AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 29192/95

                      by Mehmet ÇILIZ

                      against the Netherlands

     The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting

in private on 27 June 1996, the following members being present:

           Mr.   H. DANELIUS, President

           Mrs.  G.H. THUNE

           MM.   G. JÖRUNDSSON

                 J.-C. SOYER

                 F. MARTINEZ

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 J.-C. GEUS

                 M.A. NOWICKI

                 I. CABRAL BARRETO

                 J. MUCHA

                 D. SVÁBY

                 P. LORENZEN

                 E. BIELIUNAS

           Ms.   M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber

     Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

     Having regard to the application introduced on 6 November 1995

by Mehmet ÇILIZ against the Netherlands and registered on

9 November 1995 under file No. 29192/95;

     Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

     Having deliberated;

     Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

     The applicant is a Turkish citizen, born in 1965, and residing

in Meram Konya, Turkey. Before the Commission he is represented by Mrs.

G.E.M. Later, a lawyer practising in The Hague, the Netherlands.

A.   The particular circumstances of the case

     The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be

summarised as follows.

     The applicant came to the Netherlands on 31 March 1988. He

married a Turkish woman on 29 December 1988. Upon his request he was

granted a residence permit by the head of the Utrecht police on 14

February 1990 in order to live with his spouse and to work in the

Netherlands. This residence permit was valid for one year and, on 5

April 1990, the applicant was given a document showing that as a result

of his marriage he was allowed to reside in the Netherlands

indefinitely.

     On 27 August 1990, a son, Kürsad, was born to the applicant and

his wife.

     The applicant and his wife separated in November 1991 and divorce

proceedings were initiated. Consequently, the applicant lost the right

to reside in the Netherlands indefinitely since this had been dependent

on his marriage. On 24 January 1992, the applicant applied for and was

granted an independent residence permit in order to work in the

Netherlands. This permit was valid for one year.

     The applicant requested the Regional Court

(Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Utrecht to establish an arrangement

concerning parental access (omgangsregeling, hereinafter "access

arrangement"). The Regional Court requested the Child Care and

Protection Board (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming) to investigate the

feasibility of such an arrangement.

     In its report of 18 January 1993, the Child Care and Protection

Board stated that the mother had agreed for the applicant to meet his

son several times on a provisional basis at the maternal grandparents'

house. The applicant had failed to contact the Board. The Board

concluded that the applicant's situation had not become sufficiently

clear and for this reason the Board found that an access arrangement

would not be appropriate.

     The applicant requested a prolongation of his residence permit

in order to work in the Netherlands from the head of the Utrecht police

on 11 January 1993. At this time the applicant was in receipt of

unemployment benefits and for this reason his request was rejected on

3 February 1993. As regards Article 8 of the Convention, the head of

the Utrecht police considered, inter alia, that since it appeared that

the applicant had no regular contacts with his son there was no family

life between them within the meaning of this provision. In this respect

it was held that the applicant's claim that it was not his fault that

no regular contacts took place could not be taken into account, since

regard could only be had to the factual situation. Furthermore, even

assuming there was family life between the applicant and his son, an

interference with the right to respect for this life would, according

to the head of the Utrecht police, be justified under para. 2 of

Article 8.

     The applicant requested the State Secretary for Justice

(Staatssecretaris voor Justitie) on 22 April 1993 to review (herzien)

the decision of the head of the Utrecht police. He submitted that he

was in the process of obtaining a permanent employment contract. He

conceded that at present the contacts with his son had not yet been

regularised but that the Regional Court of Utrecht was expected to

examine and to grant a request for an arrangement concerning parental

access shortly.

     The applicant's marriage was officially dissolved on 17 March

1994.     On 15 July 1994, the applicant was heard by the Advisory

Commission for Aliens Affairs (Adviescommissie voor

Vreemdelingenzaken). The applicant stated that he visited his son

between one and three times a week.

