THE FACTS

A.  Whereas the facts presented by the Parties and apparently not in

dispute between them may be summarised as follows:

I.  The applicant is a German citizen, born in 1919 and at present

detained in prison in Karlsruhe.  He is represented by Messrs. R. and

S., two lawyers practising in Karlsruhe and acting under a

power-of-attorney, dated 5th June, 1968.

On 16th September, 1964, the Public Prosecutor's Office was informed

that the applicant had committed certain acts amounting to fraud and

embezzlement in connection with certain housing projects at Baden-Baden

and Karlsruhe.  Consequently, investigations were instituted against

the applicant who was first interrogated by the police on 12th October,

1964.  On 24th February, 1965, the applicant's premises were searched

and files and records seized.  These gave rise to the suspicion that

the applicant was involved in acts of fraud, embezzlement and forgery

on a large scale relating, in particular, to a number firms in

Karlsruhe, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland with

which the applicant was connected in one way or another.

Investigations were continued throughout 1965 and 1966.  They

concentrated on eight groups of activities which, according to the

prosecuting authorities, amounted to criminal offenses.  Three of these

cases are the subject of investigations by the Public Prosecutor's

Office at Karlsruhe;  one case has been transferred to the prosecuting

authorities in Munich, another is the subject of proceedings which have

been pending before the Regional Court (Landgericht) in Frankfurt/Main;

proceedings under two further cases have been discontinued at Karlsruhe

and in one case the applicant has been convicted and sentenced to three

months' imprisonment by final decision of the Court of Appeal

(Oberlandesgericht) at Karlsruhe, dated 17th July, 1968.

The applicant's complaints before the Commission relate to the

proceedings which are still pending before the Regional Court

(Landgericht) at Karlsruhe.  The development of these proceedings was

as follows:

On the basis of the evidence collected against the applicant, the

Public Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) at Karlsruhe made an

application to the Karlsruhe District Court (Amtsgericht) for the

applicant's arrest.  A warrant of arrest (Haftbefehl) was issued by the

said Court on 12th July, 1966.  The Court found that there was

sufficient suspicion that the applicant had committed breach of trust

vis-à-vis various persons, in that, having undertaken through the firms

A.B.C., Vaduz, to provide houses and owner flats, he spent the proceeds

from the sales for purposes other than those agreed upon in the

contracts.  The Court further found that the applicant had defrauded

various other persons by inducing such persons or companies to insure

themselves against certain risks with the S.A. D..  For this purpose,

the applicant promised them loans from third persons, although he knew

that he was not in a position to procure such loans. The Court

considered that there existed a danger of the applicant's absconding,

in view of the severe penalty which he had to expect, and his

connections abroad.

On 14th July, 1966, further papers and records were seized at the

applicant's offices and on the same day he was arrested at his home in

Karlsruhe.

However, on 19th July, 1966, the said District Court examined the

lawfulness of the applicant's detention (Haftprüfung) and decided that

the execution of the warrant of arrest should be suspended on condition

that he should report to police headquarters at Karlsruhe once a day,

that he should deposit his passport and identity card with the

authorities, subject to their being returned to him with the approval

of the competent judge only and that, finally, he should inform the

Public Prosecutor's Office at Karlsruhe of any change of address. On

the same day, the applicant was released from detention.

The Office of the Public Prosecutor at Karlsruhe lodged with the

Regional Court of Karlsruhe an appeal (Beschwerde) against this

decision. On 27th July, 1966, the Regional Court set aside the District

Court's decision of 19th July, 1966 and decided that the execution of

the warrant of arrest should be resumed.

The Court held that there existed a considerable danger of the

applicant's absconding (Fluchtgefahr). It pointed out that in view of

the strong suspicion against him and his previous convictions for

similar offenses, the applicant was faced with a severe sentence. It

was true, the Court continued, that the applicant was married, that his

private and family life were normal and his domestic circumstances in

good order. The Court also took into consideration the fact that, for

some time prior to his arrest, the applicant knew about the proceedings

against him and that he had not made an attempt to abscond after his

release from detention. The Court considered that, nevertheless, the

danger of his absconding had increased as the evidence against him

became stronger. It pointed out that his numerous international

connections and the likelihood of his having funds abroad would

facilitate an escape even without proper identification papers.

On 27th July, 1966, the District Court at Karlsruhe also extended the

warrant of arrest of 12th July, 1966, to cover another count of fraud

which had been lodged in the meanwhile. The applicant was re-arrested

on 28th July, 1966, and remanded in custody.

On 5th August, 1966, the applicant's lawyers made an application to the

Regional Court in Karlsruhe requesting that the execution of the above

warrant of arrest should be suspended and the applicant released on

bail (Sicherheitsleistung) in the amount of DM 50,000. Subsequently,

on 10th August, 1966 he lodged with the Court of Appeal at Karlsruhe,

a further appeal (weitere Beschwerde) against the decision of 27th

July, 1966, and a decision of 5th August, 1966, by which the Regional

Court had, inter alia, refused the applicant's appeal against the

warrant of arrest. At the same time, he once more offered security in

the amount of DM 50,000.

