesses of the male sex, who under Finnish law are exempted from

performing any military or substitute service. He again invokes

Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 9 of the

Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.

      In his observations of 31 May 1995 he finally complains that his

treatment, taken as a whole, has been degrading and discriminatory. In

this respect he invokes Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction

with Article 3.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

      The application was introduced on 11 November 1992 and registered

on 19 November 1992.

      On 30 November 1994 the Commission (First Chamber) adjourned the

examination of part of the application and decided to communicate that

part to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 48 para. 2 (b) of

the Rules of Procedure. It declared the remainder of the application

inadmissible.

      The Government's written observations were submitted on

14 March 1995 after an extension of the time-limit fixed for that

purpose. The applicant replied on 31 May 1995, also after an extension

of the time-limit.

      On 11 April 1995 the Commission granted the applicant legal aid.

      On 27 February 1996 the plenary Commission ordered the transfer

of the application to itself pursuant to Article 20 para. 4 of the

Convention.

THE LAW

1.    Exhaustion of domestic remedies

      (a)  The handcuffing on 18 June 1992 and the deprivation of

           liberty from 18 to 19 June 1992

      The Government submit that the applicant has not exhausted

domestic remedies in accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention, since he failed to institute proceedings against the public

officials responsible for the incidents or, in the alternative, against

the State.

      The applicant contends that he has exhausted all domestic

remedies which could be regarded as effective. The courts declined to

consider the period during which he had been handcuffed as a

deprivation of his liberty and instead considered it as forming part

of his military service. Moreover, although considering that the

applicant's handcuffing had not been justified, the Ombudsman refrained

from ordering that charges should be brought against any public

official.

      The applicant admits that he could also have instituted private

prosecution proceedings against public officials in pursuance of

section 93 of the Constitution Act. However, this remedy would have

been directed essentially towards the same end as his petition to the

Ombudsman and would in practice have been less effective.

      The applicant also admits that he could have sued the State for

damages in pursuance of the Tort Liability Act. However, in order to

obtain damages pursuant to that Act he would have had to show that a

public official either negligently or deliberately failed in his or her

duties. Particularly since the Ombudsman found that the commander of

the conscripts' police squad had acted in good faith, a claim for

damages would also have been ineffective in practice. In any case,

civil proceedings to this end would be extremely lengthy.

      The Commission recalls that under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention it may only deal with a complaint after all domestic

remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised

rules of international law. An applicant must make normal use of

remedies likely to be effective and adequate in respect of the matters

of which he complains (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Eckle judgment of

15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 30, para. 66; No. 12719/87, Dec.

3.5.88, D.R. 56, pp. 237 et seq., at pp. 243-244; No. 10978/84, Dec.

14.10.86, D.R. 49, pp. 144 et seq., at p. 155, with further

references). The burden of proving the existence of available and

sufficient remedies lies upon the State (Eur. Court H.R., Deweer

judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 15, para. 26).

      In the present case the Commission notes the Ombudsman's finding

that the applicant's treatment, although reprehensible, did not require

that charges be brought against any public official. The Commission

also notes that under the 1974 Act compensation for illegal deprivation

of liberty presupposes that it lasted more than 24 hours. The

deprivation of the applicant's liberty did not last that long. In these

particular circumstances the Commission considers that the remedies

referred to by the Government did not provide reasonable prospects of

success. These remedies cannot therefore be considered effective and

adequate for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) in respect of the

complaints at issue (cf. Eur. Court H.R., A. v. France judgment of

23 November 1993, Series A no. 277-B, p. 48, para. 32; No. 25052/94,

Dec. 5.7.95, D.R. 82-A, p. 102, at pp. 114-115). It follows that the

Government's objection must be rejected.

      (b)  The fitness classification

      In this respect the Government again object that domestic

remedies have not been exhausted, while the applicant contends that

there was no remedy whatsoever against the Military Commander's

decision of 7 December 1992.

      The Commission notes that according to section 37 of the 1950 Act

no appeal lies against a fitness classification. It furthermore finds

that the remedies referred to by the Government cannot be considered

to be effective and adequate for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26)

in respect of this complaint either. It follows that the Government's

objection must again be rejected.

2.    Articles 3 and 8 (Art. 3, 8) of the Convention

      Under these provisions the applicant complains that, on

18 June 1992, he was transported in handcuffs to the Pori Brigade's

military hospital. He also complains of the terms of his fitness

classification of 7 December 1992.

      Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention reads as follows:

      "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or

      degrading treatment or punishment."

