AQUILINA v. MALTA
Doc ref: 25642/94 • ECHR ID: 001-3438
Document date: January 17, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 25642/94
by Joseph AQUILINA
against Malta
The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting
in private on 17 January 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. J. LIDDY, President
MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ
E. BUSUTTIL
A. WEITZEL
L. LOUCAIDES
B. MARXER
B. CONFORTI
N. BRATZA
I. BÉKÉS
G. RESS
A. PERENIC
C. BÎRSAN
K. HERNDL
M. VILA AMIGÓ
Mrs. M. HION
Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 7 July 1994 by
Joseph AQUILINA against Malta and registered on 14 November 1994 under
file No. 25642/94;
Having regard to:
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
6 February 1996 and the observations in reply submitted by the
applicant on 11 March 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Maltese citizen, born in 1974 and resident in
Qormi, Malta. He is represented before the Commission by
Mr. Joseph Brincat, an advocate practising in Marsa, Malta.
The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as
follows.
a. Particular circumstances of the case
The applicant was arrested by the police on 20 July 1992 and
detained for interrogation for two days.
On 22 July 1992 the applicant was brought before the Magistrates
Court. The charge was read out by the police inspector and alleged that
the applicant had defiled his girlfriend in a public place (an offence
involving sexual acts) and threatened her family. The applicant pleaded
not guilty.
The applicant's counsel lodged an application for bail. Since the
applicant was facing charges attracting a maximum sentence of three or
more years, the application had to be served on the Attorney General.
The Acting Registrar however did not serve the application on the day
it was submitted but the next day, i.e. on 23 July 1992. The Attorney
General was granted two days by the court to reply.
On 23 July 1992 the applicant made a constitutional application
to the First Hall of the Civil Court arguing that there had been a
violation of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention in that the magistrate
before whom he had appeared the day before did not have the power to
order his release at that stage; since he was facing charges attracting
a maximum sentence of three or more years, the application for bail had
to be first communicated to the Attorney General. It was decided that
the applicant's constitutional appeal would be heard on 30 July 1992.
On 24 July 1992 the Attorney General opposed the applicant's
application for bail and the Magistrates Court decided to adjourn its
examination.
On 30 July 1992 the First Hall, having noted that the applicant
had not been notified of the hearing, decided to adjourn the
examination of his constitutional application until 6 August 1992.
On 31 July 1992 a different magistrate, acting as a Court of
Inquiry, after hearing evidence from the alleged victim, ordered the
applicant's release.
On 1 March 1993 the applicant was found guilty of the charge of
defilement in a public place but having regard to the absence of
violence, his young age (18), his previous good conduct, the fact that
he was engaged to the girl, and that most of the sexual acts took place
while he was under eighteen, he was discharged on probation.
On 25 November 1993 the First Hall held that the provisions of
Article 575 of the Criminal Code which require written notification of
the Attorney General were inconsistent with the provisions of Article 5
para. 3 of the Convention in failing to provide for the prompt
consideration of the application for bail. It also found a breach of
Article 5 para 3 in the delay taken by the Acting Registrar to notify
the Attorney General. The Court awarded LM 100 by way of compensation.
The respondents (Commissioner of Police, the Acting Registrar,
the Attorney General and Prime Minister) in the action appealed to the
Constitutional Court.
On 13 June 1994 the Constitutional Court reversed the decision
of the First Hall. It found that the applicant had been brought before
a magistrate within a short period and that Article 5 para. 3 did not
require the magistrate to have the power to order release at that
moment.
b. Relevant domestic law
Section 137 of the Maltese Criminal Code provides:
"Any Magistrate who, in a matter within his powers, fails or
refuses to attend to a lawful complaint touching an unlawful
detention, and any officer of the Executive Police, who on a
similar complaint made to him, fails to prove that he reported
the same to his superior authorities within twenty-four hours
shall on conviction, be liable to imprisonment for a term from
one to six months."
Section 575 provides as relevant:
"2. The demand for bail shall be made by an application, a copy
whereof shall be communicated to the Attorney General on the same
day, whenever it is made by -
...
(c) persons accused of any crime punishable with more that
three years imprisonment...
3. The Attorney General may, within the next working day, by
a note, oppose the application, stating the reasons for his
opposition."
Section 582 para. 1 provides:
"The Court may not ex officio grant bail, unless it is applied
for by the person charged or accused."
COMPLAINTS
The applicant complains under Article 5 para. 3 that:
1. the magistrate had no power on the applicant's appearance in
court to order his release;
2. the magistrate made no enquiry as to the reasonableness of the
arrest, the grounds for the charge or of the social threat posed by the
alleged offence - in particular since the element of violence would
have been relevant to the magistrate's power to order release
(a maximum of two years would be imposable where no element of violence
was present);
3. he was only released twelve days after his arrest, ten days after
his first appearance before the magistrate.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 7 July 1994 and registered on
14 November 1994.
On 29 November 1995 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
6 February 1996. The applicant replied on 11 March 1996.
THE LAW
The applicant complains of a violation of Article 5 para. 3
(Art. 5-3) of the Convention in that he was not brought promptly before
a judge who could examine the reasonableness of his arrest and order
his release.
Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, insofar as
relevant, provides as follows:
"Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions
of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly
before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise
judicial power ..."
The respondent Government argue that the magistrate before whom
the applicant appeared on 22 July 1992 was vested with the power to
order his release. However, the Attorney General who was responsible
for the prosecution of serious cases had to be consulted first. If the
applicant had considered that the Registrar of the Magistrates Court
had illegally prolonged his detention by failing to communicate to the
Attorney General his bail application on the day when it had been
lodged, he should have made use of Article 137 of the Criminal Code.
In any event, the Attorney General replied two days after the applicant
had been arraigned in court and this was fully compatible with
Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.
The applicant submits that, when an arrested person is brought
before the magistrate, the prosecution is represented by the Officer
of the Executive police and not the Attorney General. Article 137 of
the Criminal Code is not an effective remedy, since it does not
envisage the release of the detainee. Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of
the Convention was violated because the appearance of the applicant
before the first magistrate forty eight hours after his arrest was a
mere formality, as the magistrate had no power to order his release.
Insofar as the Government appear to be arguing that the applicant
has not exhausted all domestic remedies, because he did not make use
of Article 137 of the Criminal Code, the Commission recalls that, in
accordance with its case-law, the obligation to exhaust domestic
remedies contained in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention is limited
to making "normal use" of remedies likely to be effective and adequate
to remedy the matters of which the applicant complains (No. 11208/84,
Dec. 4.3.86, D.R. 46 p. 182). The Commission further considers that,
in the circumstances of the case, making use of Article 137 of the
Criminal Code might have led to the punishment of the public officials
involved but would not have secured respect for the rights of the
applicant under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention. It
follows that this is not an effective remedy within the meaning of
Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, No.
12747/87, Dec. 12.12.89, D.R. 64 p. 97).
Moreover, the Commission, having taken note of the parties' other
observations, considers that the application serious questions of fact
and law which are of such complexity that their determination should
depend on an examination of the merits. The application cannot,
therefore, be regarded as being manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and no
other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE,
without prejudging the merits of the case.
M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY
Secretary President
to the First Chamber of the First Chamber
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