On 22nd August, 1966, the Court of Appeal at Karlsruhe confirmed the

above Regional Court's decision of 27th July, 1966 for the reasons

stated in that decision. The Court of Appeal also found that there was

the danger of the applicant' suppressing evidence (Verdunkelungsgefahr)

resulting from the fact that he had managed to hide his transactions

by the use of agents and nominees. In case of his release, he was

likely to exert a certain influence on these persons in order to make

more difficult the proper investigation of his transactions. The Court

of Appeal finally stated that, in view of these considerations, it was

not possible to suspend the execution of the warrant of arrest in spite

of the fact that the applicant had offered bail (Sicherheitsleistung)

in the amount of DM 50,000.

On 30th December, 1966, the District Court at Karlsruhe again examined

the lawfulness of the applicant's detention on remand. The Court

referred to the reasons previously stated and concluded that the danger

of his absconding and of suppressing evidence continued. The Court

further stated that in view of the fact that danger of flight existed

to a very high degree, it was not possible to release the applicant

even on bail of DM 100,000 - which, in the meanwhile, had been offered

by his lawyers. The applicant's appeal (Beschwerde) against that

decision was refused by the Regional Court at Karlsruhe on 13th

January, 1967. The Court held that no new circumstances had become

apparent since its last decision on this subject, except that the

applicant now offered bail in the amount of DM 100,000. However, the

Court considered it impossible to accept that offer. Having regard to

the considerable sums which the applicant had probably obtained by

means of his criminal activities, it was to be expected that he would

forfeit even DM 100,000 in order to avoid prosecution. The Court

further held that the danger of his suppressing evidence continued.

On 8th February, 1967, the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal took a decision

under Articles 121, 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(Strafprozessordnung) to the effect that the applicant's detention on

remand should continue. The Court decided that the danger of his

absconding continued to exist and that this danger had not been

eliminated by his offer of bail in the amount of DM 100,000. In view

of this situation, it was not necessary to decide whether or not, owing

to the progress of the investigations, there was still a danger of the

applicant suppressing evidence. The Court further stated that in view

of the exceptionally high number of offenses with which the applicant

was charged and the resultant difficulties as to their investigation,

it had not yet been possible to terminate the preliminary proceedings.

Nevertheless, the Court expressed the expectation that the

investigations should now be expedited to the extent that the

prosecution authorities would come to a final decision with regard to

at least one of the charges against the applicant.

On 2nd May, 1967, the applicant was informed by the Karlsruhe Public

Prosecutor's Office that the investigations were closed with regard to

two construction cases and 27 insurance cases and that it was intended

to file the indictment with regard to these charges. Furthermore, the

proceedings with regard to all the other cases against him, as well as

against other accused persons, were separated from these proceedings.

Subsequently, on 3rd May, 1967, the District Court at Karlsruhe took

a decision to the effect that the warrant of arrest should be set aside

as far as it concerned those offenses with regard to which the

investigation proceedings had been closed, but upheld as to the

remainder. This decision was confirmed on 19th May, 1967 by the

Karlsruhe

Court of Appeal. The Court referred to its previous decisions and held

that the danger of his absconding had increased owing to the fact that

the applicant was suspected of having committed further offenses of

fraud with regard to the insurance scheme developed by him. Moreover,

there was also now a warrant of arrest issued by the District Court in

Frankfurt in connection with numerous offenses of fraud which the

applicant was accused of having committed there.

On 14th August, 1967, the District Court in Karlsruhe took a further

decision amending the warrant of arrest of 12th July, 1966, to include

further offenses of breach of trust in connection with the construction

cases and of fraud in connection with the insurance cases. The Court

stated that danger of flight and of suppressing evidence continued and

referred to the decision of the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal of 22nd

August, 1966. The applicant appealed against that decision, but

requested that a decision on his appeal should be adjourned until the

Court of Appeal had decided as to the lawfulness of his continued

detention on remand under Articles 121, 122 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure.

In the meanwhile, on 2nd June, 1967, the applicant had been accorded

a final hearing (Schlussgehör) by the Karlsruhe Public Prosecutor's

Office. During the hearing he made an application for an adjournment

by one month so as to prepare his case by means of his records and

papers. That application was granted on the same day.

The applicant, having also applied for a judicial examination, was

heard by the competent investigating judge, Mr. W., from 30th June to

2nd August, 1967. On 3rd August, 1967, he applied for an adjournment

on the ground that he had not had sufficient opportunity to examine

together with his counsel his correspondence which had been seized at

his offices. The District Court at Karlsruhe dismissed that

application, but this decision was set aside, on appeal, by the

Karlsruhe Regional Court on 7th August, 1967. On the basis of this

decision, the judicial examination was adjourned until 25th September,

1967.On 11th September, 1967, the Court of Appeal at Karlsruhe decided that

the applicant's detention on remand should continue. The Court first

confirmed that the applicant was strongly suspected of having committed

the offenses with regard to which the investigations were conducted.