      Article 8 (Art. 8) reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private ...

      life, ...

      2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority

      with the exercise of this right except such as is in

      accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic

      society in the interests of national security, public

      safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the

      prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      (a)  The handcuffing

      The Government stress that in the particular circumstances at

hand the applicant's handcuffing was part and parcel of his

apprehension. They therefore fail to see any issue under Article 3 or

8 (Art. 3, 8) of the Convention which could be separated from that

arising under Article 5 (Art. 5) (see point 3 below). Subsidiarily, the

Government submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded. The

threshold of treatment proscribed by Article 3 (Art. 3) was not

reached. The handcuffing was only intended as a security measure during

the applicant's transportation which at any rate did not take place in

public. Nevertheless, the handcuffing was probably unnecessary,

considering his calm behaviour.

      The applicant contends that the handcuffing amounted to treatment

contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3). Its only purpose was to degrade and

frighten him so as to influence his personal convictions in respect of

military and substitute service. It was, at any rate, disproportionate

for the purposes of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), since he in no way

resisted his purported apprehension. Nor was there any reason to expect

such resistance in view of his behaviour during previous incidents.

      The Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of this

complaint and considers that it raises questions of fact and law of

such complex nature that their determination requires an examination

of the merits. This complaint cannot therefore be declared inadmissible

as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring it

inadmissible has been established.

      (b)  The fitness classification

      The Government consider that neither Article 3 nor Article 8

(Art. 3, 8)has been violated on account of the applicant's fitness

classification. In accordance with normal practice the examination of

the applicant took into account his ability to perform military

service. His personal views did not affect the examination. His

repeated refusals to serve in the military nevertheless indicated "at

least some maladjustment to the conditions and requirements of the

military forces". In any case, his fitness classification was only

brought to the attention of himself and the military authorities and

could not therefore result in his being stigmatised.

      Although the fitness classification could be regarded as an

interference with his right to respect for his private life within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, the

Government consider this interference to have been justified. It was

in accordance with the law and served the legitimate aims of protecting

the interests of national security and health. It was finally

proportionate to those aims and thus necessary within the meaning of

Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), considering the State's wide margin of

appreciation.

      The applicant maintains that his classification as unfit for

service constituted degrading treatment within the meaning of Article

3 (Art. 3). The only reason for considering that he had "an undefined

psychosocial problem" was his refusal to perform any military or

substitute service. Shortly before being diagnosed, in October 1992,

by a physician without any qualifications in the field of psychiatry,

a psychiatrist had found that the applicant had no psychiatric

disturbances affecting his fitness for service. Moreover, at the end

of 1994 he was again considered fit for service without any fresh

medical or other examination having taken place. The applicant

therefore concludes that the medical and psychiatric sciences were

abused for political purposes so as to enable the authorities to

facilitate the handling of his case.

      The applicant points out that the Army's fitness classification

is of an official character and is requested in various contexts of

everyday life. His classification as unfit has already caused him

damage, since employers normally verify the fitness classification of

potential employees. At any rate, his right to respect for his private

life within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the

Convention has been violated. The interference caused by his

classification as unfit and the reasons advanced therefor were not in

accordance with the law, since they were not grounded on any medical

considerations. In any case, they were not proportionate within the

meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).

(a)   Assuming that the classification of the applicant as unfit for

service constituted an interference with his right to respect for his

private life, the Commission recalls that in order to be justified

under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) such an interference

must satisfy three conditions: it must be "in accordance with the law",

it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article

8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society"

for that or those legitimate aims. The notion of necessity implies that

the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in

particular, requires that it be proportionate to the legitimate aim

pursued. In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a

democratic society", the Commission will also take into account that

a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States, but its

review is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State

exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith.

Furthermore, in exercising its supervisory function, the Commission

cannot confine itself to considering the impugned decisions in

isolation, but must look at them in the light of the case as a whole.

It must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the

interferences at issue were "relevant and sufficient" (see Eur. Court

H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, pp. 31-32,

paras. 67-68).

      It has not been argued that the fitness classification was not

"in accordance with the law" for any other reason than the alleged lack

of medical considerations in support thereof. The Commission finds this

allegation unsubstantiated, since it appears that the military

physician became concerned about the applicant's health following his

repeated imprisonments and hunger strikes in the course of 1992. It was

apparently solely for this reason that the physician recommended that

the applicant's obligation to perform his military service should be

postponed for a year, pending further examinations by civilian

physicians. In these particular circumstances the Commission would

consider that the interference in question was aimed at protecting the

applicant's health and therefore served at least one of the legitimate

aims set out in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).

      The Commission furthermore considers that the reasons advanced

for the classification of the applicant as unfit were clearly relevant

and sufficient to justify the interference.  As regards, in particular,

the proportionality thereof, the Commission is not convinced by the

applicant's argument that the particular reasons mentioned in this

classification have affected or could affect his everyday life

negatively. It observes that both he himself and the Union of

Conscientious Objectors have in fact been very active in informing the

public about his treatment as a total objector.

      Taking all the circumstances into account and having regard to

the State's margin of appreciation, the Commission is satisfied that

the military physician and the Commander in Chief were reasonably

entitled to consider the applicant as unfit for military service for

the reasons set out in military physician's opinion of 5 October 1992.

The Commission therefore finds no appearance of any violation of

Article 8 (Art. 8) in this respect.

(b)   Insofar as Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention has also been

invoked in this context, the Commission recalls that the assessment of

treatment alleged to be contrary to that provision is relative and must

take account of all the circumstances of the case (e.g., Eur. Court

H.R., Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series

A no. 25, p. 65, para. 162). In the specific circumstances of this case

the Commission cannot find that the applicant's fitness classification

of 7 December 1992 and the alleged effects thereof attained the

threshold of "degrading" treatment within the meaning of Article 3

(Art. 3).

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3.    Article 5 paras. 1 and 2 (Art. 5-1, 5-2) of the Convention

      The applicant further complains that the deprivation of

his liberty from 18 June 1992, following his release from prison, until

the issuing of the arrest order on 19 June 1992 was in violation of

Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) of the Convention. Nor was he informed

either orally or in writing of the reasons for that deprivation of his

liberty, this being in violation of Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2).

      In so far as relevant, Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1) reads as

follows:

      "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person.

      No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the

      following cases and in accordance with a procedure

      prescribed by law:

      ...

      b.   the lawful arrest or detention of a person for

      non-compliance with the lawful order of a court or in order

      to secure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by

      law;

      c.   the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected

      for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal

      authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an

      offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to

      prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having

      done so; ..."

      Article 5 para. 2 (Art. 5-2) of the Convention reads, as far as

relevant, as follows:

      "Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, ...,

      of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against

      him."

      The Government submit that for the purpose of continuing his

military service the applicant was obliged to report at the Pori

Brigade as soon as he had been released from the County Prison on

18 June 1992. The commander of the conscripts' police had therefore

been instructed to place the applicant in handcuffs, should he persist

in his refusal to perform any military or substitute service once

released from prison on that day. The conscripts' police was not

entitled under domestic law to arrest him outside the County Prison but

could only offer him transportation to the Brigade. However, the

Government consider that he consented to being transported to the

military hospital. In any case, his purported arrest was very brief and

lenient in character.

      The Government concede that, although the applicant was informed

of his arrest, he could not be informed of any reasons therefor nor of

any charge against him, since he had not committed any crime before his

apprehension.

      The applicant contends that the sole reason for his

transportation to the military hospital was the authorities' wish to

circumvent the domestic legal provisions concerning his detention, both

as regards its length and the procedure to be followed. Therefore he

was formally asked only on 19 June 1992 whether he still refused to

perform any service.

      The Commission has carried out a preliminary examination of these

complaints and considers that they raise questions of fact and law of

such complex nature that their determination requires an examination

of the merits. These complaints cannot therefore be declared

inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27

para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other ground for declaring

them inadmissible has been established.

4.    Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4)

      Under this provision the applicant complains that he was

convicted repeatedly of the same offence.

      Article 4 para. 1 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4-1) reads, as far as

relevant, as follows:

      "No one shall be liable to be ... punished again in

      criminal proceedings under the jurisdiction of the same

      State for an offence for which he has already been finally

      ... convicted in accordance with the law and penal

      procedure of that State."

      The Government consider that this provision has not been

violated. They point out that the applicant voluntarily chose not to

opt for substitute civilian service, although such service was open to

him without any examination of his religious or ethical convictions.

Had he initially opted for civilian service, he could have later

refused to perform such service, and he would then have been treated

in the same manner as all others refusing to undergo civilian service

only after first having opted for such service. As a result of the

applicant's refusal to opt for an alternative which was more

advantageous to him, he formally remained a conscript, whose duty to

perform military service could not be abolished on account of the

various sentences imposed on him due to his refusals to fulfil that

duty. His various refusals were necessarily to be regarded as

independent offences for which separate sentences had to be imposed.

