THE FACTS (1)

Proceedings before the Commission

Whereas the proceedings before the Commission may be summarised as

follows:

By two partial decisions dated 7th October and 16th December, 1966, the

Commission while declaring other parts of the present Application

inadmissible, decided, in accordance with Rule 45, paragraph 3 (b) of

its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the Application to the

Government of the United Kingdom and to invite it to submit its

observations in writing on the question of admissibility in so far as

the Application related to:

- the Applicant's complaints appearing at paragraph V of the Facts,

namely, that he has been deprived of access to the courts but only in

so far as they were based on the specific allegations set out in

paragraphs V (b), (c) and (d) of the Facts, which relate to the

stopping by the

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(1) See partial decision of 7th October, 1966, above, page 85.

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prison authorities of five letters sent by the Applicant with a view

to taking certain proceedings before the courts;

- the Applicant's complaint set out in paragraph IX of the Facts

relating to an alleged decision by the Board of Trade which prevented

the Applicant from obtaining certain accounts which he desired to

submit to the Commission in connection with his Application.

On 27th February, 1967, the Government submitted its observations on

admissibility. The Applicant's reply, consisting of a letter and a

typed document dated 3rd March, 1967, together with a number of

annexes, was submitted on 30th March, 1967.

Submissions of the Parties

Whereas the submissions of the parties may be summarised as follows:

The Government, after tracing the history of the Applicant's

conviction, set out the provisions of Rules 33 and 34, paragraph (8)

of the Prisons' Rules 1964, governing communications between prisoners

and persons outside the prison. These Rules provide that a prisoner

shall not be permitted to communicate with any outside person, or that

person with him, without the permission of the Home Secretary. The

Government then states the general practice with regard to the grant

of facilities for prisoners to institute legal proceedings and if they

would be prejudiced by the deferment of such proceedings until their

release. They are not, however, given facilities to institute

proceedings which would reopen questions in issue at their trial such

as, for example, proceedings for perjury against a witness at the

trial. But a prisoner who has exhausted his rights of appeal may

petition the Home Secretary who will consider whether there are grounds

for referring the case to the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal

for reconsideration in accordance with Section 19 of the Criminal

Appeal Act, 1907. This will not be done unless the Home Secretary is

satisfied that significant new evidence has come to light since the

trial. Similar principles govern the grant of facilities to apply for

a writ of habeas corpus and as a concession facilities are also granted

for only one informal application to the Court on the question of the

legality of a prisoner's detention.

The Government then states the facilities actually granted to the

Applicant in connection with litigation pending at the time of his

conviction and one libel case which he was subsequently permitted to

commence. On 25th September, 1964, detailed instructions based on the

above principles were sent to the Prison Governor and communicated to

the Applicant (a copy is included as an annex to the Government's

observations).

The Government's observations then deal separately with each of the

five letters mentioned in sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph

V of the Facts. The letters are set out in chronological order in Annex

E to the observations and numbered for convenience E (i) - (v) as

follows:

E (i): Letter of 24th January, 1966, to the Master of the High Court

of Rhodesia. This letter concerns a claim which the Applicant wished

to pursue in the Rhodesian courts and sought an order to stay the

issues "until such time as the Secretary of State for the Home

Department has been compelled by the European Commission to cease his

unlawful denial of my rights and thereafter the evidence requisite has

been established in the [United Kingdom] courts". The Government

observes that the Applicant did not seek the Home Secretary's

permission to take such a step regarding these proceedings.

E (ii): Letter of 4th February, 1966, to Mr. N. Beach of Messrs. Beach

& Beach, Solicitors.

In this letter the Applicant instructed a solicitor to examine evidence

with a view to the prosecution for perjury of a witness at his trial

and stated "if the Secretary of State should stop this letter and

attempt to stifle such proceedings, I shall lay the copy of this before

the European Commission."  The Government observes that the Applicant

did not seek the Home Secretary's permission to write to a solicitor

with a view to the institution of proceedings of this kind.

E (iii): Letter of 5th February, 1966, to Messrs. Bull & Bull,

Solicitors.

This letter instructed solicitors to institute civil proceedings

against certain persons, including the witness referred to in

connection with the preceding letter. It was attached to a personal

letter to Sir G.B. stating it to be "written in direct defiance of the

H.S. [i.e. the Home Secretary] under protection of Articles 5 and 6 of

the Convention". The Government observes that the Applicant did not

seek the Home Secretary's leave to instruct solicitors to institute

proceedings of this kind.

E (iv): Letter of 7th February to Messrs. Beach & Beach, Solicitors.

This letter, which was expressed to be "in further defiance of the H.S.

and under the protection of Article 6 (1) of the European Convention",

instructed solicitors to institute civil proceedings against certain

other persons with a view to establishing the authenticity of evidence

that the Applicant had been wrongfully convicted.

The Government again observed that the Applicant did not seek the Home

Secretary's leave to instruct solicitors to institute such proceedings.

E (v): Letter of 22nd February, 1966, to the Master of the Crown

Office, Royal Courts of Justice, which the Government states appears

to be the letter referred to in paragraph V (d) of the Statement of

Facts. This letter made application for habeas corpus "by means of

informal procedure" so as to enable the Applicant to apply for an

injunction requiring, in effect, that the Home Secretary should allow

him certain facilities. The Government observes that the Applicant had

not sought special permission from the Home Secretary to make this

further informal application, since only one such application is

permitted by way of concession without such special permission.

The Government observes with regard to all five letters that the

Applicant, having failed to seek the permission of the Home Secretary

to pursue the proceeding contemplated in each case, has failed to

exhaust the available domestic remedies. Further, in respect of the

letters of 4th, 5th and 7th February, 1966, (E (ii), E (iii) and E

(iv)), the Applicant's obvious intention was to reopen questions in

issue at his trial, and he had already been informed that he would not

be permitted to institute proceedings of this kind.

The Government further emphatically deny the Applicant's allegations

in the first two sentences of paragraph V of the Facts that he has been

"shut out by the Home Secretary from every Court in the United

Kingdom", that he has been "wholly deprived of all access to any courts

whatsoever"; and that there has been a decision or directive to that

effect.

The Government further submits that the actions complained of in

sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph V of the Facts do not

constitute a violation of any right guaranteed by the Convention. In

particular, Article 5 invoked by the Applicant, is irrelevant in this

context because the actions here complained of in no way affected the

rights to liberty and security of the person secured to the Applicant

under that Article. Furthermore, the Government argues that the first

sentence of paragraph (1) of Article 6 (which is the only provision of

that Article which might be considered relevant) does not make it

necessary for a Party to the Convention to secure everyone within its

jurisdiction an unrestricted right to institute or pursue proceedings

in its courts. The first sentence of Article 6 (1) is concerned

essentially to ensure that the conduct of proceedings to determine

civil rights or obligations or criminal charges, once they have been

instituted, conforms to certain prescribed requirements. The Article

does not apply to a person who has been finally convicted and is

seeking a retrial nor does it (unless the proceedings in question,

though criminal in form, amount in substance to a determination of

civil rights) apply even to the conduct of proceedings in the case of

a person bringing a criminal charge.

Further, Article 6 in no way prohibits the imposition of restrictions

or the institution of proceedings by certain classes of persons such

as persons of unsound mind, bankrupts, vexatious litigants and

convicted prisoners.

Such restrictions are, for various reasons, considered essential in the

general interest.

The limitations imposed on convicted prisoners in England in this

respect, are no more restrictive than is necessary in the general

interest. Even in the case of proceedings to reopen questions in issue

at the trial, the restrictions imposed (which are concerned to guard

against a multiplication of limitation on facts already considered by

the courts) are not intended wholly to exclude the examination of such

questions by the courts and do not, in fact, do so.

The Government, therefore, submitted that Article 6 could not be

regarded as requiring it to permit the Applicant to institute or pursue

the proceedings contemplated in the five letters concerned or to allow

him to send these letters. The Government maintains that this

submission is valid irrespective of the nature of the proceedings.

Further, in respect of the letters of 4th, 5th and 7th February, 1966,

(E (ii), E (iii) and E (iv)) the Applicant was in substance seeking a

review of his conviction which the Government was clearly under no

obligation to accord to him. The Government therefore submitted further

and, in the alternative, to its submission concerning non-exhaustion

of domestic remedies, that the actions complained of in sub-paragraphs

(b), (c) and (d) of paragraph V of the Facts clearly did not constitute

a violation of any right guaranteed in Articles 5 or 6 and that the

Applicant's complaints on these matters should be considered

incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or, in the

alternative, manifestly ill-founded.

On the complaint in paragraph X of the Facts in which the Applicant

states that the Board of Trade had instructed Y. Bank Limited not to

disclose certain accounts which were alleged to be required for the

purposes of his Application to the Commission, the Government makes the

following observations in order to refute the suggestion that there may

have been any action on their part which might have hindered the

effective exercise of the right of petition contrary to the undertaking

contained in the last sentence of Article 25, paragraph (1), of the

Convention.

The Government explains that the accounts in question are those of a

company, the Z. Limited, which is subject to a court order of 28th

January, 1963, for compulsory liquidation.

The right to inspect the books of a company in this position by a

creditor or contributory as claimed by the Applicant is governed by

Section 266 (1) of the Companies Act, 1948, which provides as follows:

"The Court may, at any time after making a winding-up order, make such

order for inspection of the books and papers of the company by

creditors and contributories as the court thinks just, and any books

and papers in the possession of the company may be inspected by

creditors or contributories accordingly, but not further or otherwise".

The Government supplied copies of the Applicant's correspondence

relating to his request for disclosure to him of the company's accounts

which shows clearly that it had been pointed out to the Applicant and

to persons acting on his behalf or in his interest that, in view of the

terms of Section 266 of the Companies Act, 1948, it would not be proper

for the Senior Official Receiver to allow Y. Bank Limited to permit

inspection of the company's accounts without an order of the court. It

was, therefore, suggested that such an application to the court should

be made by the Applicant or on his behalf. The Government was not,

however, aware of any such application having been made. Although as

appears from the later correspondence the Applicant had disputed the

Senior Official Receiver's view of his powers and duties with regard

to the disclosure of the accounts he had not at any stage, as far as

the Government was aware, disputed that the points at issue were ones

on which the courts were competent to pronounce. The Applicant had not

sought to apply to the court either under Section 266 of the Companies

Act, 1948, or under Section 246 (5) of that Act which provides that "if

any person is aggrieved by any act or decision of the liquidator, that

person may apply to the court; and the court may confirm, reverse or

modify the act or decision complained of, and make such other order in

the premises as it thinks just". The Applicant's failure to obtain the

accounts was thus due to his own failure to apply to the courts which,

so far from being impeded by the United Kingdom authorities, was

actually suggested by them. No complaint of prevention from having

access to the courts can arise in respect of this matter, and there has

clearly been no decision which could justify a complaint of hindrance

of the effective exercise of the right of petition contrary to the last

sentence of Article 25, paragraph (1), of the Convention.

The Applicant in his reply states that the Government's observations

relating to the history of his trial in the courts is tendacious and

sets out his own account of the proceedings remarking particularly on

the incompletences and inaccuracy of the evidence for the prosecution.

He states that the Government is mistaken in including convicted

prisoners in the same category as persons of unsound mind and bankrupts

as persons whose access to the courts may be restricted in the public

interest on the ground that these two classes are "constitutionally

excluded save through their appointed representatives". Moreover,

Parliament had expressly conferred the right of access upon convicted

persons and in no way subordinated such rights to any previses

connected with Prison Rules or excluded litigation on now evidence

which might challenge previous convictions.

The Applicant maintains that the use of the controls provided by the

Prison Rules in order to stop letters concerned with litigation is an

abuse of the Home Secretary's powers, unconstitutional and contrary to

the Convention: or alternatively, that the Prison Rules, 1964, were

superseded by the Convention on 13th January, 1966, (the date of the

United Kingdom Government's declaration recognising the right of the

Commission to receive individual applications) and therefore could not

lawfully be employed by the Home Secretary contrary to the provisions

of Article 5, paragraph (4), and Article 6, paragraph (1), of the

Convention.

The Applicant considers that the Government's standing practice with

regard to access to the courts by convicted prisoners as set out in

paragraph 5 of its observations is in contravention of the Convention.

He states:

"In fact, no access is given to the Courts in respect of a prisoner's

claims to his lawful rights of personal property or damages in tort if

that access should risk a resulting challenge to convictions even if

such proceedings should originate from wholly new facts in no way

disclosed or known at the time of conviction or final appeal".

Since nearly all such new evidence in some way reflects upon the

Prosecution for whom the Home Secretary must answer in Parliament, it

is not proper that the Home Secretary, who is an interested party,

should be the person who decides whether such new facts should, or

should not, be adduced in a court of law. Such a situation is contrary

to substantial justice and at complete variance with Article 5,

paragraph (4), and Article 6, paragraph (1), of the Convention which

expressly state that the prisoner must have access to courts of law if

he considers any of his civil rights arise or if he considers himself

to be wrongfully in prison.

The Applicant admits that he was granted facilities, in 1964, to

continue litigation pending at the time of his imprisonment, but states

that these facilities were largely withdrawn in January 1967. With

respect to the Government's observation relating to the instructions

as to access to the courts given to the prison governor with respect

to the Applicant on 25th September, 1964 (Annex D of the Government's

observations) the Applicant re-states his position to the effect that

"regardless of rights of property or damage, the home Secretary will

not permit access to the courts if it should undermine convictions and

this would embarrass the prosecution".

In view of this, the Applicant states that he does not understand the

argument in paragraph 15 of the Government's observations that if the

issues had again been submitted on petition, the matter would have been

carefully considered. He states that he has made a petition to the Lord

Chancellor which was ignored, which was an action contrary to Article

6, paragraph (1) and that on 27th February, 1967, he was once again

informed by the Home Office that civil proceedings would not be

allowed.

The Applicant then proceeds to deal with his complaint that he had been

deprived of access to the courts by the stopping of the five letters

(E (i) - (v) above) which was the first matter referred by the

Commission for the respondent Government's observations as to

admissibility. He writes:

"The respondent Government is in error. The letters were both stopped

and confiscated ... . It is repeated that the Applicant had no further

grounds of petition to the Home Secretary because ... the Home

Secretary had categorically stated (and repeated) (on stoppage of the

letters), that such proceedings would not be allowed. The memorandum

of the Home Office states that fact. It is little short of incredible

that the United Kingdom Government now puts forward a defence to the

effect that I should have petitioned the Home Secretary when, in fact,

a decision had been taken and had been conveyed to me, leaving no room

for a further petition to the Home Secretary. As stated I petitioned

the Lord Chancellor without relief and thereby exhausted all remedies

save application to the Commission. Moreover, all the letters were

written subsequent to the Petition dated 24th January, 1966, which is

the proviso the respondent Government itself now stipulates. That

petition was refusal on 23rd March, 1966 .. .It is clear from the text

of all the letters that such proceedings would not be allowed and

indeed, they expressly say so, and are written in full knowledge

thereof in reliance on the guarantee of Article 6, paragraph (1). The

Home Secretary's decision not to allow such proceedings (25th

September, 1964) was a decision prior to 13th January, 1966, and is

not, therefore, the subject of complaint to the Commission. The Home

Secretary's actions in stopping the letters after express warning that

the Applicant now properly relied upon the Convention to which the Home

Secretary was then subject, was subsequent to 13th January, 1966, and,

therefore, constitutes a violation. This action was one in face of my

expressly stated reliance on the Convention. The failure of the Lord

Chancellor to enforce access was both an action and a decision

subsequent to 13th January, 1966. It is to trifle with substantial

justice to pretend that there was room for yet another petition to the

Home Secretary and that no further petition having been submitted, my

domestic remedies were not exhausted. They were held by all my legal

advisers to have been exhausted but the United Kingdom had voluntarily

subjected itself to the guarantees of the Convention which I correctly

invoked ... .In the first place it is suggested [in paragraph 18 of the

Government's observations] that if the civil proceedings required in

February, 1966, had the purpose of dealing with the convictions I

should have petitioned under Section 19 A of the Criminal Appeal Act,

1907, but that I omitted to do so. That allegation is false. In fact,

I did petition on 24th January, 1966, for that specific purpose. The

petition was refused on 23rd March, 1964. My statement of claim to the

Commission is dated 30th March, 1966, and was signed in the light of

the refusal dated 23rd March, 1966.

It is almost incredible of belief that a responsible Government in

observations addressed to the European Commission should omit what in

any view must be regarded as the cardinal factor in this Application

and attempt to persuade the Commission that there was no such petition.

Copies of the petition dated 24th January, 1946, and the refusal

therefore (sic) dated 23rd March, 1966, were submitted to the

Commission. I therefore firmly submit that, in fact, the United Kingdom

Government has failed to answer the Commission".

With reference to the last letter stopped (E (v)) the Applicant writes:

"... the application for habeas corpus dated 22nd February, 1966, by

way of informal letter to the Crown Office was in connection with the

right of access to the Civil Courts for the protection of rights to

property and damages (Article 6, paragraph (1)) and as the text of that

letter clearly evidences, was in no way at all related to the issues

of 2nd April, 1965, in respect of a writ of habeas corpus. The

repondent Government is taking refuge in a patent misrepresentation.

It was for the Crown Office to determine whether I was entitled to

access by informal letter or on a new and wholly different subject from

that exhausted in 1965. Applications for habeas corpus are not limited

to one. I am entitled to apply on new or different issues, or on new

evidence in respect of a previous application. I expressly petitioned

for that purpose, which petition was refused and the letter to the

court stopped. In fact, the letter to the Crown Office, therefore,

never reached the court at all, so that the court could not determine

whether or not an application in such form was, in fact, admissible.

No facilities were given or suggested for application under the Rules

in this matter. I was entitled to seek informal application and it was

for the court to determine that issue. The Home Secretary stopped that,

and the court never knew about it at all, and was not allowed to know.

The United Kingdom had no possible defence to this complaint. No other

issue is in any way relevant since all other issues were ones for the

Court to determine. No civil rights exceeds in importance habeas corpus

and Article 6, paragraph (1) was therefore violated". Commenting on a

passage in the Government's observations (paragraph 18), which reads:

"... and on 7th February, 1967, the Applicant sent to the Secretary of

State a number of documents and a further statement in support of his

petition. These are now being examined, and no final decision on this

petition has yet been taken", the Applicant writes: "In the second

place the respondent Government astonishingly argues that only on 7th

February was a petition submitted which is still under consideration,

so that, in fact, I have therefore never exhausted my domestic

remedies". The Applicant then proceeds to give a detailed history of

his petitions to the Home Secretary, directed towards obtaining a

reopening of his case in view of the new evidence which had come to

light, and makes the point that his communications to the Home

Secretary dated 26th July, 20th September, 6th, 7th and 23rd December,

1966, 2nd (mistakenly referred to in the Government's observations as

7th) February, and 17th February, 1967, were not fresh petitions but

merely reminders.

He also makes certain submissions in this connection. In answer to the

Government's argument that Article 6, paragraph (1) was concerned

essentially with the conduct of proceedings and not with access to the

courts he submits: "Article 6 (1) does not merely provide for the

conduct of proceedings. It essentially guarantees access to the courts.

It would be derisory if only conduct but not access were intended since

without access conduct cannot arise at all. The prime requisite is

access. As to civil rights, it is fundamental that issues of property,

damages and wrongful conviction ... all involve separate and basic

civil rights. If excluded the Article would be almost meaningless since

scarcely any other rights arise. It is also submitted that criminal

convictions procured unlawfully by fraud, perjury or falsification of

evidence and accounts, are ipso facto unlawful convictions unless and

until confirmed by a court in despite of such disclosures. This must

ipso facto raise both Article 5, paragraph (4) and Article 6, paragraph

(1)". The Applicant argues that a convicted person retains a right to

property and damages and has a civil right guaranteed by the Convention

(Article 6 (1)) to establish the same, notwithstanding that the result

may be to undermine decisions taken in earlier proceedings at which

certain facts and evidence were not known. He states that it is wrong

to argue that proceedings for perjury against the principal prosecution

witness would not involve the civil rights of the Applicant. If the

Applicant was convicted on perjured evidence and a court found that

evidence to have been perjured, it clearly would affect the Applicant's

rights.

With regard to the second question on which the Commission had

requested observations from the respondent Government and which

concerned the Applicant's complaint of a decision of the Board of

Trade, which prevented him from obtaining certain accounts which he

desired to submit to the Commission, the Applicant writes: "... the

Applicant is aware that he should apply to the courts. But the Home

Secretary has repeatedly stated that save in the actions permitted on

2nd January, 1964, the Applicant will not be given such access. It is

wholly remarkable that the respondent Government now suggests that such

access is open when it has repeatedly been refused in writing. The

Respondent fails to explain this".

The Applicant also makes a number of further submissions which extend

beyond the matters on which the respondent Government was invited to

submit its observations and which have, therefore, not been included

in this summary.

THE LAW

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaint that he is improperly

detained in prison, it is clear that the Applicant has been convicted

by the judgment of a competent court, which has become res judicata,

and is therefore properly detained in accordance with the provisions

of Article 5, paragraph (1) (a) (Art. 5-1-a); whereas accordingly an

examination of the case as it has been submitted, including an

examination made ex officio, does not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and

in particular in Article 5, paragraph (4) (Art. 5-4); whereas it

follows that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded

within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the

Convention;

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains that the stopping of his

letters of 4th, 5th and 7th February, 1966, prevented him from

obtaining access to the Courts, it is clear that the Applicant's

purpose was thereby to obtain by retrial or otherwise, a reopening of

the proceedings against him; whereas the same applies to his letter of

22nd July, 1966, to the Master of the Crown Office; whereas it is to

be observed that the Convention, under the terms of Article 1 (Art. 1),

guarantees only the rights and freedoms set forth in Section I of the

Convention; and whereas, under Article 25, paragraph (1) (Art. 25-1),

only the alleged violation of one of those rights and freedoms by a

Contracting Party can be the subject of an application presented by a

person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals;

Whereas otherwise its examination is outside the competence of the

Commission ratione materiae; whereas no right of retrial or appeal is

as such included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the

Convention; whereas in this respect the Commission refers to its

previous decisions concerning applications for retrial, Nos. 864/60,

M. v. Austria - Collection of Decisions Volume 9, page 17 and 1237/61

- Yearbook V, page 96;

Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is incompatible

with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27,

paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;

Whereas, in so far as the Applicant complains that the stopping of the

said letters prevented him from obtaining access to the courts for the

determination of his civil rights or obligations whether these rights

and obligations were or were not connected with facts or events on

which the Applicant's trial and conviction were based, it is to be

observed that, under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, the

Commission may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have

been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of

international law; and whereas the Applicant failed to apply in

accordance with the Prison Rules to the Home Secretary for permission

to send these letters; whereas, therefore, he has not exhausted the

remedies available to him under English law; whereas, moreover, an

examination of the case as it has been submitted, including an

examination made ex officio, does not disclose the existence of any

special circumstances which might have absolved the Applicant,

according to the generally recognised rules of international law, from

exhausting the domestic remedies at his disposal; whereas, in

particular, the Applicant's contention that an application to the Home

Secretary would have been useless in view of the Home Secretary's

instructions of 25th September, 1964, is based on his misinterpretation

of those instructions; whereas the Applicant failed to satisfy, or

attempt to satisfy, the Home Secretary that these letters complied with

the express conditions on which permission for their dispatch would

have been granted under the instructions, namely that they were

intended to obtain access to the Courts for the determination of the

Applicant's civil rights and obligations and not with a view to

obtaining a review of his conviction; whereas, therefore, the condition

as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies laid down in Articles 26 and

27, paragraph (3) (Art. 26, 27-3), of the Convention has not been

complied with by the Applicant;

Whereas the Commission has taken into consideration the declaration

made by the United Kingdom Government under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention by which the United Kingdom recognised the competence of the

Commission to receive applications from individuals in relation to acts

or decisions, facts or events occurring or arising subsequently to 13th

January, 1966;

Whereas, however, in the circumstances of the case it is not necessary

to consider whether complaints relating to proceedings arising out of

facts and events prior to that date are in any event outside the

competence of the Commission ratione temporis;

Whereas, in regard to the Applicant's complaint concerning the stopping

of his letter of 24th January, 1966, to the High Court of Rhodesia, an

examination of the case shows that the High Court of Rhodesia in fact

received and acted upon a letter to the same effect written by the

Applicant on 21st January, 1966; whereas, therefore, there is no

appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the

Convention and in particular in Article 8 (Art. 8); whereas as regards

the Applicant's further complaints relating to the control and stopping

of his letters in general, such measures were designed, inter alia, to

limit the number of letters to be written by him and were imposed under

the provisions established by law, namely Rules 33 and 34, paragraph

(8) of the Prison Rules, 1964; whereas these provisions are consistent

with the Convention since the limitation of the right of a detained

person to conduct correspondence is a necessary part of his deprivation

of liberty which is inherent in the punishment of imprisonment; whereas

similarly an examination of the complaint does not disclose any

violation of Article 8, paragraph (1) (Art. 8-1), or of any of the

other rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention;

Whereas with regard to the Applicant's complaint that he was prevented

by the Board of Trade from obtaining certain accounts which he desired

to submit to the Commission in connection with the present Application,

the Applicant himself admits that he did not petition the Home

Secretary for leave to apply to the Court under Sections 246 (5) or 266

of the Companies Act, 1948; whereas accordingly it does not appear that

there was any denial of facilities by the respondent Government

contrary to its undertaking under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the

Convention;

Now therefore the Commission declares this Application inadmissible.