THE FACTS

I.   Description of the applicant and the relation of the present

application to application No. 5155/71

On 20 August 1971 the first applicant, Mr. X., a citizen of the United

Kingdom, introduced an application against the United Kingdom. He was

represented by the second applicant, Mr. Y., a citizen of the United

States of America and a lawyer practising in Buffalo, New York.

That application which concerned, inter alia, the first applicant's

arrest in August 1971 and subsequent detention in Northern Ireland, was

registered in the register of the Commission's Secretariat on 6

September 1971 under file No. 5155/71. On 25 September 1971 the

Commission decided, in accordance with Rule 45, 3 (b) of its Rules of

Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent

Government and to invite the Government to submit its observations in

writing on the admissibility of the application. The Commission also

decided to give precedence to the application in accordance with Rule

38 , 1 of the Rules of Procedure.

The respondent Government's observations on the admissibility were

submitted on 18 February 1972. In these observations the respondent

Government confirmed, inter alia, that the first applicant had been

arrested on .. August 1971 under Regulation 11 issued under the Civil

Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 on the grounds

that he was suspected of having committed an offence under Regulation

24 A by having in his possession documents relating to, or purporting

to relate to, the affairs of an unlawful association, namely the Irish

Republican Army (IRA). On .. September an order was signed by the

Ministry for Home Affairs in his capacity as Civil Authority for the

first applicant's internment under the provisions of Regulation 12 of

the Special Powers Regulations. On .. September 1971 another order was

made under the same regulations authorising his removal to Long Kesh

Internment Camp where he is still being detained.

The respondent Government's observations on the admissibility of

application No. 5155/71 were forwarded to the second applicant in his

capacity as legal representative of the first applicant on 25 February

and the second applicant was invited to submit observations in reply

before 26 April 1972.

Under cover of a letter of 10 March 1972 the second applicant submitted

to the Commission a "new petition" on behalf of the first applicant and

on his own behalf. The Commission examined this petition (the full text

of which will be reproduced under II below) on 23 March 1972. It

decided that the petition should be regarded as a new application which

was consequently registered in the register of the Commission's

Secretariat under file No. 5459/72.

II.  The applicants' application of 10 March 1972

The application states as follows:

"The undersigned attorney, Y, on behalf of X, who has previously filed

a complaint against the Government of Great Britain herein and on

behalf of himself as attorney for the said client, petitions the Human

Rights Commission as follows:

In order to reply to the Government's answer, I must communicate with

my client who is interned at the Long Kesh concentration camp. I cannot

do this since the Government continuously intercepts and opens and

censors all mail between my client and myself.

The internment of my client does not justify this breach of the

confidential relationship between attorney and client, well recognised

by the Commission and the common law of Great Britain. It is

unrealistic to expect an attorney to accept such conditions, knowing

the British Government is taking note of each and every word exchanged

between attorney and client.

The right to legal counsel, recognised by the Convention, implies the

right to communicate with said counsel in private without interference

from the Government. An attorney who cannot so act, is of little

assistance to his client who, in effect, is unrepresented by counsel.

Due process of law requires legal representation free from governmental

interference. The Government's action is an effect to intimidate and

restrain both attorney and client herein.

The Government's action violates Article 5 of the Convention which

guarantees 'liberty and security of person'. and Article 6 of the

Convention which guarantees due process of law, including the right to

communicate and be represented by legal counsel and the 'right to have

adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence' as

well as 'legal assistance'.

Article 8 guarantees the right of privacy and is also violated. Since

Mr. X. is incarcerated, he is hardly a threat to public peace and order

or a threat to the 'freedom of others'.

Article 11 is also violated since the petitioner is denied the right

of 'freedom of association' with his attorney for the purpose of

presenting his case through a legal representative.

Under British law, convicted criminals have the right to communicate

in private with their attorneys without the aforementioned interference

by the Government, yet the petitioner, who is not even charged with the

commission of a crime, is denied this basic right.

Aside form the right of the interned petitioner X herein, the

undersigned, as legal counsel of Mr. X is therefore afforded certain

separate and distinct rights under the aforementioned articles of the

Convention. He is also afforded additional rights, not as the original

petitioner herein, but as legal counsel to said petitioner, pursuant

to the provisions of the Council's European Agreement relating to

persons participating in proceedings of the European Commission and

Court of Human Rights.

Article 5 of that agreement guarantees said attorney 'the freedom of

speech and the independence necessary for the discharge of their

functions, tasks and duties, or the exercise of their rights in

relation to the Commission and the Court'. The very purpose of this

agreement is to protect the privileged communications passing between

attorney and client, a relationship recognised under British law. In

this case, said law is not applied to the petitioner X because he is

an Irishman. If he were a convicted felon in a London prison, he would

enjoy full rights of privacy without interference from the Government

as alleged hereinbefore. The Government's action constitutes

intimidation of counsel and wrongful interference in counsel's ability

to perform any functions as attorney, as well as counsel's freedom of

speech which includes the right to communicate in private, with his

client either orally or in writing.

Article 3 of the aforementioned agreement protecting attorney and

client provides that 'there shall be no interference by a public

authority except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary

in a democratic society in the interest of national security, for the

detection or prosecution of a criminal offence or for the protection

of health'. It should be noted that my client is not being held in any

criminal proceedings and has not been charged with a crime. In fact,

the answer of the British Government herein merely states that my

client is 'suspected' of being associated with the Irish Republican

Army. Suspicion does not constitute a crime under British law and the

Government's action violates the Convention and the aforementioned

agreement. There is no claim by the Government that for 'national

security' purposes, it must open mail between attorney and client

herein nor is there any claim that there is any need for the

'protection of health' herein. Therefore, there is no basis for the

Government's interference.