The Court continued that, in view of the danger of his absconding which

persisted to a considerable degree, it was not possible to release the

applicant. The question as to whether or not, after the investigations

have been closed, there still was a danger of his suppressing evidence

could remain open. The Court finally examined the question whether or

not it was still justified, under Article 121 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure to keep the applicant in detention on remand, in view of the

fact that he had already been in custody for 13 months. The Court

pointed out that the investigations had been closed since 2nd May,

1967, but that the indictment had not yet been filed owing to the fact

that the applicant had asked for a judicial examination with regard to

all the accusations against him prior to a final hearing by the

prosecuting authority. This request had been granted and the judicial

examination was still going on. Nevertheless, the Public Prosecutor's

Office and the District Court should see to it that the investigations

be terminated and the indictment filed as, in the case of any further

avoidable delay, it would no longer be justified to keep the applicant

in custody.

The judicial examination of the charges against the applicant was

continued on 25th September, 1967. On that day, the applicant requested

a further adjournment of the hearing which was granted and a new date

was fixed for 10th October, 1967. However, when the Public Prosecutor's

Office protested against that date, the District Court at Karlsruhe

decided, on 28th September, 1967, that the examination should continue

on 3rd October, 1967. The applicant's appeal against that decision was

rejected on 4th October, 1967 as being ill-founded. Similarly, his

challenge of Judge W. for bias, which he had made on 3rd October, 1967

after having refused to make any statements on that day pending a

decision on his appeal, had been rejected.

A new date to continue the judicial examination was fixed for 6th

October, 1967. On that day, the applicant again challenged Judge W.,

but his challenge was immediately declared inadmissible.

The examination continued until 16th October, 1967. On 17th October,

1967 the applicant again challenged Judge W. for bias, an allegation

which the President of the District Court rejected on 20th October,

1967, as being ill-founded. The Regional Court at Karlsruhe, on 26th

October, 1967, dismissed the applicant's appeal (Beschwerde) against

that decision.

The examination continued on 30th October, 1967. On that day, the

applicant once more challenged Judge W. on the ground that he had

failed to protect the applicant against certain personal remarks made

by the Public Prosecutor during the hearing. The applicant furthermore

requested that Judge W. should be instructed to put on record certain

names and facts relating to various insurance companies which the

applicant intended to dictate. Judge W. had refused to allow any

further dictation during the hearing on the ground that these facts

should be submitted by the applicant in writing. Both the challenge and

the request to put on record came before the Regional Court at

Karlsruhe which decided on 31st October, 1967, that they were

ill-founded. The Court considered that the repeated challenge of Judge

W. was calculated to protract the proceedings and that there was no

legal provision requiring the recording of facts, as requested.

The examination was to be continued on 2nd November, 1967. The

applicant now declared that he was unable to make any final statement

before he had an opportunity to examine, together with his counsel, the

various bank statements which had been put in evidence against him.

Subsequently, at a hearing on 6th November, 1967, the applicant applied

for an adjournment of the judicial examination. He stated that he would

not make any final statement before he had examined all the documents

and letters connected with his case. He also requested from the Court

photocopies of the entire material collected from the banks, such

photocopies to be made at the expense of the Court. On 7th November,

1967 the District Court refused the above applications and this

decision was confirmed by the Karlsruhe Regional Court on 15th

November, 1967.

The judicial examination was resumed once again and terminated on 6th

December, 1967. The applicant was informed that it was not intended to

submit the indictment, in accordance with the Public Prosecutor's

letter of 2nd May, 1967, with regard to all cases concerning the

construction schemes and the insurance schemes, except one (the E.

Case). With regard to that case, further investigations had proved to

be necessary. The applicant was also advised that he could again apply

for a final hearing (Schlussgehör) by the Public Prosecutor's Office,

or for the taking of evidence, or submit objections against the

intention to file the indictment.

On 6th December, 1967, the Karlsruhe District Court also took a

decision separating the E. Case from the remainder of the charges

against the applicant and amending the warrant of arrest accordingly.

On 5th January, 1968, the Court of Appeal at Karlsruhe took a further

decision under Articles 121, 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

confirming the applicant's continued detention on remand. The Court

referred to the grounds of its decisions of 22nd August, 1966 and 11th

September, 1967, adding that only a heart attack suffered in 1963 was

not calculated to eliminate the danger of flight. The Court further

stated that the applicant's detention on remand over and above the

period provided for in Article 121 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

namely six months, continued to be justified owing to the applicant's

applications for a judicial examination, for adjournments, challenge

of judges and appeals in other matters. It was not necessary to

determine whether or not these applications were made to protract the

proceedings. Continued detention on remand was justified if the

proceedings have been prolonged simply by the fact that the applicant

had availed himself of all remedies which were at his disposal.

Furthermore, no fault on the part of the Public Prosecutor or the

District Judge concerned had been established and it could be expected

that the indictment would now soon be filed.

The applicant, having applied for a final hearing, was heard on 19th

January, 1968. On 15th March, 1968, the indictment was filed with the

Karlsruhe Regional Court. The applicant was charged with having

committed breach of trust and embezzlement in respect of one

construction case, and fraud in respect of another such case, as well

as in respect of the making of insurance contracts in 31 cases.

According to the indictment, the latter charges also constituted an

offence under Article 240, paragraph (1), of the Act relating to the

Supervision of Insurance Companies (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz). The

Public Prosecutor's Office also made an application that the applicant

should be convicted as being a dangerous habitual criminal and

committed to preventive detention (Sicherungsverwahrung), subsequent

to serving his sentence.