      The applicant refers to the findings of the Ombudsman and the

District Court of Kokemäki which in his view confirm that his treatment

and punishments have been unreasonable and out of proportion. He also

considers that by introducing the 1994 amendment to the 1950 Act

(Act no. 358/94) Parliament acknowledged that his repeated convictions

had been unreasonable, having regard both to domestic and international

legal principles.

      The Commission recalls that Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4)

prohibits, inter alia, repeated convictions based on the same conduct

of the accused (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Gradinger v. Austria judgment of

23 October 1995, Series A no. 328-C, para. 55). However, this provision

cannot be interpreted so as to exclude repeated convictions based on

conduct shown on a number of distinct occasions, although in essence

the conduct would be substantially similar to that previously shown.

      The Commission observes that under Finnish law conscripts have

the right to opt either for armed or unarmed military service or for

substitute civilian service. A refusal to opt for any of these

alternatives is placed on an equal footing with an offence committed

by a conscript already performing his service. It is undisputed that

the applicant has been convicted in accordance with Finnish law and

penal procedure. Given that the convictions have been based on his

repeated but nevertheless distinct refusals to perform any kind of

service, he cannot be considered to have been punished "again" for an

offence for which he had "already been ... finally convicted". The fact

that the various convictions indirectly stem from his constant

opposition to performing any kind of service cannot change this

conclusion (cf. No. 17889/91, Dec. 5.5.93, not published). Accordingly,

there is no appearance of any violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7

(P7-4).

      It follows that this complaint must be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

5.    Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention

      Under this provision the applicant complains that he has been

discriminated against in various ways for having consistently refused

to perform either military or substitute service.

      Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention reads as follows:

      "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

      Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any

      ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,

      political or other opinion, national or social origin,

      association with a national minority, property, birth or

      other status."

      (a)  The alleged discrimination in the light of the treatment of

           conscientious objectors voicing total objections at a later

           stage

      The applicant complains that he has been discriminated against,

if compared with conscientious objectors refusing to perform any kind

of service once they have already opted for substitute civilian

service. He invokes Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with

Article 9 of the Convention and Article 4 of Protocol No. 7

(Art. 14+9+P7-4).

      Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention reads as follows:

      "1.  Everyone has the right to freedom of thought,

      conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to

      change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or

      in community with others and in public or in private, to

      manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching,

      practice and observance.

      2.   Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be

      subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law

      and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests

      of public safety, for the protection of public order,

      health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and

      freedoms of others."

      The Government consider that Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention has not been violated. They recall that Article 9 (Art. 9)

does not guarantee any right to be exempted from substitute civilian

service in countries where conscientious objectors are recognised. With

reference to their above arguments in respect of the complaint under

Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4), they also consider that Article 14

of the Convention is not applicable in conjunction with that provision

(Art. 14+P7-4).

      In any case, the Government consider that the applicant was not

discriminated against. Objecting at the very outset to any military or

substitute service, he was not in a situation comparable with that of

conscientious objectors refusing to perform military or substitute

service only after having opted for substitute service. At any rate,

there existed an objective and reasonable justification for any

differential treatment of the applicant. The means employed to this end

were not disproportionate. The Government finally refer to the States'

wide margin of appreciation in the field of national security.

      The applicant submits that since his objection to performing any

military or substitute service was based on his political convictions,

he was unable to opt for substitute civilian service so as to receive

more favourable treatment. Due to his repeated convictions for having

refused to perform any military or substitute service he has had to

serve 18 days more in prison, if compared with those who objected to

substitute service only after first having opted for such service. Even

after the 1950 Act was amended on 1 June 1994 he has been arrested on

several occasions. He has twice had to appear before a court and he has

also been fined.

      The Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) complements the

other substantive provisions of the Convention and the Protocols. It

has no independent existence since it has effect solely in relation to

"the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms" safeguarded by those

provisions. Although the application of Article 14 (Art. 14) does not

presuppose a breach of those provisions - and to this extent it is

autonomous -, there can be no room for its application unless the facts

at issue fall within the ambit of one of more of the latter (e.g., Eur.

Court H.R., Karlheinz Schmidt v. Germany judgment of 18 July 1994,

Series A no. 291-B, p. 32, para. 22).

      For the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention a

difference of treatment of persons in "relevantly" similar situations

is discriminatory if it "has no objective and reasonable

justification", that is if it does not pursue a "legitimate aim" or if

there is no "reasonable relationship of proportionality between

the means employed and the aim sought to be realised". The Contracting

States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and

to what extent differences in otherwise similar situations justify a

different treatment (cf., ibid., pp. 32-33, para. 24; Eur. Court H.R.,

Fredin judgment, Series A no. 192, p. 19, para. 60).

      It is true that the right to conscientious objection to military

and substitute service is not as such guaranteed by the Convention or

any of its Protocols. The Commission nevertheless accepts that the

present complaint of discrimination falls within the ambit of Article

9 (Art. 9) of the Convention which protects the right to freedom of

thought, conscience and religion (cf., e.g., No. 17086/91, Dec.

6.12.91, D.R. 72 pp. 245-250, at p. 249, with further references).

      The Commission has just found no appearance of a violation of

Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 (P7-4) on account of the various

convictions of the applicant based on his distinct refusals to perform

military service. It would nevertheless accept that the present

complaint of discrimination also falls within the ambit of that

provision.

      The Commission must first examine whether the applicant was

placed in a situation similar to that experienced by those who have

objected to substitute service after first having opted for such

service. It has recently held that the situation facing a so-called

"total objector" refusing to perform both military and substitute

civilian service cannot, for the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14) of

the Convention, be regarded as comparable to that of conscientious

objectors who are prepared to fulfil their military obligations by

opting for substitute civilian service (No. 24630/94, Dec. 22.5.95, not

published).

      The Commission nevertheless considers that the present case

differs from Application No. 24630/94 in that the applicant seeks to

compare himself not with conscientious objectors who are willing to

perform substitute civilian service but with other "total objectors",

who refuse to perform any military or substitute service after first

having opted for substitute service. Once the last-mentioned group of

objectors have refused to perform any kind of service they can

reasonably be placed on an equal footing with total objectors objecting

to any kind of service already at the outset. The Commission therefore

considers that, for the purposes of Article 14 (Art. 14), the applicant

was in a situation comparable to that facing total objectors who,

contrary to himself, have expressed their objections at a later stage.

      The Commission observes that the applicant's aggregated prison

sentence, as already served by him, exceeds by 18 days the fixed one-

time sentence which could be imposed on the last-mentioned group of

conscientious objectors. Moreover, while the serving of the fixed

sentence exempts such objectors from performing any further military

or substitute service, the applicant in principle remained liable until

1 June 1994 to complete his military service, irrespective of the

prison sentences which he had already served. Accordingly, he has been

subjected to differential treatment.

      As to the possible justification of this treatment, the

Commission must first examine whether it had a "legitimate aim". It

notes that prior to the 1994 amendment to section 39 of the 1950 Act

the Finnish authorities found it difficult to create a distinction

between, on the one hand, a conscript's purely conscientious objection

to performing military service and, on the other hand, "classic"

military offences with the aim of evading service (see para. 4 of

"Relevant domestic law" above). On balance, the Commission can accept

that the need to avoid such a distinction constituted a sufficiently

legitimate aim.

      The question remains whether the differential treatment of the

applicant also fulfilled the requirement of proportionality, inherent

in Article 14. In this connection the Commission recalls that any

system of compulsory military service imposes a heavy burden on the

citizens. The burden may be regarded as acceptable only if it is shared

in an equitable manner and if exemptions from the duty are based on

solid grounds (cf. the above-mentioned No. 17086/90, p. 250). If some

citizens were to be exempted without convincing reasons, a question of

discrimination against the other citizens would arise (No. 10410/83,

Dec. 11.10.84, D.R. 40, p. 203).

      The Commission furthermore recalls that the Convention does not

prevent a Contracting State from taking measures to enforce performance

of substitute civilian service, or from imposing sanctions on those who

refuse to perform such service (No. 10600/83, Dec. 14.10.85, D.R. 44,

p. 155). It notes that the Finnish authorities considered it difficult

to create a system for punishing total objectors which would be fair,

if compared both with the system for punishing ordinary desertion and

with the system for convicting those who refuse to perform substitute

civilian service after having opted therefor (see para. 4 of "Relevant

domestic law" above).

      It is true that the applicant's total prison sentence exceeded

by 18 days that which was applicable to conscientious objectors voicing

their total objection to any kind of service only at a later stage. The

Commission considers, however, that the actual punishment served by him

is not of such a duration as to make it disproportional to the

legitimate aim sought to be realised by the State. It finally notes

that as a result of the 1994 amendment to section 39 of the 1950 Act

the applicant is no longer liable to perform military service and can

no longer be sentenced for refusing to perform any kind of service in

peacetime.