The petitioner X and the undersigned attorney cannot accept any

tortured interpretation of Article 3 which would interpret Article 3

as providing protection only to attorneys in Northern Ireland, thus

affording the Government the right to interfere if the petitioner had

an American or non-British attorney representing him. The Convention

and the agreement clearly protect all petitioners and all attorneys.

Whereafter, the undersigned respectfully urges that the Commission

direct the British Government to cease and desist with respect to the

aforementioned practices and permit communications in private without

opening of mail or other communications between attorney and client

herein. This petition is filed on behalf of X and also on behalf of Y,

New York, USA, Attorney for said petitioner whose rights are also

protected under the aforementioned provisions of the Convention and the

aforementioned agreement."

THE LAW

1.   The Commission observes that the subject matter of the present

application is only the alleged opening and censoring by the

authorities of correspondence between the first and the second

applicant relating to application No. 5155/71.

The applicants have complained that such examination of the

correspondence between a lawyer and his client amounts to a violation

of Articles 5, 6, 8 and 11 (Art. 5, 6, 8, 11) of the Convention and

they have also invoked Articles 3 and 5 (Art. 3, 5) of the European

Agreement relating to persons participating in proceedings of the

European Commission and Court of Human Rights.

2.   The Commission has first examined this complaint under Article

8 (1) (Art. 8-1) of the Convention which stipulates that "everyone has

the right to respect for .... his correspondence". However, paragraph

(2) of this Article (Art. 8-2) provides as follows:

"There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise

of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is

necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national

security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for

the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or

morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."

The Commission first finds that the applicants have produced no

evidence of censoring of correspondence in the sense that any

communications have been allegedly stopped or their contents, wholly

or partly, deleted or otherwise tampered with.

The Commission next finds that the examination of the correspondence

in question clearly constitutes an interference by a public authority

with the applicant's right to respect for their correspondence within

the meaning of Article 8 (1) (Art. 8-1). The Commission is therefore

called upon to consider whether or not this interference can be

justified on the grounds set out in paragraph (2) of the said Article

(Art. 8-2).

The Commission does not find it necessary, for this purpose, to

determine whether the first applicant's detention as such is consistent

with the provisions of the Convention, in particular Article 5

(Art. 5). It is sufficient to note that he is being detained at the

Long Kesh Internment Camp under the provisions of Regulation 12 of the

Special Powers Regulations, in accordance with an order made by the

Northern Ireland Minister of Home Affairs, on suspicion of "acting or

having acted or being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the

preservation of the peace and the maintenance of order in Northern

Ireland". Moreover, Regulation 13 (2) provides that no "communications

may be sent or received by a person interned under the regulations

except such as have been examined and passed" by the competent officer.

It is therefore clear that the supervision complained of was "in

accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 (2) (Art. 8-2)

of the Convention, having regard to the provisions of Regulation 13 (2)

taken in conjunction with Sec. 1 (3) of the Civil Authorities (Special

Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922. Taking into account the reasons

for the first applicant's internment, the Commission further finds that

the examination of this correspondence was fully justified "in the

interests of national security" or "for the prevention of disorder or

crime" within the meaning of Article 8 (2) (Art. 8-2).

In this connection, the Commission recalls that it has frequently held

that the examination of a detained person's correspondence, or, in

certain circumstances even the stopping of particular letters sent or

received by such a person, is not inconsistent with the provisions of

Article 8 (see e.g. the decisions on the admissibility of applications

No. 793/60, Yearbook, Vol. 3, pp. 444, 448;  No. 2749/66, Yearbook,

Vol. 10, pp. 388, 412 and No. 4445/70, Collection of Decisions, Vol.

37, pp. 119, 122). The Commission also refers in this respect to the

judgment of 18 June 1971 of the European Court of Human Rights in the

De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp Cases ("Vagrancy" Cases) (paragraphs 91 - 93,

pp. 45 - 46).

The Commission has also noted the applicant's arguments with regard to

the European Agreement relating to persons participating in proceedings

of the European Commission and Court of Human Rights. This Agreement

has been ratified by the United Kingdom and certain other High

Contracting Parties and entered into force on 17 April 1971. The

Commission observes that it derives its competence solely from the

European Convention of Human Rights and has no competence to examine

whether or not measures taken by a Contracting Party are consistent

with the provisions of that Agreement.

It follows that, insofar as the applicants allege that the examination

of their correspondence constitutes a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8)

of the Convention, the application is manifestly ill-founded within the

meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

3.   The Commission nas next examined that applicants' complaints

under Articles 5, 6 and 11 (Art. 5, 6, 11) of the Convention and

considers that the arguments advanced by the applicant are wholly

without merit. As regards alleged violations of Articles 5 and 11

(Art. 5, 11), the Commission has already found that the applicants'

present complaints do not raise any issue under Article 5 (Art. 5) and

the Commission is equally clear that the applicants have not shown the

basis for any possible violation of Article 11 (Art. 11). It might

further be pointed out that the provisions of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1)

of the Convention only apply to proceedings before national tribunals

charged with the determination of a person's "civil rights and

obligations or of any criminal charge against him" and cannot be

directly invoked in connection with proceedings before the Commission

itself. It should be added that the applicants have not even suggested

that their correspondence relates to any form of proceedings instituted

before courts or authorities in the United Kingdom by the first

applicant or by the second applicant on his behalf. The Commission

finds, therefore, that an examination in this respect of the complaints

as they have been submitted, do not disclose any appearance of a

violation of the rights and freedoms set out in the Articles invoked

by the applicants.

It follows that, also in this respect, the application is manifestly

ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2)

(Art. 27-2), of the Convention.

For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION

INADMISSIBLE