THE FACTS

Whereas the applicant states that he is an Irish citizen, born in 1940,

and at the time of his application was detained in prison in L.. He is

represented by Mr. B., a solicitor, practising in L.. The applicant was

granted legal aid by the Commission.

He states that on the night of .. June 1969, he was lying with a friend

on a grass patch, and under suspicion of attempting to commit a felony.

Two police cars arrived on the scene, and at least six policemen got

out, one with a dog. The applicant says that he got up to surrender

himself but the dog was released by the police officer, and attacked

and salvaged the applicant, causing extensive injuries to both his

upper arms, for which he required hospital treatment. The applicant

further alleges that, in the police car on the way to the station, he

was assaulted by a police officer, who punched him in the face, and

that later, in the police station, when his hands were handcuffed

behind his back, he was again assaulted by the police officer on two

separate occasions. The applicant was later charged with assaulting two

police officers; he maintains that those charges were completely false.

When the applicant first tried to write to the Commission he was

directed to write to the Chief Constable of S.. The applicant wrote to

the Chief Constable of S. Constabulary by letter dated .. June 1969 in

which he made complaints against a police dog handler and certain other

police officers. As a result of the advice given to the applicant by

the Deputy Chief Constable in a letter dated .. July 1969, the

applicant took no further action until after his trial at L. Assize in

October 1969. As a result of the applicant's letter dated .. October

1969 an enquiry was held by order of the Chief Constable of S..

Constabulary under the direction of Chief Superintendent S.. and the

result of the investigation was communicated to the applicant in a

letter dated .. May 1970 from the Chief Constable. This letter stated

that the applicant could take any action which he considered

appropriate. Copies of the statements forming part of the investigation

were not made available to the applicant nor were other particulars of

the investigation although they were submitted eventually to the

Director of Public Prosecutions. It should be noted that the enquiry

spread over a period of six months, the Chief Constable having

appointed on .. November a Chief Superintendent to carry out the

investigation and the report being eventually submitted to the Director

of Public Prosecutions on .. April. Despite the length of time which

it took the Chief Superintendent to prepare the report, the Director,

within three days of receiving it, expressed the view that there was

not sufficient evidence to justify the introduction of criminal

proceedings against any of the officers named.

In the meanwhile, a further and more serious charge had been made

against the applicant, namely that of attacking a police dog handler

with a knife and attempting to cause him grievous bodily harm. The

applicant says that this charge was equally false. It was brought two

weeks after his arrest an he submits that the police could not during

that period have overlooked the fact that he had assaulted them with

a knife.

At his trial the applicant pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary but

not guilty to three charges of assaulting a police officer. He was

acquitted on those three charges, but was sentenced to eighteen months'

imprisonment for burglary. He alleges that the judge, in passing

sentence, was influenced by the other charges since the applicant's

accomplice was merely put on probation for an extended period, although

already on probation at the time of the offense.

The applicant states that he wishes to maintain his claim for

compensation for injuries, unnecessary suffering and damage to

clothing. The injuries which he received left twelve scars on his arms,

and his clothing was ripped and bloodstained. He also suffered mental

strain while detained on remand, knowing that he could expect a very

long term of imprisonment if he was found guilty of the allegedly false

charges made against him.

The applicant submits that he was unaware of any remedies available to

him either in criminal or civil law and that he was unable to obtain

any further information from the prison authorities concerning any such

remedies as he had been informed by the prison censor at L. Prison,

shortly after his conviction in October 1969, that he had no right to

contact his solicitor as he had no legal rights while serving a term

of imprisonment. This officer informed the applicant of this position

when refusing to forward a letter from the applicant to his solicitor.

Changes in staff at L. Prison made a verification of this complaint

impossible.

The applicant states that he was aware of Rules 35 and 34 of the Prison

Rules 1964, insofar that he knew that his mail was restricted, but did

not know that he was required to apply to the Home Secretary for

permission to write to his solicitor his case had been determined by

the Court. The prison sensor did not inform the applicant of this

procedure or endeavour to explain Rules 33 and 34 to him.

The applicant invokes Articles 3, 5 (2) and (3) and Article 6 of the

Convention, without giving details of the exact provisions relied upon.

The respondent Government dispute the account of events as given by the

applicant with regard to his arrest on .. June and contend that the

police had been called to investigate a burglary at B. Road, S. and saw

the applicant and another man lying on the ground near the premises

concerned. The applicant at once jumped up, and was seen by the officer

to reach into his pocket and take out what appeared to be a large

knife. The applicant lunged towards the officer with the knife

whereupon the dog leapt at him, seizing him by the arm and causing him

to drop the knife. The police officer told the applicant and the other

man that they were being arrested for forcing an entry into the

premises concerned and the applicant kicked out at the police dog which

promptly seized his other arm. The applicant was throughout abusive and

violent and had to be handcuffed and, when brought to the police

station assaulted two officers and used obscene language. On the day

of his arrest, he was brought before the S.. City Magistrates and, on

.. July 1969 after a voluntary statement made by the person who had

been arrested with him, he was committed for trial and charged with

aggravated burglary and attempt to wound a police officer with intent

to cause grievous bodily harm.

The applicant applied several times to the Chief Constable for the

investigation of his complaints and this was ordered after the

applicant's trial and disclosed no evidence in support of his

allegations. The report of the investigation was transmitted to the

Director of Public Prosecutions and it was decided that no action

should be taken against the officers concerned.

As regards the applicant's complaint that the prison authorities

obstructed an attempt which he made about a week after his conviction

to contact his solicitors, with a view to bringing legal proceedings

against the police, the respondent Government submit that the prison

records have been inspected and, although a record of all letters sent

and received by inmates is kept, there is no record of any letter from

the applicant to his solicitors having been stopped. The practice is

that, if, for any reason, a letter by a prisoner is not posted, it is

retained in the prisoner's personal file. If the applicant had

attempted to write to solicitors without obtaining the permission of

the Home Secretary, his letter would have been stopped and he would

have been advised to petition for the necessary permission. Any such

petition would have been considered in accordance with the usual

practice. It has not been possible to trace the officer who may have

given the applicant advice on his right to seek legal advice; this may

be due to the fact that there have been changes of staff at the L.

Prison since the time when the applicant alleges that his letter was

written. If,  however, any advice had been given, the United Kingdom

Government would have expected the advice to be in the terms indicated

above.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION

Whereas the proceedings before the Commission can be summarised as

follows:

In accordance with Rule 45, 1, of the Commission's Rules of Procedure,

the application was examined on 21 July 1970 by a group of three

members of the Commission, who considered that the application should

be communicated to the respondent Government.

In accordance with Rule 45, 3 (b), the application was communicated by

the Commission on 23 July 1970 to the Government of the United Kingdom,

which was invited to submit, before 22 September 1970, its observations

in writing on the admissibility of the application. At the request of

the respondent Government, this time-limit was subsequently extended

to 8 October 1970. The Government submitted its written observations

on 1 October 1970 which were communicated to the applicant on 9 October

1970. A time-limit expiring on 2 November 1970 was fixed for the

submission of the applicant's written observations in reply. This

time-limit was subsequently extended to 20 January 1971 after the

confirmation by the Commission's Secretary of the appointment of Mr.

B. on 21 December 1970 as the applicant's legal representative. The

applicant's observations were submitted under cover of his lawyer's

letter dated 14 January 1971.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES

Whereas the submissions of the parties may be summarised as follows:

I. LAW RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE

AND REMEDIES FOR ASSAULT. LAW AND PRACTICE CONCERNING PRISONERS'

COMMUNICATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH COURT PROCEEDINGS AND PRISON PRACTICE

RELATING THERETO

1. The respondent Government submit that the competence for the

investigation of complaints against the police is placed by the Police

Act 1964 on local police authorities. Under the same Act the overall

direction and control of a police force lies with the Chief Constable

who is appointed by the local police authority, subject to the approval

of the Home Secretary.

Under Section 49 of the Act, the Chief Constable is required to record

a complaint made by a member of the public and to cause it to be

investigated. Unless he is satisfied from the report of the

investigation that no criminal offence has been committed, he is

required to send the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. It

is, however, common practice, even if the Chief Constable himself is

of the opinion that no criminal offence has been committed, to submit

the report to the Director in order that the decision whether or not

to take proceedings may be seen to have been taken impartially.

Further, the applicant could institute legal proceedings for damages

for tort (or civil wrong) within three days from the date when the

cause of action accrued. By virtue of Section 48 (1) of the Police Act

1964, the Chief Constable is in such cases treated for all purposes as

being jointly liable with the police officers concerned, and Section

48 (2) provides that any such damages or costs awarded shall be paid

out of the police fund thereby ensuring that a successful claim shall

be met.

The victim of an assault, in this case allegedly the applicant, could

also himself institute criminal proceedings against the persons who

commit the assault, either for common assault or for assault

occasioning actual bodily harm or for unlawful wounding.

A prisoner may take legal proceedings after obtaining leave of the

responsible authority. According to Prison Rules 1964 (Rule 37 (1)),

he is to be given all reasonable facilities to consult his lawyer and

may do so out of hearing, but within sight, of a prison officer. He may

also apply for legal aid.

The above is subject to restrictions. The respondent Government submit

that the Prison Rules 1964 made by the Secretary of State under Section

47 of the Prison Act 1952, place certain restrictions on communications

between prisoners and other persons. The relevant provisions are

contained in Rules 33 and 34, the text of which has been submitted to

the Commission. In particular, Rule 34 (8) provides that a prisoner may

not communicate with any person in connection with any legal or other

business, or with any person other than a relative or friend, except

with the leave of the Home Secretary.

A prisoner who wishes to take legal advice in connection with his

treatment in prison, as with any other matter, must therefore obtain

the permission of the Home Secretary before communicating with a

solicitor. In deciding whether or not to grant a request for leave to

seek legal advice, the Home Secretary takes into account the extent to

which the particulars contained in the request reveal a possible cause

of action and leave will not normally be granted if the particulars are

insufficient in indicate the precise nature of the prisoner's

complaint. If the particulars are not sufficient for this purpose, the

prisoner is normally invited to submit further particulars. In

considering whether a prisoner should be allowed to communicate with

a solicitor while still serving his sentence, the Home Secretary takes

into account whether any proceedings which the prisoner might wish to

take would, before his release from prison, become barred by statutory

limitation

on account of the passage of time since the alleged cause of action

arose. But in any event it is not the practice of the Home Secretary

to refuse leave to communicate with a solicitor for the purpose of

obtaining legal advice if the request indicates the nature of the

complaint in question and the complaint is of such a nature as, on a

reasonable and objective view of the facts, to reveal a cause of

action.

In considering a request to pursue legal action against the prison

authorities or against individual prison officers it is the

responsibility of the Home Secretary to satisfy himself as to the full

circumstances of the case and, where appropriate, to cause such

enquiries to be made as are necessary for this purpose. Where the

complaint involves accusations of misconduct by prison officers (e.g.

assault) it is the practice of the Home Secretary to insist that,

before he entertains a request for permission to consult a solicitor

with a view to bringing legal proceedings, the prescribed procedure for

dealing with such allegations of disciplinary offenses by the prison

officers concerned (or, in appropriate cases, as criminal offenses)

should first be exhausted.

2. The applicant submits, with regard to the investigation of

complaints made against members of the police force, that under the

existing system he was entirely dependent upon what in effect was an

internal police inquiry, although the eventual decision as to whether

or not proceedings should be instituted was taken by the Director of

Public Prosecutions. Nevertheless, the inquiry, the interviewing of

witnesses, the taking of statements, the interview of the applicant's

accomplice and other interviews were carried out in private by a

serving police officer in respect of complaints relating to other

serving police officers. It is submitted that an investigation under

Section 49 (1) of the Police Act 1964, is most unsatisfactory from the

point of view of the complaint, as it is not sufficient for there to

be an independent assessment of the evidence adduced at the end but the

preparation of such evidence and the enquiries necessitated by such an

investigation, the taking of proofs, the interviewing of witnesses

should be conducted in a more independent manner rather than by a

fellow officer of those against whom complaints are, in fact, being

made.

The applicant further submits, with regard to prisoners' communications

in connection with court proceedings that it is clearly not sufficient

to say that a convicted prisoner is "open to take any action which he

considers appropriate", as indicated in the respondent Government's

observations. Clearly, as will be adduced hereafter, steps open to a

convicted prisoner are completely different from those open to a person

able to seek legal advice unhampered by the restrictions hereafter

referred to. It is noted that the respondent Government concedes that

these restrictions may, in practice, have the effect of restricting the

prisoner's ability to institute legal proceedings. It is in respect of

these restrictions upon a prisoner to institute such legal proceedings

that the present application is, in fact, made. It is submitted that

such concession on the part of the respondent Government is sufficient

to permit the general admissibility of this complaint.

So far as the observations of the respondent Government are concerned,

the applicant is further disturbed to note that the Home Secretary is

not prepared to allow the matter to be considered in a dispassionate

way by the defendant's independent legal adviser, in each and every

case without hesitation. But, the Home Secretary, in the event of

receiving a request to pursue legal action against prison authorities

or individual prison officers (and to some extent the position of a

police officer must be allied to these two) and in order to satisfy

himself as to the full circumstances of the case, causes his own

inquiries to be made. Thus again, do we have an internal and far from

independent inquiry touching upon matters which one would hope would

be dealt with at a later stage by an independent judicial tribunal. It

could then be cleaned up and whitewashed prior to such independent

judicial inquiry.

II. CONSIDERATION OF ADMISSIBILITY

A. As to Article 3

1. The respondent Government submit that the applicant does not

particularise his complaint under Article 3 but it is assumed that it

relates to the alleged assault by police officers when he was arrested.

The applicant's allegations in this respect were investigated in

pursuance of Section 49 of the Police Act and no evidence in support

of these allegations was disclosed. However, this investigation does

not preclude civil or criminal proceedings instituted by he complainant

himself. It was open, and it is still open, to the applicant to pursue

one or more of the remedies described subject, of course, to prior

permission of the Home Secretary, as described above to communicate

with a solicitor.

The Government accordingly submit that the applicant has failed to

exhaust domestic remedies in this respect, as required by Article 26

of the Convention, and his complaints under Article 3 should be

considered as inadmissible under Articles 26 and 27 (3) of the

Convention.

2. The applicant submits that the respondent Government's observations

in this respect should be rejected having regard to the nature of the

inquiry under the Police Act. A fuller open inquiry before a jury at

L. Assize would have been preferable. The court had in fact accepted

the applicant's version and not the version submitted by the police

officers on oath with regard to the facts at the time of his arrest.

It is further submitted that the applicant's complaints under Article

3 relate to the assault by the police dog and its handler and to the

police officers concerned in the arrest. The officer in charge of the

dog failed to warn the applicant that the dog would attack if he moved

and made no effort to call the dog off when he was it salvaging the

applicant. The applicant further complains that the assault on him by

the police officers carrying out the arrest were a further breach of

Article 3.

It is finally submitted that the necessity to obtain the permission of

the Home Secretary to communicate with a solicitor and to set out the

grounds of complaint amount to a disclosure of a possible statement of

claim. This must be made prior to the receipt of legal advice and thus

makes difficult the pursuit of domestic remedy.

B. As to Article 5 (2) and (3)

1. The respondent Government submit that the applicant does not

indicate the respects in which he contends that this Article has been

violated.

With regard to Article 5 (2), reference is made to the facts of the

case as presented by the Government and it is submitted that, since the

reason given to the applicant for his arrest was true and the charges

against him were genuinely preferred and in absence of evidence to the

contrary, it is undisputed evidence that the provisions of the said

Article were fully complied with in the present case. And, further,

that the subsequent amendment of the charges against the applicant

(before he was finally committed for trial and as a result of further

evidence coming into the hands of the police) to include certain more

serious charges arising out of the same events was not in itself any

way improper and cannot be taken as casting any doubt on the property,

in terms of Article 5 (2) of the Convention of the conduct of the

police at the time of the arrest and the initial preferment of charges.

With regard to Article 5 (3), reference is again made to the

Government's observations on the facts and it is submitted that the

applicant was arrested under circumstances contemplated by Article 5

(1) (c) and was brought before the judge on the same day. He was

further tried within fifteen weeks and four days from the date of his

arrest and this period, is, in the Government's submission, reasonable.

The Government suggest that the applicant's complaints under Article

5 (2) and (3) are therefore inadmissible as being manifestly

ill-founded.

2. The applicant submits with regard to the alleged violation of

Article 5 (2) of the Convention, that he was informed of the charge of

burglary at the time of his arrest but he was not charged with the

further offenses in relation to the police officers until .. July 1969

although the incident giving rise to these further charges took place

on .. June 1969 and were of such a nature that the length of

investigation, prior to the charges being brought, should not have

taken fourteen days.

Further, the applicant's allegation of the breach of Article 5 (3)

relates to the delay in his being brought to trial by reason of the

police waiting for fourteen days before bringing the further charges

which resulted in a delay in the applicant being brought to trial. Had

he been charged with the further offenses upon his arrest, his case

would have been dealt with at the July Assizes. Due to delay, however,

he was retained in custody until his case came before the Assizes in

October. There can be no excuse for the delay in preferring the further

charges as no further inquiries were needed and no further witnesses

had to be brought.

C. As to Article 6 of the Convention

1. With regard to the applicant's general allegation of a violation of

Article 6, the respondent Government submit that, insofar as the

allegation relates to the trial itself, i.e. that the judge, in

determining his sentence was influenced by the charges of assault of

which he was in fact acquitted, such allegation is totally unsupported

by any evidence. They further point out that the applicant failed to

seek leave to appeal, or leave to appeal out of time, against his

sentence on grounds of it being excessive or having been determined by

reference to improper considerations.

The Government submit, in this context, that the applicant's complaint

relating to his trial, is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded

or for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.

Insofar as the applicant's complaints of being obstructed by the prison

authorities in the institution of proceedings against the police

officers concerned in his arrest, the respondent Government submit that

detention in prison, pursuant to a sentence passed on conviction of a

criminal offence (this being a deprivation of liberty permitted under

Article 5 of the Convention), necessarily involves a deprivation of

liberty going beyond the mere fact of confinement. There is inherent

in physical confinement a restriction on the ability of the person

confined to see to the conduct of his affairs. It is, therefore,

further submitted that the fact of confinement affects the application

of provisions of the Convention beyond those of Article 5, for example,

those relating to family life, correspondence, assembly and marriage,

and that this is a necessary consequence of the inherent

characteristics of confinement and is distinct from the express

qualifications on certain of the provisions of the Convention such as

those set out in Articles 8 (2), (9), 10 (2) and 11 (2). In support of

these submissions, the respondent Government refer to the final

decision of the Commission as to admissibility in the application of

de Courcy against the United Kingdom (No. 2749/66, Yearbook, Vol. X,

p. 388 at p. 412),  and to the decision of the Commission in relation

to Article 12 of the Convention (which does not contain any express

qualifying provision such as is to be found in Article 8 (2)) in

Application No. 892/60 (Yearbook, Vol. IV, p. 240 at p. 256).

The respondent Government further submit that the circumstances of a

regime of detention are such that certain restrictions on the free

access of prisoners to the machinery of civil litigation are both

necessary and justifiable; that, even as regards persons who are not

prisoners, it is generally accepted that there may be circumstances in

which it is legitimate to impose restrictions in appropriate cases on

their untrammelled recourse to the machinery of litigation; and that,

in the case of convicted persons there is a greater necessity for such

restrictions.

The respondent Government further submit that, as explained in the part

of their observations concerning the facts of the case, they have no

evidence that the applicant did in fact make any attempt to write to

his solicitors or that any letter signed by him for this purpose was

stopped by the prison authorities. It is also clear that the applicant

did not seek the permission of the Home Secretary to send any such

letter as he was required to do under the practice described above. If

he had done so, his request would have been considered and leave would

then have been granted or withheld in accordance with that practice.

Accordingly, the applicant's complaint in this respect should be

considered inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.

Without prejudice to the above, the Government also submit that it is

still open to the applicant to request the Home Secretary's permission

to consult his solicitor and until such a request has been made and

refused, the applicant cannot be considered to be the victim of a final

decision in violation of his rights under the Convention. Therefore

this complaint should be, in the alternative, inadmissible for

non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in accordance with Articles 26 and

27 (2) of the Convention.

2. The applicant alleges a breach of Article 6 in that the offence with

which he was originally charged would have been brought before the

Court in July 1969, but, as a result of the further charges being

brought fourteen days after his arrest, the applicant had to await

trial at the Assize held in October 1969.

The applicant wrote to his solicitors shortly after his conviction in

October 1969 raising the question of appeal against sentence, together

with a request for advice concerning any remedy he might have against

the police force. This letter was censored by the prison censor.

It is basically because of this measure that a breach of Article 6 is

complained of, in that, although domestic remedies might have been

available both for the bringing of proceedings and the submission of

an appeal, the refusal by the prison authorities to permit access to

his solicitor prevented the applicant from pursuing this remedy. The

applicant maintains that the respondent Government's observations are

inconsistent with Article 6 as, although clearly certain restrictions

upon liberty necessarily result from prison detention, it is

inconsistent with basic human rights that a prisoner should be

ill-treated in the manner described in Article 3 and should have

subsequently no proper recourse to law, particularly when he alleges

that it is the prison officials themselves who are so treating him.

It is further submitted that a proposed defendant should not be the

person to decide whether or not a complaint is frivolous or vexatious.

Had the applicant been permitted to seek legal advice and subsequently

bring proceedings, then an application for legal aid could be granted,

the Law Society would have made an independent assessment of the

question whether or not the application was frivolous or vexatious. It

is submitted that such a safety valve, as regards an appreciation of

the value of a detained person's claim, is preferable in that it is at

least independent.

The applicant finally notes that within recent months the respondent

Government has brought into operation regulations whereby an accused

person after conviction, can make specific representations upon

specific forms seeking advice from his solicitor upon the question of

an appeal. These forms have been brought into use since the present

case was heard and a copy of one such form has been submitted to the

Commission.

THE LAW

Whereas the applicant first complains of a violation of Article 3

(Art. 3) of the Convention which provides that "no-one shall be

subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or

punishment";

Whereas, although the applicant has not himself specified which part

of Article 3 (Art. 3) he invokes, the Commission has not considered

that his complaint could possibly raise any question as regards

"torture" or "inhuman or degrading punishment" but only as regards

"inhuman or degrading treatment"; whereas the applicant alleges that

at the moment of his arrest on .. June 1969 he was attacked and

salvaged by a police dog and that, in the police car on the way to the

police station and in the station itself, he was twice assaulted by

police officers while his hands were handcuffed behind his back;

whereas the respondent Government disputed the account of events as

given by the applicant and submitted that in actual fact the applicant

at the time of his arrest became violent and lunged towards the police

dog handler with a knife whereupon the dog leapt at him and gripped his

arm; that afterwards he kicked out at the police dog which promptly

seized his other arm; that, after his arrest, the applicant continued

to be abusive and violent and, when brought to the police station,

assaulted two police officers;

Whereas the applicant was committed for trial on .. July 1969 and

charged with aggravated burglary, with attempt to wound a police

officer with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and with assaulting

two other police officers; whereas, it is not disputed that at his

trial the applicant was convicted only on the charge of burglary and

was acquitted on the other charges; whereas the applicant's allegations

in regard to his being assaulted by the police were investigated in

pursuance of Section 49 of the Police Act 1964, and the Director of

Public Prosecutions decided that no evidence in support of these

allegations was disclosed and therefore refused to take action against

the police officers concerned;

Whereas, further, the respondent Government contended in this respect

that the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies available

to him in that he failed to institute criminal or civil proceedings

against those persons who had allegedly ill-treated him;

Whereas the Commission notes that the institution of such proceedings

require the prior permission of the Home Secretary but in fact, the

applicant did not petition the Home Secretary for such permission;

Whereas, however, the Commission has previously found in similar

circumstances that it is doubtful whether the institution of such

proceedings constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of

Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention (see Application No. 3868/68,

in Collection of Decisions, Vol. 34, p. 10 (17));

Whereas, the Commission next had regard to the account of events as

given by the respondent Government and to the results of the

investigation carried out under the authority of the Chief Constable;

Whereas it considers that the account of events given by the Government

appears to be generally correct; whereas, the Commission in any case

finds that even the applicant's version of the various incidents does

not disclose a treatment so serious as to amount to inhuman or

degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the

Convention (see Report of the Commission on First Greek Case, Vol. II,

I, p. 1); whereas, therefore, the Commission is in any event of the

opinion that the applicant's complaints as regards his alleged

ill-treatment are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article

27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, the applicant also complains of a violation of Article 5,

paragraph (2) (Art. 5-2) of the Convention which provides that

"everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language

which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge

against him";

Whereas, the applicant submits that he was informed of the charge of

burglary at the time of his arrest but it was not until .. July 1969

that he was charged with the further offenses in relation to the police

officers, although the incidents giving rise to these charges took

place on .. June 1969 and were of such nature that the length of their

investigation prior to the charges being brought should not have taken

fourteen days.

Whereas, the respondent Government submit that the applicant was

brought before the S. Magistrates' Court on .. and .. June and .. July

1969, and that there is no evidence to show that the reason given to

him for his arrest was untrue or that the charges against him were not

genuinely preferred; further, that the subsequent amendment of the

charges against the applicant, before his committal for trial, was a

result of subsequent evidence, in particular, of the statement made on

.. June 1969 by a person arrested together with him;

Whereas the Commission has frequently found that Article 5, paragraph

(2) (Art. 5-2) of the Convention does not require this information

about the charges to be given in any special form (see Applications

Nos. 1211/61, Yearbook, Vol. 5, p. 224; 1216/61, Collection of

Decisions, Vol. 2, p. 1; 2621/65 Yearbook, Vol. 9, p. 474 (480));

Whereas, the Commission is also satisfied that the reasons given to the

applicant for his arrest were true and indeed resulted in his

conviction on the charge of burglary and that, moreover, Article 5 (2)

(Art. 5-2) does not require that a complete description of all the

charges should be given to the accused at the moment of his arrest;

Whereas, therefore, the Commission finds that the examination of the

case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 5 (2)

(Art. 5-2) of the Convention; whereas it follows that this part of the

application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of

Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas the applicant further alleges a violation of Article 5,

paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, in that his being brought

to trial was unduly delayed as it was not until fourteen days after the

date of his arrest that the police brought further charges and he was

therefore tried at the Assizes in October instead of July 1969;

Whereas it is true that under Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of

the Convention "everyone arrested or detained in accordance with

paragraph (1) (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of this Article, shall be brought

promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise

judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time

or to release pending trial."

Whereas the applicant was arrested on .. June 1969 and remanded in

custody. He was brought before the Magistrates' Court on the morning

of his arrest, and appeared again before that Court on .. June and ..

July 1969; whereas it is therefore clear that the applicant was

"brought promptly" before the competent judge within the meaning of the

above provision;

Whereas the Commission is next called upon to decide whether or not the

applicant's detention on remand has been prolonged beyond a reasonable

time and was thereby contrary to the second requirement of Article 5,

paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention;

Whereas the Commission observes that the charges were clearly serious

that they involved an accomplice, and that the applicant's detention

on remand lasted for a period of fifteen weeks and four days only;

Whereas, consequently, an examination of the case does not disclose any

appearance of a violation of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the

Convention;

Whereas it follows that similarly this part of the application is

manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in regard to the applicant's further complaint a violation of

Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) in that he allegedly did not have "a fair and

public hearing within a reasonable time", the proceedings from the time

of his arrest until his conviction lasted, as did his detention on

remand, for a total period of fifteen weeks and four days;

Whereas this period can equally in no way be considered as a violation

of this right mentioned in Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1); whereas it follows

that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within

the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention;

Whereas, finally the applicant further complains under Article 6 (1)

(Art. 6-1) that by the refusal of the prison authorities to allow him

to consult a solicitor he was prevented from obtaining the

determination of a civil right by a tribunal in that he was unable to

pursue his claim against the police officers before a court;

whereas it is true that such a refusal might give rise to the question

whether the applicant's right to access to a court, insofar as it can

be considered as being guaranteed under the said provision (see

Application No. 4115/69, Knechtl v. United Kingdom), had been

interfered with; whereas, however, the applicant has failed to

substantiate his allegation that he has written to his solicitor or,

if so, that any such letter was stopped by the prison authorities;

Whereas an examination of the case does not disclose any appearance of

a violation of this particular right under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1);

Whereas it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE