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AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

Application No. 32783/96

by Peter CHESTER

against the United Kingdom

The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 11 September 1997, the following members being present:

Mrs. J. LIDDY, President

MM. M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

E. BUSUTTIL

A. WEITZEL

C.L. ROZAKIS

L. LOUCAIDES

N. BRATZA

I. BÉKÉS

G. RESS

A. PERENIC

C. BÎRSAN

K. HERNDL

Mrs. M. HION

Mr. R. NICOLINI

Mrs. M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

Having regard to the application introduced on 2 January 1996 by

Peter CHESTER against the United Kingdom and registered on

27 August 1996 under file No. 32783/96;

Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

Having deliberated;

Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

The applicant is a British citizen born in 1954 and currently

serving a sentence of life imprisonment in HM Prison Full Sutton, York.

The facts, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as

follows:

The applicant has maintained regular contact with relatives and

friends via correspondence and, over the last 3 to 4 years by

telephone. Previously the use of telephones required the purchase of

"telephone cards". A new system was introduced in October 1995 in the

applicant's prison. This system required the use of a Personal

Identification Number ("PIN") for prisoners requesting access to

telephone facilities and the prior nomination of a limited number of

(up to twenty) telephone numbers that could be called by the

individual. The PIN arrangement has lead to occasions when, by the

refusal to accept a nominated number, requests to contact people or

organisations have been denied by the prison authorities; for example,

the applicant was unable to contact a Building Society, and the local

County Court, the latter in relation to a civil case he was bringing

concerning the telephone arrangements.

The applicant made complaints about these matters to the prison

authorities on 26 October 1995. The reply from the Governor of

26 October 1995 referred to the policy of improving prison security and

stated that information contained on the system was secure. The

applicant appealed to the Area Manager who, by reply of

9 February 1996, stated that the PIN system was introduced in the face

of abuse by prisoners of the previous system and that ex-directory

numbers would not be accessible to any outside source.

The applicant issued proceedings against British Telecom for its

installation of the system in the prison. His case was dismissed by the

County Court on 3 April 1996, and his appeal dismissed on 1 May 1996.

COMPLAINTS

1. The applicant complains that his right to respect for private

life under Article 8 has been violated because he is restricted as to

who he can call; the PIN system requires him to give prior notification

to the prison authorities of the telephone numbers he intends to use

and on past occasions certain legitimate numbers have been refused or

delayed. Further, he is forced to reveal the telephone numbers (some

of which are confidential) he intends to call both to the authorities

and, by virtue of the fact that the numbers are displayed on a visual

display screen on the telephone, visible to others in the vicinity of

the telephones at the time. For example, the applicant wishes to call

his brother who, for security reasons related to his work, wishes his

number to remain strictly confidential. The applicant, in the

circumstances outlined above, will not telephone his brother, a soldier

in Northern Ireland, for security reasons and so is prevented from

regular telephone contact in this way.

2. The applicant likewise complains that the same facts constitute

a breach of Article 10 of the Convention, in so far as this relates to

his right to receive and impart information from family, friends and

institutions.3. The applicant further complains that he has been

subjected to discriminatory treatment under Article 14, in that he is

restricted to twenty telephone numbers whereas members of the public

and prisoners serving in other prisons (where the telephone card

arrangements continue) are not so restricted.

4. The applicant also claims a breach of Article 13 in so far as his

civil action to remedy the complaint was ineffective.

THE LAW

1. The applicant complains about restrictions on telephone calls and

the conditions under which telephone calls are made. He invokes

Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as relevant:

"1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and

family life, ... and his correspondence.

2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with

the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with

the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests

of national security, public safety or the economic well-being

of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the

protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the

rights and freedoms of others."

The applicant submits that the limitation on the number of

persons whom he may call, the refusal of the authorities to allow calls

to certain persons or institutions, and the requirement to inform the

authorities of the numbers interferes with his rights under Article 8

(Art. 8). He also submits that the use of a visual display screen on

the telephone which shows the number being called is an intrusion of

privacy and prevents him calling his brother, who by his work must take

security precautions.

The Commission notes the importance that prisoners maintain

contacts with family and friends outside prison. It recalls however

that Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention does not guarantee prisoners

the right to make telephone calls, in particular where the facilities

for contact by way of correspondence are fully available and adequate

(see eg. Boyle v. the United Kingdom, No. 9659/82, Dec. 5.5.83). Where

telephone facilities are provided by the prison authorities, having

regard to the ordinary and reasonable conditions of prison life, these

may be subjected to legitimate restrictions, for example, in light of

the shared nature of the facilities with other prisoners and the

requirements of the prevention of crime or disorder. In this context

and to the extent that such conditions may be regarded as an

interference with private life or correspondence, the Commission finds

that they may be considered justified in terms of the second paragraph

of Article 8 (Art. 8).

Further, the Commission does not find it substantiated that the

visual display screen on the telephone is of such a size or positioned

in such a way as to place the applicant at a serious risk that the

numbers may be noted or used by other prisoners or prison officers in

such a way as to interfere with the applicant's private life. Nor does

the Commission find it substantiated that the refusal of the prison

authorities to allow calls to certain persons or institutions has

interfered with his private life or his ability to manage his affairs,

the possibility of correspondence remaining unrestricted. Insofar as

the applicant does not wish to disclose to others ex-directory numbers,

the Commission does not find that the prison authorities can be

required to waive security precautions to enable him to use his

telephone privileges in respect of such numbers.

Consequently, the Commission finds that the restrictions and

conditions complained of fail to disclose any appearance of a violation

of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention. This part of the application

must therefore be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning

of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant has also invoked Article 10 (Art. 10) of the

Convention, which guarantees freedom of expression, in respect of the

restrictions on his telephone calls. The Commission finds that these

complaints disclose no appearance of a violation of Article 10

(Art. 10) of the Convention for the same reasons as above and that

these complaints are also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

3. The applicant complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention, which prohibits discrimination in the enjoyment of the

rights guaranteed under the Convention, that he is subject to

restrictions which are not applied to prisoners in other prisons or to

persons at liberty.

The case-law of the Convention organs establishes however that

it is not every difference in treatment which constitutes

discrimination within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the

Convention. It must be established that other persons in an analogous

or relevantly similar situation enjoy preferential treatment and that

there is no reasonable or objective justification for this distinction

(see eg. Eur. Court HR, Van der Mussele v. Belgium judgment of 21

November 1982, Series A no. 70; Fredin v. Sweden (No. 1) judgment of

18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p. 19, para. 60).

In the present case, the Commission is not satisfied that the

applicant may claim to be in a comparable position to persons at

liberty or to prisoners in other establishments where different regimes

or security considerations may apply. It accordingly rejects this part

of the application as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

4. The applicant also invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the

Convention, which provides that :

"Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this

Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a

national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been

committed by persons acting in an official capacity."

The Commission recalls however that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not

require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation

of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to

have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur. Court

HR, Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom judgment of 27 April 1988,

Series A no. 131, p. 23, para. 52).

The Commission finds that the applicant cannot be said, in light

of its findings above to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of his

Convention rights.

It follows that this complaint must be dismissed as manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission unanimously,

DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

M.F. BUQUICCHIO J. LIDDY

Secretary President

to the First Chamber of the First Chamber

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CHESTER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

CHESTER v. THE UNITED KINGDOM

LEXI