      In these specific circumstances and having particular regard to

the State's margin of appreciation, the Commission can accept that the

differential treatment of the applicant was objectively and reasonably

justified. Accordingly, it cannot find any appearance of a violation

of Article 14 of the Convention read in conjunction either with

Article 9 (Art. 14+9) of the Convention or with Article 4 of Protocol

No. 7 (Art. 14+P7-4).

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      (b)  The alleged discrimination on account of the fitness

           classification

      In his observations of 31 May 1995 the applicant further

complains that the infringement upon his privacy on account of the

fitness classification has also been discriminatory and contrary to

Articles 14 and 17 of the Convention read in conjunction with Article 8

(Art. 14+8, 17+8).

      With reference to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the

Commission recalls that, where the alleged violation consists of a

continuing situation, the six months' period within which an

application must be lodged only starts to run if and when that

situation comes to an end (cf., e.g., No. 11123/84, Dec. 9.12.87,

D.R. 54, pp. 52 et seq.). It observes that the classification of the

applicant as unfit for service on account of his "undefined

psychosocial problem" remained in force until 20 December 1994. The

complaint concerning discrimination in this respect has therefore been

lodged within the prescribed six months' time-limit. The Commission

nevertheless finds this complaint unsubstantiated. Accordingly, there

is no appearance of any violation of Articles 14 and 17 of the

Convention read in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 14+8, 17+8).

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      (c)  Further aspects raised in the applicant's observations

      Concerning the further aspects of the applicant's complaint under

Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention which were raised on

31 May 1995, the question arises whether he has thereby expanded his

application on points which cannot be considered as particular aspects

of any of his initial complaints (cf. No. 10857/84, Dec. 15.7.86, D.R.

48, pp. 106 et seq., at p. 152). If so, the six months' period under

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention would not have been respected,

the situation complained of having ended on 1 June 1994, when the

amendment to the 1950 Act entered into force and the applicant could

no longer be called up for military service.

      However, even assuming that these grievances can be considered

as particular aspects of the applicant's initial application, the

Commission nevertheless finds that they are inadmissible for the

following reasons.

      (ca) The alleged discrimination in the light of the treatment of

           Jehovah's Witnesses

      The applicant complains that he has also been discriminated

against, if compared with Jehovah's Witnesses of the male sex, who

under Finnish law are exempted from performing any military or

substitute service.

      The Commission has examined this aspect of the complaint under

Article 14 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 14+9).

It has previously noted that membership of Jehovah's Witnesses entails

adhering to a comprehensive set of rules of behaviour which cover many

aspects of everyday life and require, inter alia, the rejection of both

military and substitute service. There is a strict informal control

among Jehova's Witnesses that these rules are complied with. Membership

of such a religious sect is thus an objective fact which creates a high

degree of probability that exemption from military and substitute

service is not granted to persons simply wishing to escape service,

since it is unlikely that a person would join such a sect only for the

purpose of not having to perform any service of the above-mentioned

kind (the above-mentioned No. 10410/83, loc. cit.).

      In the light of these considerations the Commission finds that

the differential treatment of the applicant was objectively and

reasonably justified, even if his situation is compared with that of

male Jehovah's Witnesses with Finnish citizenship. Accordingly, there

is no appearance of any violation of Article 14 of the Convention read

in conjunction with Article 9 (Art. 14+9) on this point either.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must also be

rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      (cb) The alleged discrimination on account of the applicant's

           treatment in general

      The applicant complains that his treatment in general has also

been discriminatory and contrary to Articles 14 of the Convention read

in conjunction with Article 3 (Art. 14+3). He refers to his repeated

arrests and related de facto isolation, the significant number of

separate sets of criminal proceedings brought against him as well as

his treatment by the authorities in general.

      The Commission finds this complaint wholly unsubstantiated.

Accordingly, there is no appearance of any violation of Article 14 of

the Convention read in conjunction with Article 3 (Art. 14+3).

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must also be

rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission,

      by a majority and without prejudging the merits of the case,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the complaint relating to the applicant's

      handcuffing on 18 June 1992;

      unanimously,

      DECLARES ADMISSIBLE the complaints relating to the lawfulness of

      the applicant's arrest from 18 to 19 June 1992; and

      unanimously,

      DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Commission            President of the Commission

      (H.C. KRÜGER)                         (S. TRECHSEL)