     The Advisory Commission proposed to the State Secretary for

Justice that the applicant's request for revision be rejected. Even

though it considered that there was family life between the applicant

and his son and that the refusal to grant the applicant continued

residence in the Netherlands would constitute an interference with the

applicant's right to respect for his family life, the Commission held

that this interference was justified for the protection of the economic

well-being of the country. In this respect the Commission considered

that the applicant was in receipt of unemployment benefits. It might

be true that these benefits would be withdrawn in view of the

applicant's contract as a stand-by employee in the clothing industry,

but the Commission did not regard these activities as serving an

essential national interest since it had appeared that on the Dutch

labour market other people, having priority over the applicant, were

available for this kind of work.

     The Commission further took into account that the applicant had

only lived with his son for one and a half year, that he saw his son

irregularly and briefly, and that he contributed irregularly to the

costs of his son's upbringing and education.

     Having regard to the opinion of the Advisory Commission, the

State Secretary for Justice rejected the applicant's request for

revision on 6 October 1994. The applicant was informed at the same time

that an appeal (beroep) against this decision would not suspend his

expulsion.

     The applicant filed an appeal against the decision of 6 October

1994 with the Aliens' Chamber (Vreemdelingenkamer) of the Regional

Court of The Hague sitting at Amsterdam (nevenzittingsplaats Amsterdam)

on 31 October 1994. On the same date he also requested the Chairman of

the Aliens' Chamber to grant an interim measure (voorlopige

voorziening) allowing him to await the outcome of the appeal

proceedings in the Netherlands.

     Meanwhile, following a hearing on 25 November 1994, the Utrecht

Regional Court on 24 January 1995 appointed the applicant's former wife

as guardian and the applicant as auxiliary guardian of their son. It

further ordered that as a contribution to the costs of the upbringing

and education of his son, the applicant should pay to the mother any

child benefits he might receive under the statutory regulations. The

Regional Court decided, however, not to establish an access arrangement

and rejected the applicant's request for such an arrangement.

     The applicant filed an appeal with the Court of Appeal

(Gerechtshof) of Amsterdam against the decision of the Utrecht Regional

Court not to establish an access arrangement. A hearing took place on

19 April 1995, during which the applicant's former wife stated that she

was not willing to co-operate in an access arrangement, since she felt

that the applicant only wished to have such an arrangement established

in order to obtain a right to reside in the Netherlands. Furthermore,

she did not believe that the applicant was capable of maintaining

regular contacts with his son and submitted that irregular contacts

would not be conducive to the boy's well-being.

     On 10 May 1995, a hearing took place before the Regional Court

of The Hague sitting at Amsterdam on the appeal filed by the applicant

against the rejection of his request for revision of the decision not

to prolong his residence permit. The Regional Court rejected the appeal

by decision of 24 May 1995. It held that the refusal to grant the

applicant continued residence in the Netherlands constituted a

justified interference with his family life. The Regional Court

considered in this respect, inter alia, that the Utrecht Regional Court

had rejected the applicant's request to establish an access

arrangement. It found, furthermore, that the contacts between the

applicant and his son were irregular and short and that the applicant

did not contribute regularly to the costs of his son's upbringing and

education. The Regional Court further held that the economic well-being

of the country should be taken into account as well. It noted that the

applicant had submitted an employment contract from which it appeared

that his probationary period had not yet been concluded and that, in

any event, there was a sufficient amount of work force with priority

over the applicant available on the Dutch labour market for the kind

of work the applicant was employed to do.

     When this decision was sent to the applicant, i.e. on 26 June

1995, the applicant's probationary period had come to an end and he was

in the possession of a contract of employment for an indefinite period.

     By separate decision of 24 May 1995, the President of the

Regional Court rejected the request for an interim measure in view of

the fact that the appeal proceedings had been concluded.

     As regards the applicant's request for the establishment of an

access arrangement, the Court of Appeal decided on 1 June 1995 to

adjourn these proceedings and to request the Child Care and Protection

Board to organise a number of experimental contacts between the

applicant and his son and to report on these contacts.

     On 19 September 1995, the applicant was informed that the Court

of Appeal had further adjourned the proceedings until 3 December 1995

in view of the heavy workload of the Child Care and Protection Board.

By letter of 16 October 1995, the applicant asked the Court of Appeal

whether there was no other organisation capable of organising the

experimental contacts as he wished to see his son and a further delay

would have negative effects on both the applicant and the child.

     On 31 October 1995, the applicant was placed in detention with

a view to his expulsion (vreemdelingenbewaring).

     On 2 November 1995, the applicant again requested a residence

permit in order to work in the Netherlands, to be able to be with his

child and on compelling humanitarian grounds. At the same date, the

applicant filed a request with the Haarlem Regional Court in order to

obtain his release.

     The first experimental contact between the applicant and his son,

organised by the Child Care and Protection Board, took place on 3

November 1995 at the offices of this organisation. Since the applicant

was still in detention, he was accompanied by two police officers who

observed the meeting between the applicant and his son from a different

room.

     On 7 November 1995, the applicant's representative contacted the

officer of the Child Care and Protection Board who had also been

present at the meeting between the applicant and his son. In the

opinion of this officer, another experimental contact should be

organised by the Board, perhaps in the presence of a psychologist,

following which the question of the possibility of a supervised access

arrangement should be considered.

     The applicant's request for a residence permit of 2 November 1995

was rejected by the State Secretary for Justice on 6 November 1995. The

State Secretary held that no relevant new facts had been adduced by the

applicant. Based on the information submitted by the police officers

who had observed the meeting between the applicant and his son on 3

November 1995, the State Secretary considered furthermore that it had

not appeared that the relationship between the applicant and his son

at the present time was meaningful, mutual or anything more than

shallow and neither was it realistically foreseeable that a closer

relationship would develop.

     The applicant filed an objection (bezwaar) against the refusal

of a residence permit with the State Secretary for Justice on

6 November 1995. He submitted, inter alia, that proceedings concerning

access to his son were still pending before the Amsterdam Court of

Appeal and that the first experimental contact which had been ordered

by the Court of Appeal on 1 June 1995 had only taken place as late as

3 November 1995. Given the fact that at that time the applicant had

been in detention, it was unreasonable to expect that this meeting

between the applicant and his son would give a true impression of the

nature of the relationship between them.

     On 8 November 1995, the applicant was expelled to Turkey.

B.   Relevant domestic law and practice

     In general, an application for a residence permit in the

Netherlands is granted only if the individual's presence serves an

essential national interest or if there are compelling humanitarian

grounds (klemmende redenen van humanitaire aard). At the relevant time,

foreigners married to either a Dutch national, a recognised refugee or

a holder of a permanent residence permit fell into the latter category.

After one year of legal residence in the Netherlands they acquired ex

jure an indefinite right to remain pursuant to Section 10 para. 2 of

the Aliens Act (Vreemdelingenwet).

     This right expired ex jure when the spouses no longer co-habited

(Section 47 para. 1 sub (a) of the Order on Aliens

[Vreemdelingenbesluit]). If, at that time, the foreigner had been

married for more than three years and had legally resided with his

spouse in the Netherlands for at least one year during the time

directly preceding the dissolution or breakdown of the marriage, he

would be eligible for an independent residence permit.

     An independent residence permit in order to work in the

Netherlands, which had been granted following the dissolution or

breakdown of a marriage, could be prolonged if at the time of the

request for such a permit the foreigner was certain of employment for

at least another year. However, prolongation was not refused if, inter

alia, there were compelling humanitarian grounds (klemmende redenen van

humanitaire aard) for accepting the individual's presence in the

Netherlands.

     An "essential national interest" as mentioned above is considered

to exist where a foreigner is employed in a sector where there is not

a sufficient number of capable people available on the labour market

to fill all vacancies. To establish whether this is the case, regard

is only had to the number of registered unemployed people enjoying

priority (prioriteit genietend aanbod). For example, on the Dutch

labour market E.U. citizens have priority over most other foreigners.

COMPLAINTS

     The applicant complains in the first place that his expulsion

constituted a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In this respect

he submits that a meeting between himself and his son was suddenly

organised on 3 November 1995, raising expectations on the side of his

son of more frequent contacts with his father but was followed five

days later by his father's expulsion.

     The applicant further complains of a violation of Article 8 of

the Convention, arguing that the interference with his right to respect

for his private and his family life cannot be justified under para. 2

of this provision.

     The applicant finally complains that the decision of The Hague

Regional Court sitting at Amsterdam of 24 May 1995 amounts to

unjustified discrimination, in that a distinction is made between

persons who are and those who are not employed in a sector where there

is a sufficient number of unemployed people enjoying priority available

on the Dutch labour market. The applicant submits that employees in a

sector with an insufficient number of such unemployed people are able

to enjoy their rights under Article 8 of the Convention, whereas the

applicant is not. He invokes Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8

of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.   The applicant complains that the refusal to grant him continued

residence in the Netherlands and his resulting expulsion infringed

Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention, which provides as follows:

     "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading

     treatment or punishment."

     Insofar as the applicant has alleged that his expulsion amounted

to a violation of this provision in respect of his son, the Commission

notes that the application has not been introduced on behalf of the

applicant's son. Therefore, the Commission is not competent to examine

this part of the complaint.

     As regards the alleged violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention in respect of the applicant, the Commission recalls that a

treatment has to reach a certain level of severity before it can be

considered to be contrary to Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention. The

assessment of this level depends on all circumstances of the case, such

as the nature and context of the treatment, the manner and method of

its execution, its duration, its physical or mental effects and, in

some instances, the age of the victim (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Cruz Varas

and Others judgment of 20 March 1991, Series A no. 201, p. 31, para.

83).

     The Commission finds that the facts of the present case do not

demonstrate that the applicant underwent suffering of the level

inherent in the notions of "inhuman" or "degrading" treatment (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., Tyrer judgment of 25 April 1978, Series A no. 26).

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2.   The applicant further claims that his expulsion constituted a

breach of his right to respect for his private and family life under

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This provision, insofar as

relevant, reads as follows:

     "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

     family life ...

     2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with

     the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

     the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

     of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

     of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

     protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

     rights and freedoms of others."

     The Commission finds that it cannot, on the basis of the file,

determine the admissibility of this complaint at this stage and

considers that it is therefore necessary, in accordance with Rule 48

para. 2 (b) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, to give notice of

this complaint to the respondent Government.

3.   The applicant finally complains under Article 14 in conjunction

with Article 8 (Art. 14+8) of the Convention of an unjustified

difference in treatment. He submits that he would have been granted

continued residence in the Netherlands if he had been working in a

sector where there were insufficient unemployed people enjoying

priority available on the Dutch labour market.

     Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as follows:

     "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this

     Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground

     such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other

     opinion, national or social origin, association with a national

     minority, property, birth or other status."

     The Commission recalls in the first place that Article 14

(Art. 14) of the Convention has no independent existence since it has

effect solely in relation to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms

guaranteed by the other substantive provisions of the Convention and

its Protocols. Furthermore, it safeguards individuals against

discriminatory offences only if they are placed in analogous situations

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., Rasmussen judgment of 28 November 1984, Series

A no. 87, pp. 12 and 13, paras. 29 and 35).

     The Commission further recalls that for an interference with the

right guaranteed in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) to be justified under

para. 2 of this provision, it must, inter alia, pursue one of the

legitimate aims listed in para. 2. The "economic well-being of the

country" being one such legitimate aim, the Commission considers that

in order to assess the effects of the granting of residence to a

foreigner on the economic well-being of the country, it may well be

relevant for the national authorities to take the situation on the

labour market into account.

     In this respect the Commission finds that the applicant is not

in an analogous situation to a person who is employed in a sector where

there is not a sufficient number of unemployed people enjoying priority

readily available. Accordingly, there has been no discriminatory

treatment within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.

     It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

     For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

     DECIDES TO ADJOURN the examination of the applicant's complaint

     of an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his

     private and family life;

     DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.

Secretary to the Second Chamber  President of the Second Chamber

      (M.-T. SCHOEPFER)                       (H. DANELIUS)