On 29th March, 1968, the Karlsruhe Regional Court once more extended

the warrant of arrest to cover five further cases of insurance fraud

which had already been included in the indictment. Subsequently, on

19th April, 1968, the Court of Appeal at Karlsruhe took a further

decision under Articles 121, 122 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

confirming the applicant's continued detention on remand. The Court

considered that the danger of his absconding continued to exist, the

more so as, in the meanwhile, the indictment had been submitted in the

Frankfurt proceedings and, moreover, in the present proceedings, the

prosecuting authorities had moved to convict the applicant as being an

habitual criminal and to commit him to preventive detention. Finally,

the continued detention was justified in view of the complexity of the

case and the extent of the investigations which had largely been the

result of the applicant's own conduct and could not be imputed to any

slowness on the part of the authorities.

In the meanwhile, on 1st February, 1968, the applicant had lodged with

the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) a

constitutional appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) against the decision of

the Court of Appeal on 5th January, 1968 invoking Articles 2 and 104

of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) and Article 5, paragraph (3), of the

European Convention on Human Rights. Subsequently, the applicant also

appealed against the Karlsruhe Court of Appeal's decision of 19th

April, 1968. On 16th May, 1968, three judges of the Federal

Constitutional Court rejected the appeals as being inadmissible insofar

as Article 5 of the Convention  was concerned and as being clearly

ill-founded with regard to the remainder. The Court held that the

applicant's constitutional rights had not been violated by the

decisions concerned, nor was the length of his detention on remand due

to any delay which could have been avoided. The Court stated that,

insofar as the delay was caused by the fact that the applicant had

availed himself of his procedural rights, it could not be held against

the prosecuting authorities.

On 18th June, 1968, the Public Prosecutor's Office at Karlsruhe filed

with the Karlsruhe Regional Court a further indictment concerning

another case of fraud which the applicant was alleged to have committed

in connection with the building scheme. Again the Public Prosecutor

moved that the applicant should be convicted as being a dangerous

habitual criminal.

The question of the applicant's continued detention on remand came

again before the Court of Appeal at Karlsruhe on 5th August, 1968. On

that day, his detention was confirmed on the grounds previously stated.

The Court also pointed out that, in the Frankfurt proceedings, the

applicant had, in the meanwhile, been committed for trial which was to

start in February, 1969.

On 20th August, 1968, the applicant began serving a three months'

sentence to which he had been convicted by the Karlsruhe Court of

Appeal's final decision of 17th July, 1968. Subsequently, on 20th

November, 1968, the applicant served until 11th February, 1969, the

balance of a prison sentence that had been suspended during a

probationary period. It is not clear whether or not, after that date,

the applicant was again remanded in custody.

In any event, on 5th November, 1968, the Regional Court at Karlsruhe

had decided that the applicant should be committed for trial in respect

of the charges set forth in the indictments of 15th March and 18th

June, 1968. However, the proceedings should be discontinued insofar as

the prosecuting authorities had charged the applicant with having

committed an offence contrary to Article 240, paragraph (1), of the Act

concerning the Supervision of Insurance Companies. The Court further

decided that detention on remand should continue for the reasons set

out in the warrant of arrest.

On 20th December, 1968, the Karlsruhe Public Prosecutor's Office

submitted to the Regional Court the indictment concerning the E. case

which had been separated earlier from the remainder of the cases and

with regard to which the investigations had now been completed. In this

case, the applicant was again charged with having committed an

insurance fraud.

Subsequently, on 24th January, 1969, the Regional Court at Karlsruhe

decided that the warrant of arrest should be extended to cover the E.

case. On 24th January, 1969, the same Court also took a further

decision committing the applicant for trial as regards the offence set

forth in the indictment of 20th December, 1968.

On 1st August, 1969, the applicant was convicted by the Regional Court

at Karlsruhe for having committed breach of trust in three cases and

fraud in 26 cases. He was sentenced to seven years' penal servitude as

well as 29 fines of DM 100 each. The Court further decided that, during

a period of five years, the applicant should abstain from any activity

as real estate, financial or insurance agent, and that the period which

he spent in detention on remand should be credited towards his

sentence.

The applicant appealed (Revision) against that decision to the Federal

Court.

B. Whereas the proceedings before the Commission may be summarised as

follows:

The application was lodged on 6th June, 1968, and registered on 10th

June, 1968 in the special register of the Commission's Secretariat

under file No. 3637/68.

On 12th July, 1968, a group of three members of the Commission examined

the application and unanimously expressed the opinion that it appeared

to be admissible. In pursuance of the group's report, the President of

the Commission, on 15th July, 1968, decided that the application should

have priority (Rule 38, paragraph 1). On the same day, he also made an

order under Rule 45, paragraph 2, that the application should be

communicated to the respondent Government and that the Government

should be invited to submit its observations in writing on the

admissibility of the application. Such observations were received from

the respondent Government on 19th September, 1968, and from the

applicant in reply on 2nd October, 1968. The respondent Government

submitted supplementary information on 9th December, 1968, 24th March,

1969 and 2nd September, 1969, as to the state of the proceedings

against the applicant.

