AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF

                      Application No. 27894/95

                      by Helena BÄCKSTRÖM

                      against Finland

      The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting

in private on 11 September 1997, the following members being present:

           Mrs.  J. LIDDY, President

           MM.   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ

                 E. BUSUTTIL

                 A. WEITZEL

                 C.L. ROZAKIS

                 L. LOUCAIDES

                 B. MARXER

                 N. BRATZA

                 I. BÉKÉS

                 G. RESS

                 A. PERENIC

                 C. BÎRSAN

                 K. HERNDL

           Mrs.  M. HION

           Mr.   R. NICOLINI

           Mrs.  M.F. BUQUICCHIO, Secretary to the Chamber

      Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection

of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;

      Having regard to the application introduced on 20 February 1995

by Helena BÄCKSTRÖM against Finland and registered on 19 July 1995

under file No. 27894/95;

      Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules

of Procedure of the Commission;

      Having deliberated;

      Decides as follows:

THE FACTS

      The applicant is a citizen of the United States of America, born

in 1941 and resident in Närpes, Finland. She is a photographer by

profession. Before the Commission she is represented by Mr. Jan Hanses,

a lawyer in Mariehamn, the Ã…land Islands, Finland.

      The facts of the case, as they have been submitted by the

applicant, may be summarised as follows.

      The applicant and her two cousins are joint owners of a coastline

property (Kalhamn 6:42) in Tjärlax in the city of Närpes (formerly a

municipality). In 1989 the Planning Engineer of the then municipality

apparently informed the applicant that a shore plan covering her

property had to be adopted for any construction thereon exceeding one

house with a private shore, alternatively two houses with access to a

shared shore. Subject to the adoption and confirmation of a shore plan,

the construction of two houses with private shores, alternatively four

houses with a shared shore could be permitted.

      The applicant requested that a surveyor be appointed to draw up

a shore plan for an area of some 12 hectares, the length of the

shoreline amounting to some 500 metres. The request was refused by the

County Administrative Board (lääninhallitus, länsstyrelsen) of Vaasa

on 27 November 1989, as the area was not considered sufficiently large

for appropriate planning. The Board noted that the shoreline was about

470 metres long.

      The applicant appealed to the Ministry for the Environment

(ympäristöministeriö, miljöministeriet), referring to areas of a

similar character and size for which shore plans had been adopted and

confirmed. The appeal was refused on 22 March 1991. The Ministry noted,

among other things, that the shoreline to be covered by the plan

foreseen by the applicant was some 500 metres long and that a shore

plan had also been requested for another area in the vicinity. The area

which the applicant had proposed for shore planning did not therefore

in itself constitute an appropriate entity for such purposes.

      The applicant and others then requested that a surveyor be

appointed to draw up a shore plan for an area covering some

190 hectares, the length of the shoreline amounting to some

3,5 kilometres. Previously some 20 leisure houses had been erected

within the area. The request was granted by the County Administrative

Board on 20 March 1992.

      A nature inventory of the area supported the intended plan. On

the basis of the inventory it was also found that the area was of no

particular value for nature conservation or public recreation purposes.

The plan was adopted by the City Assembly (kaupunginvaltuusto, stads-

fullmäktige) of Närpes on 12 March 1993. On average, the plan permitted

the construction of eight leisure houses per kilometre of shoreline.

Alternatively, this number could be doubled if the houses were to be

situated farther away from the shoreline, thus having access to a

shared shore. As regards the applicant's property, the plan permitted

the construction of four houses with access to a shared shore. In

determining the permissible construction potential on the property the

City Assembly had regard to the previous construction of two houses

with their own shore on two adjoining properties which had previously

formed part of Kalhamn 6:42 but had not been included in the plan.

Those properties were not owned by the applicant. The construction

potential of the applicant's property was below the average for the

overall area covered by the plan.

      On 18 August 1993 the County Administrative Board declined to

confirm the plan in so far as it covered, inter alia, two building

sites on the applicant's property. The Board recalled that a shore plan

could be left unconfirmed if it sought to create urban development.

Given the length of the shoreline for the whole area covered by the

plan (some 3,2 kilometres), the Board considered that the number of

construction sites included therein was too high and "neither furthered

an appropriate use of the use of the area (sic) nor the equal treatment

of property owners both within and outside the area". The County

Administrative Board gave no reasons pertaining specifically to the

individual properties in respect of which the plan was not confirmed.

      The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court on

points of law and fact. She stressed that the construction potential

of her property as adopted by the City Assembly was below both the

average for the whole area covered by the plan and the average for

shoreline properties in the county. In refusing to confirm part of the

plan the County Administrative Board had discriminated against her

without specifying any reasons therefor and had exceeded its statutory

competence to review matters of expediency. Moreover, by failing to

provide adequate reasons, contrary to section 24 of the 1982 Act on

Administrative Procedure (hallintomenettelylaki, lag om förvaltnings-

förfarande 598/1992), the Board had rendered it impossible for her to

challenge its decision effectively.

      In an opinion to the Supreme Administrative Court the County

Administrative Board explained in detail how it had reached its

decision of 18 August 1993. It considered, among other things, that the

discrepancies between the Board's and the applicant's views were partly

due to differing methods of calculating the length of the shoreline

directly forming part of her property. The Board essentially stated

that her private shore was in fact only some 200 metres long, whereas

the remainder of the shoreline taken into account in fixing the

construction potential of her property actually formed part of

neighbouring properties.

      In her rejoinder the applicant recalled that in its decision of

22 March 1991 the Ministry for the Environment had found that the

relevant shoreline (including the shoreline which formed part of

neighbouring properties) had been some 500 metres long. The County

Administrative Board had been informed that the owners of the

neighbouring properties had consented to the shore plan. Moreover, the

County Administrative Board had not previously relied upon the reasons

which it had now presented to the Supreme Administrative Court.

      The applicant's appeal was refused on 24 August 1994. The Supreme

Administrative Court, invoking section 123a, subsection 3 of the

Building Act (rakennuslaki, byggnadslag 370/1958), found no reason to

amend the County Administrative Board's conclusion. The Supreme

Administrative Court noted that the shoreline on the applicant's

property was encumbered by the two already constructed real properties

which had previously formed part of her property but had not been

included in the plan. The Supreme Administrative Court also took into

account the length of the shoreline (though without specifying it), the

total construction potential permitted on the relevant properties and

the need for equal treatment of the property owners.   According to the

1958 Building Act, a property owner is entitled to have a shore plan

adopted and confirmed if it has been drawn up according to requirements

of the Act. A plan may nevertheless be left without approval and

confirmation if it is aimed at creating urban development (section

123d, subsection 2). In the preparation of a shore plan particular

regard shall be had to creating an appropriate planning entity and

ensuring construction adapted to the shore area and the use of the land

in adjacent areas (section 123a, subsection 3).

      In examining whether the conditions for confirming a plan are

met, the county administrative boards review both the lawfulness and

the expediency of the municipality's or the city's decision to adopt

the plan. According to the Act on Administrative Procedure, the

reasoning of an administrative decision shall contain the main facts

and the legal provisions or other rules on which it is based. The

decision need not be reasoned if, for instance, this would be clearly

unnecessary (section 24).

COMPLAINTS

1.    The applicant complains that the dispute regarding the terms of

the shore plan was not fully examined by an impartial tribunal within

the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention. The question of permissible

construction on her property being considered a matter of expediency,

it was finally decided by the County Administrative Board, whereas the

Supreme Administrative Court could only examine the lawfulness of the

Board's decision.

2.    The applicant furthermore complains that her property rights have

been interfered with in a disproportionate manner. The intended further

construction on her property would have been clearly below the average

permitted for shoreline properties within the county. No precise

reasons were advanced in support of the County Administrative Board's

derogation both from that average and the average construction

potential permitted by the shore plan in question. Due to the

effectively denied construction rights the applicant's property has

allegedly become impossible to sell. It has not been expropriated and

she has not received any compensation for the lost construction

potential.

      The applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 6

of the Convention.

THE LAW

1.    The applicant complains that the dispute regarding the terms of

the shore plan was not examined in full by an impartial tribunal. The

question of permissible construction on her property being considered

a matter of expediency, it was finally decided by the County

Administrative Board, whereas the Supreme Administrative Court could

only examine the lawfulness of the Board's decision.

      The Commission has examined this complaint under Article 6

para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which, in so far as relevant,

reads as follows:

      "In the determination of his civil rights ..., everyone is

      entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by an independent and

      impartial tribunal established by law. ..."      The

      Commission considers that the applicant's right to develop

      her property in accordance with the applicable laws and

      regulations was "civil" within the meaning of Article 6

      para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Fredin v.

      Sweden judgment of 18 February 1991, Series A no. 192, p.

      20, para. 63). There was furthermore a "genuine and

      serious" dispute between the applicant and the authorities

      regarding the lawfulness of the impugned decision of the

      County Administrative Board. The outcome of this dispute

      was directly decisive for the applicant's right to

      construct leisure houses on her property. Article 6 para.

      1 (Art. 6-1) accordingly applies.

      (a)  Access to court

      The Commission has first examined whether the applicant had

sufficient access to court within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1

(Art. 6-1) of the Convention. This provision does not oblige the

Contracting States to submit disputes over civil rights to a procedure

which at each stage meets the requirements of that provision, provided

it eventually may be determined by a body which does (cf., e.g., Eur.

Court HR, Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium judgment of

23 June 1984, Series A no. 43, pp. 22-23, para. 51). It is sufficient

that decisions taken by administrative authorities which do not

themselves satisfy the requirements of that provision be subject to

subsequent control by an independent judicial body with sufficient

jurisdiction and which itself provides the safeguards required by

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Fischer v.

Austria judgment of 26 April 1995, Series A no. 312, p. 17, para. 28).

       The Commission notes that before the Supreme Administrative

Court the applicant challenged the lawfulness of the County

Administrative Board's decision and its appreciation of the facts. She

essentially argued that the Board had exceeded its competence to

examine matters of expediency. Having examined the merits of her

appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court, adding its own reasons, found

no grounds for amending the County Administrative Board's conclusion.

The Supreme Administrative Court did not have to decline jurisdiction

on any of the points raised by the applicant and there is no indication

that it was unable fully to re-examine the facts (cf. Eur. Court HR,

Zumtobel v. Austria judgment of 21 September 1993, Series A no. 268-A,

pp. 19 et seq., paras. 69 et seq.).

      In these circumstances the Commission does not find that the

applicant was denied access to a tribunal within the meaning of

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention for the purposes of

challenging the County Administrative Board's decision. Accordingly,

there is no indication of a violation of Article 6 (Art. 6) on this

point.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected as

being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      (b)  Fairness of the proceedings

      The applicant also complains about the insufficient reasoning

adduced in support of the partial non-confirmation of the shore plan

as far as covering her property. This is an issue going to the fairness

of the proceedings.

      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) places the "tribunal" under a duty

to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and

evidence adduced by the parties, without prejudice to its assessment

of whether they are relevant to its decision. It also obliges the

courts to give reasons for their judgments, but cannot be understood

as requiring a detailed answer to every argument. Nor are the

Convention organs called upon to examine whether arguments are

adequately met (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Van de Hurk v. the

Netherlands judgment of 19 April 1994, Series A no. 288, pp. 19-20,

paras. 59-61). The question whether a court has failed to fulfil the

obligation to state reasons can only be determined in the light of the

circumstances of the case (see, e.g., Eur. Court HR, Ruiz Torija v.

Spain judgment of 9 December 1994, Series A no. 303-A, p. 12,

para. 29).

      In assessing their fairness the Commission must take a

comprehensive view of the proceedings. It can accept that the reasons

put forward in the County Administrative Board's decision of 18 August

1993 were summary and indeed extensively supplemented in the Board's

opinion to the Supreme Administrative Court following the applicant's

appeal. The Commission notes, however, that in the course of the

proceedings before the Supreme Administrative Court the applicant was

able to comment on the County Administrative Board's opinion and thus

challenge whatever further reasons advanced by the Board. Moreover, the

decision of the Supreme Administrative Court mentioned the facts, the

relevant legal provision applied as well as its reasons for upholding

the County Administrative Board's conclusion.

      In these circumstances there is no indication that the

proceedings considered as a whole were unfair and thereby contrary to

Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.

      It follows that this aspect of the complaint is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the

Convention.

2.    The applicant also complains that her property rights have been

interfered with in a disproportionate manner. The intended further

construction on her property would have been clearly below the average

permitted for shoreline properties within the county. On the one hand,

the applicant's property has allegedly become impossible to sell due

to the denied construction rights, whereas, on the other hand, her

property has not been expropriated and she has not received any

compensation for the lost construction potential.

      The Commission has examined this complaint under Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention which reads as follows:

      "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful

      enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of

      his possessions except in the public interest and subject

      to the conditions provided for by law and by the general

      principles of international law.

      The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way

      impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it

      deems necessary to control the use of property in

      accordance with the general interest or to secure the

      payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."

      Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) comprises three distinct

rules. The first rule, set out in the first sentence of the first

paragraph, is of a general nature and enunciates the principle of

peaceful enjoyment of property. The second rule, contained in the

second sentence of the same paragraph, covers deprivation of

possessions and makes it subject to certain conditions. The third rule,

stated in the second paragraph, recognises that Contracting States are

entitled, amongst other things, to control the use of property in

accordance with the general interest. The three rules are not

"distinct" in the sense of being unconnected: the second and third

rules are concerned with particular instances of interference with the

right to peaceful enjoyment of property and should therefore be

construed in the light of the general principle enunciated in the

first rule (see, e.g., the above-mentioned Fredin judgment, p. 14,

para. 41).

      Moreover, although Article 1 (Art. 1) contains no explicit

procedural requirements, the proceedings at issue must afford the

individual a reasonable opportunity of putting his or her case to the

responsible authorities for the purpose of effectively challenging the

measures interfering with his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No.

1 (P1-1). In ascertaining whether this condition has been satisfied a

comprehensive view must be taken of the applicable procedures (see,

e.g., Eur. Court HR, Agosi v. the United Kingdom judgment of 24 October

1986, Series A no. 108, p. 19, para. 55; Hentrich v. France judgment

of 22 September 1994, Series A no. 296-A, p. 21, para. 49).

      The Commission considers that the County Administrative Board's

partial refusal to confirm the shore plan in so far as it covered the

applicant's property amounted to a control of the use of that property.

This interference with her property rights falls to be examined under

the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) as to its

lawfulness, purpose and proportionality.

      As regards the lawfulness of the interference, the Commission

notes that pursuant to section 123d of the 1958 Building Act a shore

plan may be left unconfirmed by a County Administrative Board if the

plan is found to aim at creating urban development. In refusing to

confirm part of the shore plan in so far as covering the applicant's

property the County Administrative Board explicitly invoked this

provision.

      The Commission accepts that the purpose of the County

Administrative Board's decision was to restrict construction along the

shore. This aim must be considered as reflecting the demands of the

general interest of the community, the protection of the environment

constituting an increasingly important consideration in today's society

(see, e.g., the above-mentioned Fredin judgment, p. 16, para. 48).

      As regards the proportionality, the Commission recalls that a

fair balance must be struck between the demands of the general interest

of the community and the requirements of the protection of the

individual's fundamental rights (ibid.). The Commission notes that the

shore plan as confirmed by the County Administrative Board and the

Supreme Administrative Court permits the construction of two new

leisure houses on the applicant's property. In these circumstances it

cannot be said that the plan has rendered the property so useless as

to constitute a de facto expropriation for which compensation is due.

      Finally, recalling also its considerations above with regard to

the fairness of the proceedings, the Commission considers that the

applicant had at her disposal sufficient procedural safeguards for the

purposes of challenging the County Administrative Board's decision of

18 August 1993.

      Summing up, the Commission finds that the applicant has not been

made to carry an individual and excessive burden and that a fair

balance has been struck between the conflicting interests at stake,

regard also being had to the procedural safeguards afforded to her.

Accordingly, there is no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of

Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).

      It follows that this complaint must also be rejected as being

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2

(Art. 27-2) of the Convention.

      For these reasons, the Commission, unanimously,

      DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.

  M.F. BUQUICCHIO                                 J. LIDDY

     Secretary                                    President

to the First Chamber                        of the First Chamber