VERVERGAERT v. THE NETHERLANDS
Doc ref: 26788/95 • ECHR ID: 001-3846
Document date: September 10, 1997
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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
Application No. 26788/95
by Peter R.H.H.B.G. VERVERGAERT
against the Netherlands
The European Commission of Human Rights (Second Chamber) sitting
in private on 10 September 1997, the following members being present:
Mrs. G.H. THUNE, President
MM. J.-C. GEUS
A. GÖZÜBÜYÜK
J.-C. SOYER
H. DANELIUS
F. MARTINEZ
M.A. NOWICKI
I. CABRAL BARRETO
J. MUCHA
D. SVÁBY
P. LORENZEN
E. BIELIUNAS
E.A. ALKEMA
A. ARABADJIEV
Ms. M.-T. SCHOEPFER, Secretary to the Chamber
Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
Having regard to the application introduced on 10 November 1994
by Peter R.H.H.B.G. VERVERGAERT against the Netherlands and registered
on 21 March 1995 under file No. 26788/95;
Having regard to :
- the reports provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of
the Commission;
- the observations submitted by the respondent Government on
19 December 1996;
Having deliberated;
Decides as follows:
THE FACTS
The applicant is a Dutch citizen, born in 1965, and residing in
Spijkenisse, the Netherlands. Before the Commission he is represented
by Mr. R.J. Baumgardt, a lawyer practising in Spijkenisse.
The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be
summarised as follows.
A. The particular circumstances of the case
On 3 February 1990 the applicant was arrested and taken into
police custody on suspicion of having committed a number of burglaries.
He was released on 5 February 1990.
On 13 March 1991 the applicant was summoned to appear before the
Regional Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank) of Rotterdam on several
charges of burglary. The Regional Court heard the case on 24 May 1991.
The applicant did not appear. His lawyer, however, was present. The
applicant had been summoned at the address where he was officially
registered, but since he had recently left this house he had not
received the summons in time.
On 7 June 1991 the Regional Court convicted the applicant, in
absentia, as charged and sentenced him to a partially suspended term
of fifteen months' imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial
detention.
The applicant filed an appeal against this judgment with the
Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) of The Hague.
The Court of Appeal had planned a hearing on 29 July 1992 but as
the applicant was unable to attend due to illness, it was adjourned.
On 21 December 1992 the Court of Appeal examined the case.
According to the procès-verbal of this hearing, the applicant's lawyer
explained to the Court that his client was unable to attend the hearing
since he was on holiday to celebrate his engagement. The lawyer,
however, requested the Court to provide him with the opportunity to
conduct the defence. The Court of Appeal rejected this request, since
it considered there were no compelling reasons (klemmende redenen) for
the applicant's absence. The Court of Appeal subsequently declared the
applicant in default of appearance and started its examination.
On 4 January 1993 the Court of Appeal quashed the Regional
Court's judgment, convicted the applicant as charged and sentenced him
to twelve months' imprisonment less the time spent in pre-trial
detention.
The applicant filed an appeal in cassation with the Supreme Court
(Hoge Raad). He complained, inter alia, that the Court of Appeal had
not allowed his lawyer to conduct his defence in his absence. He
invoked Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the Convention and referred to the
Poitrimol v. France judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of
23 November 1993 (Series A no. 277-A) and to the Commission's Reports
concerning the cases of Lala and Pelladoah (Comm. Reports 4.5.93,
para. 52 and para. 60 respectively, Eur. Court HR, Series A no. 297-A
and B, p. 18 and 39 respectively).
The Advocate General (Advocaat-Generaal) advised the Supreme
Court to reject the applicant's appeal in cassation because there had
been no compelling reasons for the applicant's absence.
In its judgment of 17 May 1994 the Supreme Court rejected the
applicant's appeal in cassation.
B. Relevant domestic law and practice
The Netherlands Code of Criminal Procedure (Wetboek van
Strafvordering) does not ensure the rights of a lawyer to conduct the
defence of an accused before a court, where the latter has been
declared in default of appearance.
There are, however, according to the Netherlands Supreme Court's
case-law, two situations in which a court must allow a lawyer to
conduct the defence in the absence of the accused:
- in cases concerning nationals of EU member states in which civil
liability issues arise (Hoge Raad, judgment of 17 November 1981, N.J.
1982 nr. 269), and
- in cases where there are compelling reasons (klemmende redenen)
preventing the appearance of an accused at the hearing of his case
(Hoge Raad, judgment of 26 February 1988, N.J. 1988 nr. 794) and where
a lawyer has made an explicit request to that effect to the court (Hoge
Raad, judgment of 14 November 1986, N.J. 1987 nr. 862 and judgment of
18 September 1989, N.J. 1990 nr. 145).
COMPLAINT
The applicant complains under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the
Convention that at the hearing of 21 December 1992 before the Court of
Appeal of The Hague, his lawyer was not allowed to conduct his defence
in his absence and that he was therefore deprived of a fair trial in
the determination of the criminal charges against him.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
The application was introduced on 10 November 1994 and registered
on 21 March 1995.
On 16 October 1996 the Commission decided to communicate the
application to the respondent Government.
The Government's written observations were submitted on
19 December 1996. The applicant has not availed himself of the
opportunity to submit observations in reply.
THE LAW
The applicant complains that in the determination of the criminal
charges against him he did not receive a fair trial as the Court of
Appeal did not allow his lawyer to conduct the defence in his
absence. The applicant invokes Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c)
(Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention, which, insofar as relevant,
provide:
"1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge against
him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by a ...
tribunal ...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following
minimum rights:
...
c. to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of
his own choosing ..."
The Government submit that the issues raised in the present case
are similar to those in the cases of Lala and Pelladoah in which the
Court found a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c)
(Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) of the Convention (judgments of 22 September 1994,
loc. cit.). However, they point out that the Court's judgments had not
yet been delivered at the time when the Supreme Court examined the
present case. Following the Court's judgments, counsel for an accused
who has not appeared in court is now always given the opportunity to
speak in his client's defence. Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
adapted its case-law accordingly.
In view of the above, the Government defer to the opinion of the
Commission.
The Commission agrees with the Government that this application
raises the same issues as the cases of Lala and Pelladoah.
Having regard to the parties' submissions and the case-law of the
Convention organs, the Commission considers that the present
application raises questions of fact and law which require an
examination of the merits. This complaint cannot, therefore, be
declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention. No other
grounds for inadmissibility have been established.
For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,
DECLARES THE APPLICATION ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the
merits of the case.
M.-T. SCHOEPFER G.H. THUNE
Secretary President
to the Second Chamber of the Second Chamber
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