C. Whereas in his application form and in his relevant written

submissions, the applicant alleges that his detention pending trial for

over two years constitutes a clear violation of Article 5, paragraph

(3), of the Convention;  whereas he seems further to allege that he was

denied a fair hearing during the proceedings relating to his detention

on remand;

Whereas the respondent Government, in its above written observations,

submits that the application is inadmissible, which is contested by the

applicant in his observations in reply:

Whereas the arguments of the Parties may be summarised as follows:

1. The respondent Government submitted that the applicant's complaints

regarding the length of his detention on remand were manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2), of the

Convention.

The Government pointed out that the offenses with which the applicant

was charged were very complex and the investigations difficult. The

subject matter was very complicated and proof could mostly be obtained

by documentary evidence only. Consequently, numerous records and files

had been seized at the applicant's home and at his business

establishments. On 15th August, 1968, the material submitted to the

Court comprised 31 volumes with altogether 7,652 pages in addition to

a further 3,770 pages of documents and 33 files containing 4,928 pages.

These records contained the statements of 145 witnesses, 20 of whom had

been heard abroad. To obtain this evidence, eight requests for rogatory

commission had been made to courts and prosecuting authorities in three

European countries, and 19 similar requests to eight other countries

with the assistance of Interpol. In the course of the investigations,

a further 101 persons had been heard who, however, could not give any

pertinent evidence. A further 196 files containing business

transactions were examined and then returned to the applicant.

Furthermore, it had been difficult to reconstruct the transactions

which allegedly amounted to criminal offenses since there had not been

a proper filing system and there had not been any accounts or regular

commercial bookkeeping.

Moreover, it had been difficult to obtain the necessary information

from the injured parties. According to the respondent Government, the

applicant had used monies which he had obtained through further

fraudulent manipulations in order to repair some of the financial

damage inflicted by him. Consequently, many of the injured parties,

whose losses had been fairly recovered, and those who hoped to recover

at least part of their losses, had not been interested in an effective

criminal prosecution and had refused to give any pertinent information.

Similarly, those persons who were dependent on the applicant or

involved in any way in his manipulations had not been interested in a

clarification of the case.

The respondent Government furthermore pointed out that, apart from the

interrogations and hearings of persons who had suffered financial loss,

the essential investigations to clear up the background of the firms

and the network of the insurance connections had to be made abroad. For

that purpose, as has been pointed out in connection with various

rogatory commissions, it had been necessary to obtain assistance from

foreign judicial authorities , who had been requested to take

depositions of the evidence collected abroad. However, it had not been

possible to make the necessary arrangements before all the material had

been sorted out and evaluated and before the hearing of witnesses in

the Federal Republic of Germany had progressed far enough so that

suitable and precise questions could be put to witnesses abroad.

Subsequently, it had taken between two and four months before the

depositions taken abroad were received by the competent German

authorities.

The investigations were further prolonged by reason of the fact that

the applicant submitted numerous hierarchical appeals against the

Public Prosecutor dealing with his case and, on various occasions,

challenged the judges who took decisions with regard to his case. In

most of these cases, the applicant pursued all remedies available to

him under German law. Moreover, efforts on the part of the prosecuting

authorities to confine the proceedings to a small number of cases and

to concentrate the investigations on the most essential points had been

opposed by the applicant who had consistently declared that "everything

belonged together and was interlaced".

Finally, the respondent Government submitted that it had not been

possible to ensure the applicant's appearance in court to stand trial

in any other way, but by keeping him in custody. Furthermore, it was

considered that the applicant would suppress evidence by bringing his

influence to bear upon those persons who had suffered financial damage

and those who had, in one way or another, worked with him. In this

respect, the Government referred to the reasons given by the German

courts in the decisions by which they had examined ex officio, or upon

the applicant's applications, the lawfulness of his continued detention

on remand.

2. The applicant, represented by his lawyer, Mr. R., submitted his

observations in reply on 2nd October, 1968.

He alleged, first, that the Karlsruhe Regional Court made an offer on

27th July, 1966, for his re-arrest and detention on remand pursuant to

the Public Prosecutor's appeal against the decision for his release,

dated 19th July, 1966, without having previously communicated to him

the grounds of the prosecuting authority's appeal or having heard him

or his lawyers. This, he considered, was improper procedure and a

denial of fair hearing.

The applicant then submitted that the period of his detention on remand

was unreasonable within the meaning of Article 5, paragraph 3, of the

Convention. He contended, in particular, that his own conduct did not

cause any delay of the proceedings concerned.

The applicant stated that the decisions as to the seizure of his files

and records relating to the building projects were taken on 23rd

December, 1964, but that these decisions were not executed until two

months later, on 24th February, 1965. Having been in possession of all

the necessary documents since that time, it should have been possible

for the prosecuting authorities to close the investigations as regards

the building projects even before 14th July, 1966, the date of his

first arrest.

In particular, it would have been possible to complete the

investigations within a period of two years at the most, if they had

been conducted according to a clear preconceived plan and if economic

experts had been called in promptly. This was shown by the Frankfurt

proceedings which had similar international ramifications and in which

the applicant had been brought to trial much earlier than in the

present proceedings only owing to the fact that an economic expert had

been consulted at an early stage.

The applicant also submitted that the proceedings would have been

expedited if the prosecuting authorities had not consistently caused

difficulties as regards his or his lawyer's requests for an examination

of the case files. On several occasions, permission for such

examination was only granted after he had made appeals to the superior

authority or the courts, and the files were submitted to him a very

short time before his interrogation only. Consequently, he had not been

able to make a statement for failure of having before him complete

factors.

Moreover, as early as 23rd June, 1965, he had requested an examination

by a judge, but without success. It was not until the final hearing on

2nd June, 1967, that his request for a judicial examination was

granted.

Furthermore, the applicant contended that, since his challenges of the

investigating judge and his hierarchical appeals against the Public

Prosecutor concerned were justified in the circumstances, they could

not be held against him. The decisions in these matters had nothing to

do with the investigations of his case;  they were taken by different

courts and the proceedings concerned could not have interfered with the

investigations which were conducted by the police and the Public

Prosecutor's Office. Instead, the appeals and applications made by him

were calculated to expedite proceedings.

Nor should it be held against him that he availed himself of the

remedies that were at his disposal. Apart from the fact that it was

untrue that the proceedings were to a considerable extent prolonged

because the applicant availed himself of such remedies, this conception

was inconsistent with constitutional thinking. It would lead to the

untenable conclusion that a person who avails himself of his rights

under the law of criminal procedure must spend a longer period in

detention on remand than a person who does not take advantage of these

procedural possibilities.

The applicant finally submitted that, having regard to his age, his

heart condition, his close relations with his family and, in

particular, his legal convictions, there never was any danger, either

of his suppressing evidence or of absconding. He never intended to

abscond, although he knew about the investigations right from the start

owing to the seizure of documents. Nor did he, in fact, abscond when

the District Court release him and suspended the execution of the

warrant of arrest without any security having to be furnished.

Nevertheless, bail had been offered by him on several occasions first

in the amount of DM 50,000 - later the amount of DM 100,000. Each time,

however, his release on bail had been refused by the courts.

The applicant submitted that, for the above reasons, his application

should be declared admissible.

THE LAW

Whereas Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention states

that everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions

of paragraph (1), subparagraph (c), of that Article (Art. 5-1-c) "shall

be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending

trial", whereby "release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for

trial";

Whereas it is not disputed that the applicant was arrested on 14th

July, 1966 on suspicion of having committed various offenses of fraud,

embezzlement, and breach of trust; that he was released against certain

guarantees on 19th July, 1966 but re-arrested on 28th July, 1966; that

he remained in custody until 20th August, 1968; that from that date

onwards until 11th February, 1969, he served prison sentences in

execution of previous convictions; that on 1st August, 1969, he was

convicted and sentenced at first instance by the Regional Court of

Karlsruhe;

Whereas the applicant alleges that his detention pending trial for over

two years constitutes a clear violation of Article 5, paragraph (3)

(Art. 5-3) of the Convention;

Whereas the respondent Government submits that the investigations in

the applicant's case concerned a particularly high number of offenses;

that the cases were extremely complex and difficult but, nevertheless,

carried out with the greatest possible expedition; and that it had not

been possible to guarantee the applicant's appearance before the court

for trial in any other way than by keeping him in continuous detention

on remand;

Whereas, when determining the question whether or not the period of the

applicant's detention on remand was unreasonable within the meaning of

Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, the Commission

must first decide what period of detention is under consideration;

Whereas the Commission considered that question in the light of the

judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the "Wemhoff" and

"Neumeister" Cases (cf. Eur. Court H.R. "Wemhoff" and "Neumeister"

Cases, judgments of 27th June, 1968); whereas, having regard to those

judgments, the first period under consideration in the present case

lasted from 14th July, 1966, being the date of the applicant's arrest,

until 19th July, 1966, being the date of his release, and the second

period from 28th July, 1966, being the date of his re-arrest, until

20th August, 1968, being the date on which the applicant was imprisoned

in execution of his previous convictions; whereas his imprisonment

ended on 11th February, 1969, and it may be assumed that subsequently

he was again remanded in custody; whereas in 1st August, 1969, the

applicant was convicted and sentenced at first instance; whereas the

Commission finds that the period of detention on remand within the

meaning of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention,

which, in accordance with the point of view adopted by the European

Court of Human Rights in its above judgment, ends with the applicant's

conviction at first instance, terminated in his case on 1st August,

1969;

Whereas it follows that, in the present case, the applicant was

detained on remand during three separate periods of altogether two

years, six months and seventeen days;

Whereas, having regard to this period the Commission is called upon to

decide whether or not the applicant's provisional detention has been

prolonged beyond a reasonable time and was thereby contrary to Article

5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.

Whereas it has been established that the provisions of Article 5,

paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, do not simply leave the

national judicial authorities with a choice between two obligations,

namely that of conducting within a reasonable time the proceedings

until judgment or that of releasing the accused pending trial, if

necessary against certain guarantees;

Whereas, on the contrary, they require that national courts determine,

in the light of the fact of the detention of the person being

prosecuted, whether the time that has elapsed before judgment is

passed, has at some stage exceeded a reasonable limit, that is to say,

imposed a greater sacrifice than could, in the circumstances,

reasonably be expected of a person presumed to be innocent. (cf. Eur.

Court H.R., "Wemhoff" Case, para 5, of The Law);

Whereas it has also been established that this question is not to be

decided in abstracto but to be considered in the light of the

particular circumstances of each case; whereby the factors which may

be taken into consideration are extremely diverse (see Eur. Court H.R.

"Wemhoff" Case, para. 10 of The Law; see also Appendix XI to the

Commission's Report in the Wemhoff Case);

Whereas, having regard to the judgments of the European Court of Human

Rights in the "Wemhoff" and "Neumeister " Cases of 27th July, 1968, as

well as to the Court's judgment in the "Stögmüller" and "Matznetter"

Cases of 10th November, 1969, the Commission finds that there are two

principal questions which must be examined when deciding upon the

reasonableness of any period of detention on remand;

Whereas, first, the Commission must determine whether the reasons given

by the national authorities to justify continued detention are relevant

and sufficient to show that detention was unreasonably prolonged and

thus contrary to Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention;

and whereas, secondly, the Commission must determine whether or not,

even assuming that there was good cause not to release the applicant

pending trial, the national judicial authorities have conducted the

case in a manner which unreasonably prolonged the detention on remand,

thus imposing on the applicant a greater sacrifice in the interest of

public order than could normally be expected of a person presumed to

be innocent;

Whereas, in respect of the first of these questions, it is to be

observed that, in the present case, the warrants of arrest were

consistently based on the ground that the applicant would abscond if

he were left at liberty and that he would suppress evidence; whereas

these reasons continued to be invoked in the court decisions in which,

on numerous occasions, the lawfulness of his continued detention was

examined ex officio and in which the applications made by the applicant

for his conditional release were rejected;

Whereas the German courts found that the applicant, who was charged

with having committed economic offenses on a wide scale and on an

international level, had numerous business connections abroad which he

might use to abscond in order to avoid prosecution; that, for the same

reason, he was likely to have considerable funds abroad; that the

applicant was fully aware of the evidence became stronger; that the

applicant, being a recidivist, was faced with a severe sentence if he

were to be convicted on the charges made against him; that the

prosecuting authorities furthermore had submitted to the Court that the

applicant, subsequent to having served his sentence, should be

committed to preventive detention on the ground that he was an habitual

criminal; that, moreover, the applicant, if he were set free, was

likely to use his influence on various witnesses in an attempt to

persuade them that they should not give evidence against him;

Whereas the German courts considered that, for these reasons, it was

not possible to release the applicant from detention on remand, even

against certain financial or other guarantees, and at the same time

ensure his appearance for trial; whereas, in reaching this conclusion,

the courts had due regard to the applicant's age and health, his family

ties and domestic circumstances, as well as to his offers of bail,

first in the amount of DM 50,000 and later DM 100,000;

Whereas the Commission has itself examined the grounds on which the

applicant was detained on remand during the above period;

Whereas it notes that present day border controls are calculated to

facilitate international travel and are not, therefore, always

stringently enforced, making it possible to cross borders even without

proper identification papers; whereas, consequently, there are few

technical obstacles which would have prevented the applicant from

leaving the Federal Republic of Germany;

Whereas the Commission finds that the danger of absconding increases

as the investigations continue and the evidence against the accused

gradually accumulates; whereas, in the present case; the applicant was

fully aware of the state of the investigation and knew that there was

considerable evidence against him, thereby making his conviction,

including possibly his subsequent committal to preventive detention,

more and more probable;

Whereas it is true that the possibility of a severe sentence, while

constituting a factor which might encourage an accused person to

abscond, is not by itself sufficient to lead to the assumption of a

danger of flight; whereas this reasoning has already been adopted by

the European Court of Human Rights in the Wemhoff Case (Judgment, para.

14 of The Law); whereas, however, as in the Wemhoff Case, the German

courts have been careful in the present case as well to support their

affirmations that a danger of flight existed by referring at an early

stage in the proceedings to certain circumstances relating to the

material position of the accused;

Whereas the Commission has also considered the offers of bail made by

the applicant; whereas again the Commission had regard to the judgment

of the European Court of Human Rights in the Wemhoff Case;

Whereas the Court emphasised that the concluding words of Article 5,

paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention show that, when the only

remaining reason for continued detention is the fear that the accused

will abscond and thereby avoid appearing for trial, his release pending

trial must be ordered if it is possible to obtain from him guarantees

that will ensure such appearance;

Whereas the Commission notes that, in the present case, the applicant

between August 1966 and May 1967 repeatedly offered guarantees to

ensure his appearing for trial, first in the amount of DM 50,000 and

later DM 100,000; whereas these offers were refused by the German

courts on the ground that they were insufficient in the circumstances

to ensure such appearance and, moreover, that the danger of the

applicant's suppressing evidence continued; whereas, consequently, the

fear that the applicant would abscond was, between August 1966 and May

1967 not the only reason for his continued detention; whereas it is

true that, subsequently, the German courts held that the danger of his

suppressing evidence had possibly disappeared in view of the fact that

the investigations had been closed; whereas, however, at that stage the

applicant had no longer offered any guarantees to ensure his appearing

for trial, but was seeking release on other grounds;

Whereas, for these reasons, the Commission finds that the grounds

relied on by the German courts refusing the applicant's release pending

trial were relevant and sufficient;

Whereas, on the other hand, as has been stated above, the danger of

absconding or of suppressing evidence, however justified such danger

might be, cannot alone exempt the judicial authorities from the

obligations imposed by Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention where they themselves are shown to have conducted the case

in a manner which has unreasonably prolonged the applicant's detention

on remand;

Whereas, in this respect, the Commission had regard to the complexity

of the present case and also to the conduct of the applicant himself

in connection with the proceedings against him; whereas it has noted

that the offenses with which the applicant was charged were economic

offenses which involved numerous persons; that it had been necessary,

in the insurance fraud cases, to examine the interrelationship and the

holdings of various firms in the Federal Republic and abroad, which the

applicant had allegedly created in order to camouflage his

transactions; that it had been difficult to obtain the evidence of

witnesses and that, consequently, the prosecuting authorities had been

required to reconstruct the transactions concerned, mostly by

documentary evidence; that such material was very voluminous and

allegedly badly organised; that, in addition thereto, the prosecuting

authorities had examined approximately 245 witnesses, whose evidence

had in part been taken by rogatory commissions in altogether twelve

countries;

Whereas the Commission further noted that, in spite of these

difficulties, the investigations had been closed on 2nd May, 1967, i.e.

only about ten months after the applicant had been arrested and

remanded in custody;

Whereas it is true that, subsequently, the investigations were

continued until 6th December, 1967 in the form of judicial

investigations; whereas, however, the reopening of the investigations

had been the result of applications made by the applicant in the

exercise of his rights under the German Code of Criminal Procedure;

whereas, during the judicial investigations, the applicant on various

occasions challenged the investigating judge dealing with his case and

lodged disciplinary complaints against the Public Prosecutor concerned;

whereas, the Commission finds that, regardless of the question whether

or not an accused person is, in principle, entitled to avail himself

of all possibilities that are at his disposal under the applicable

procedural law to prevent him from being committed for trial, he must

bear the consequences as to any resultant prolongation of the

investigation;

Whereas, for these reasons, the Commission finds that the investigating

and judicial authorities have conducted the case in such a manner as

not to prolong the detention of the applicant beyond limits which were

reasonable having regard not only to the particularly complicated

nature of the charges against him, but also to the fact that part of

the delay which actually occurred in bringing him to trial must be

ascribed to other factors than their conduct of the case;

Whereas the applicant's further arguments to the effect that Article

5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention has been violated in his

case, are not, in the circumstances, calculated to lead the Commission

to any other conclusion in the present case; whereas, in particular,

the Commission is called upon only to examine the length of the

applicant's detention on remand under that provision, and any argument

relating to the length of the proceedings themselves, or to the

arguments that his arrest and detention as such were unlawful, or that

the investigations should have been terminated prior to his arrest are

not relevant in this case;

Whereas, in the circumstances, the Commission sees no ground for

examining ex officio the application under the relevant provisions of

the Convention, namely Article 5, paragraph (1) (c) or Article 6,

paragraphs (1) and (3) (Art. 5-1-c, 6-1, 6-3);

Whereas, therefore, the Commission finds that an examination of the

case as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and,

in particular, in Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention;

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is manifestly

ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas it appears that the applicant furthermore wishes to complain

of the proceedings relating to the examination by the German courts of

the lawfulness of his detention on remand; whereas he alleges, in

particular, that on 27th July, 1966, the Karlsruhe Regional Court made

an order for his re-arrest and detention on remand without having

previously communicated to him the grounds submitted in support of that

order by the prosecuting authorities or having heard him and his

lawyers;

Whereas, here again, the Commission had regard to the jurisprudence of

the European Court of Human Rights; whereas, in the "Neumeister" Case

(cf. Eur. Court H.R., "Neumeister" Case, Judgment of 27th July, 1968),

the European Court held that the principle of "equality of arms" which

is included in the notion of fair hearing under Article 6, paragraph

(1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention, was not applicable to the

examination of requests for provisional release, since such examination

does not relate to the "determination of any criminal charge" as

required under that provision; whereas the Court further held that it

was also not possible to justify the application of the principle of

"equality of arms" to proceedings concerning detention on remand by

invoking Article 5, paragraph (4) (Art. 5-4) of the Convention, which

while requiring that such proceedings shall be allowed, stipulates that

they should be taken before a "court", but in no way relates to the

procedure to be followed; whereas the court considered that full

written proceedings or an oral hearing of the parties in the

examination of such remedies would be a source of delay which it was

important to avoid in this field;

Whereas the Commission has followed the holding of the European Court

in its decision of 18th July, 1968, on the admissibility of Application

No. 2614/65 (Collection of Decisions, Vol. 27, pages 29, 59);

Whereas it finds no reason to find otherwise in the present case;

Whereas, consequently, this part of the application, even assuming that

the said complaint was properly brought before the Commission and

within the time-limit provided for in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the

Convention, does equally not disclose any appearance of a violation of

the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, and in particular,

in Articles 5, paragraph (4), and 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 5-4, 6-1);

Whereas it follows that in this respect the application is also

manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article

27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE