Provisional text

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber)

4 September 2025 ( * )

( Appeal – Action for annulment – Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union – Representation of non-privileged parties in direct actions before the Courts of the European Union – Representation of a law firm by a partner of that firm – Lawyer having the status of third party in respect of the applicant – Presumption of independence – Rebuttal of the presumption – Conditions )

In Case C‑776/22 P,

APPEAL under Article 56 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, brought on 20 December 2022,

Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante, established in Rome (Italy), represented by L. Cascone, A. Clemente, F. De Filippis and A. Marega, avvocati,

appellant,

the other parties to the proceedings being:

European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO), represented by D. Hanf, R. Raponi and D. Stoyanova-Valchanova, acting as Agents,

defendant at first instance,

supported by:

European Commission, represented by F. Erlbacher, P. Stancanelli and C. Urraca Caviedes, acting as Agents,

intervener in the appeal,

THE COURT (Grand Chamber),

composed of K. Lenaerts, President, T. von Danwitz, Vice-President, F. Biltgen, K. Jürimäe, C. Lycourgos, S. Rodin, A. Kumin and N. Jääskinen (Rapporteur), Presidents of Chambers, A. Arabadjiev, E. Regan, N. Piçarra, F. Schalin, S. Gervasoni, N. Fenger and R. Frendo, Judges,

Advocate General: J. Richard de la Tour,

Registrar: A. Calot Escobar,

having regard to the written procedure,

after hearing the Opinion of the Advocate General at the sitting on 27 February 2025,

gives the following

Judgment

1 By its appeal, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante, a professional partnership of lawyers established under Italian law (‘the law firm’), asks the Court of Justice to set aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 10 October 2022, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO – Nunziante and Ughi (UGHI E NUNZIANTE) (T‑389/22, ‘the order under appeal’, EU:T:2022:662), by which the General Court dismissed as manifestly inadmissible its action for annulment of the decision of the Fifth Board of Appeal of the European Union Intellectual Property Office (EUIPO) of 8 April 2022 (Case R 407/2021-5), relating to proceedings for revocation of the trade mark Ughi e Nunziante (‘the decision at issue’), commenced by the law firm.

Legal context

2 Under the first to fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union:

‘The Member States and the institutions of the [European] Union shall be represented before the Court of Justice by an agent appointed for each case; the agent may be assisted by an adviser or by a lawyer.

The States, other than the Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area [of 2 May 1992 (“the EEA Agreement”)] and also the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] Surveillance Authority referred to in that Agreement shall be represented in same manner.

Other parties must be represented by a lawyer.

Only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the [EEA Agreement] may represent or assist a party before the Court.’

3 Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union provides:

‘A case shall be brought before the Court of Justice by a written application addressed to the Registrar. The application shall contain the applicant’s name and permanent address and the description of the signatory, the name of the party or names of the parties against whom the application is made, the subject matter of the dispute, the form of order sought and a brief statement of the pleas in law on which the application is based.

The application shall be accompanied, where appropriate, by the measure the annulment of which is sought or, in the circumstances referred to in Article 265 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, by documentary evidence of the date on which an institution was, in accordance with those Articles, requested to act. If the documents are not submitted with the application, the Registrar shall ask the party concerned to produce them within a reasonable period, but in that event the rights of the party shall not lapse even if such documents are produced after the time limit for bringing proceedings.’

4 In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 53 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, Title III thereof, which includes the provisions cited in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the present judgment, is applicable to the procedure before the General Court.

5 Article 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, entitled ‘Obligation to be represented’, provides:

‘1. A party must be represented by an agent or a lawyer in accordance with the provisions of Article 19 of the Statute [of the Court of Justice of the European Union].

2. The lawyer representing or assisting a party must lodge at the Registry a certificate that he is authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement unless that certificate has already been lodged for the purposes of opening an account giving access to eCuria.

3. Where the party represented by the lawyer is a legal person governed by private law, the lawyer must lodge at the Registry an authority to act given by that person.

4. If the document referred to in paragraph 2 or that referred to in paragraph 3 is not lodged, the Registrar shall prescribe a reasonable time limit within which the party concerned is to produce it. If the party concerned fails to produce the required documents within the time limit prescribed, the General Court shall decide whether the non-compliance with the procedural requirement in question renders the application or written pleadings formally inadmissible or whether it leads to the lawyer being regarded as not representing or assisting the party concerned.’

6 Article 55 of those rules of procedure, entitled ‘Exclusion from the proceedings’, is worded as follows:

‘1. If the General Court considers that the conduct of an agent, adviser or lawyer before the General Court, the President, a Judge or the Registrar is incompatible with the dignity of the General Court or with the requirements of the proper administration of justice, or that such agent, adviser or lawyer is using his rights for purposes other than those for which they were granted, it shall inform the person concerned. …

2. On the same grounds, the General Court may at any time, having heard the person concerned, decide to exclude an agent, adviser or lawyer from the proceedings by reasoned order. That order shall have immediate effect.

3. Where an agent, adviser or lawyer is excluded from the proceedings, the proceedings shall be suspended for a period fixed by the President in order to allow the party concerned to appoint another agent, adviser or lawyer.

…’

7 Article 78 of the Rules of Procedure, relating to ‘Annexes to the application’, provides:

‘1. The application shall be accompanied, where appropriate, by the documents specified in the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute [of the Court of Justice of the European Union].

…

5. The application shall be accompanied by the documents referred to in Article 51(2) and (3).

6. If the application does not comply with the requirements set out in paragraphs 1 to 5, the Registrar shall prescribe a reasonable time limit within which the applicant is to produce the abovementioned documents. If the applicant fails to put the application in order within the time limit prescribed, the General Court shall decide whether the non-compliance with these conditions renders the application formally inadmissible.’

Background to the dispute

8 The background to the dispute may be summarised as set out below.

9 On 26 September 2017, the law firm filed with EUIPO an application for revocation of the EU word mark UGHI E NUNZIANTE in respect of all the services for which that mark had been registered.

10 By decision of 23 February 2021, the Cancellation Division of EUIPO granted that application in respect of all the services, with the exception of ‘legal services’ in Class 45 within the meaning of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of Goods and Services for the Purposes of the Registration of Marks of 15 June 1957, as revised and amended.

11 On 1 March 2021, the law firm filed a notice of appeal with EUIPO against that decision only in so far as the application for revocation had been rejected.

12 By the decision at issue, the Fifth Board of Appeal of EUIPO dismissed the appeal.

The procedure before the General Court and the order under appeal

13 By application lodged at the Registry of the General Court on 1 July 2022, the law firm brought an action for annulment of the decision at issue.

14 By the order under appeal, the General Court dismissed that action as manifestly inadmissible.

15 In paragraph 5 of that order, the General Court recalled, inter alia, that, in accordance with the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the parties, other than the Member States and the institutions of the European Union, the States which are parties to the EEA Agreement and the EFTA Surveillance Authority, must be represented by a lawyer, and only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement may represent a party before the Courts of the European Union.

16 In paragraph 6 of the order under appeal, the General Court stated that it is apparent from the wording of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular from the use of the term ‘represented’, and from paragraph 44 of the judgment of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA (C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555), that a ‘party’ as referred to in that provision, whatever that party’s standing, is not authorised to act on its own behalf before a Court of the European Union, but must use the services of a third party, even if the ‘party’ is a lawyer authorised to plead before a national court.

17 In paragraph 7 et seq. of that order, the General Court recalled the reasons for which that literal interpretation was confirmed both by the context of that provision and by the objective which it pursues.

18 Relying, inter alia, on paragraph 47 of the judgment of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA (C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555), the General Court thus found, in paragraph 9 of the order under appeal, that the objective of that task of representation by a lawyer, as referred to in the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is carried out in the interests of the sound administration of justice, is above all to protect and defend the principal’s interests to the greatest possible extent, acting in full independence and in line with the law and professional rules and codes of conduct.

19 In paragraph 10 of the order under appeal, the General Court then noted that the definition of the concept of the lawyer’s ‘independence’ has evolved in the matter of representation before the Courts of the European Union, the predominant criterion applied in that regard now being the protection and defence of the client’s interests.

20 In paragraph 11 of that order, the General Court recalled that, in accordance with settled case-law, the requirement of the independence of a lawyer is determined not only negatively, that is to say by the absence of an employment relationship between the lawyer and his or her client, but also positively, that is to say by reference to ethical obligations.

21 In paragraphs 12 and 13 of the order under appeal, the General Court stated, in the light of its own case-law and that of the Court of Justice as follows: first, that that requirement of independence, in the specific context of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, necessarily implies that there must be no employment relationship between the lawyer and his or her client; second, that the requirement of independence also applies if the party represented is a law firm; and, third, that the requirement of independence requires not the absence of any connection whatsoever between the lawyer and his or her client, but only the absence of those connections which have a manifestly detrimental effect on the capacity of the lawyer to carry out the task of defending his or her client while acting in that client’s interests to the greatest possible extent, in line with the law and professional rules and codes of conduct.

22 In paragraphs 15 and 16 of the order under appeal, the General Court found that, in the present case, the applicant, which is a law firm, had appointed three lawyers to represent it, who practised within that firm as partners. It held that that status was not compatible with the requirements of independence necessary in order to represent that firm before the Courts of the European Union.

23 The General Court therefore held, in paragraph 17 of that order, that the application initiating proceedings had been signed by lawyers who did not have the status of independent third parties in respect of the applicant, with the result that the action had not been brought in accordance with the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

24 Lastly, in paragraph 18 of the order under appeal, the General Court held that failure to comply with the obligation to provide representation by a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement was not one of the requirements which may subsequently be met after the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings, in accordance with the second paragraph of Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 78(6) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

The procedure before the Court of Justice and the forms of order sought by the parties to the appeal

25 By application lodged at the Registry of the Court of Justice on 20 December 2022, the law firm brought the present appeal against the order under appeal, in support of which it puts forward three grounds.

26 By documents lodged on the same date, the appellant requested, first, pursuant to Article 170a(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice, that its appeal be allowed to proceed, in accordance with Article 58a of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, and, second, under Article 95(2) of those rules of procedure, that it be granted anonymity together with the various lawyers mentioned in the appeal.

27 By decision of 4 January 2023, the Court refused the request for anonymisation.

28 By order of the Court of Justice of 8 May 2023, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO (C‑776/22 P, EU:C:2023:441), the appeal was allowed to proceed in respect of the second and third grounds of appeal.

29 By decision of the President of the Court of 18 September 2023, the European Commission was granted leave to intervene in support of the form of order sought by EUIPO.

30 By its appeal, the appellant claims that the Court of Justice should:

– uphold the second ground of appeal and either set aside the order under appeal or declare that its legal representation by the lawyers, whom it instructed for the purposes of the action before the General Court, is valid and, consequently, refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the merits;

– in the alternative, uphold the third ground of appeal and either set aside the order under appeal or decide that the law firm is entitled to continue the proceedings with the assistance of a lawyer from outside its partnership and, consequently, refer the case back to the General Court to rule on the merits, and

– order EUIPO to pay the costs of the appeal proceedings.

31 EUIPO contends that the Court of Justice should:

– dismiss the appeal and

– order the law firm to pay the costs.

32 The Commission also contends that the appeal should be dismissed and that the appellant be ordered to pay the costs of the proceedings.

The appeal

33 The appellant’s second ground of appeal alleges infringement of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and of Article 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. Its third ground of appeal alleges infringement of Articles 47 and 52 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and, as the case may be, of Article 51(4) and Article 55(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. As has been pointed out in paragraph 28 above, the appeal has been allowed to proceed in respect of the second and third grounds of appeal.

Arguments of the parties

34 By its second ground of appeal, the appellant complains, in essence, that the General Court misinterpreted Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. That ground comprises two parts.

35 By the first part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court erred in law in holding, in paragraph 17 of the order under appeal, that the action at first instance was not brought in accordance with, in particular, the fourth paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, under which only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State may represent or assist a party before the Court. The appellant maintains that it lodged all the documents establishing that the lawyers whom it had instructed to represent it were registered with the Rome Bar (Italy) and, therefore, that they were authorised to practise before the Italian courts, thereby complying with the condition laid down by the provision in question.

36 By the second part of the second ground of appeal, the appellant complains that the General Court misinterpreted the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in so far as it held that lawyers who are partners in a law firm do not have the required independence from that firm in order to be able to represent it in proceedings before the Courts of the European Union, in disregard of the case-law of the Court of Justice and, in particular, the judgment of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA (C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555).

37 In that second part, the appellant submits, in the first place, that the case-law relating to ‘self-representation’ before the Courts of the European Union, referred to in paragraphs 6 and 8 of the order under appeal, is not relevant in the circumstances of the present case.

38 The professional partnership known as ‘Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante’, in accordance with the national law governing the matter, is a legal entity autonomous from its members. According to the appellant, there would have been ‘self-representation’ only if it had appointed the legal officer of the partnership as its lawyer. However, as the General Court itself found in paragraph 15 of the order under appeal, that was not the case here.

39 In the second place, the appellant submits, in essence, that, in accordance with the recent case-law of the Court of Justice, it cannot be presumed that a partner in a law firm does not possess the independence required in order to be able to represent that law firm before the Courts of the European Union.

40 In that regard, the appellant states, first of all, that, in order to determine whether a lawyer satisfies the requirement of independence, as interpreted in that recent case-law, it is necessary primarily to assess whether that lawyer is able to protect the interests of the party which appointed him or her as a representative. Furthermore, the requirement of independence of the lawyer should be assessed in a particular manner where the applicant is a law firm.

41 Next, the appellant submits that, while the concept of ‘lawyer’ within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union must be interpreted autonomously, by contrast the criteria required in order to establish a lawyer’s independence, namely the absence of an employment relationship and the reference to professional rules and codes of conduct, must be examined in the light of the relevant national legislation, especially in the absence of any EU rules of law on the matter.

42 In that regard, the appellant states, first, that, under Italian law, the practice of the profession of lawyer is incompatible with any work relationship implying a relationship of subordination, with the result that there is no employment relationship between a law firm and a lawyer who is a member of that firm as a partner. Second, the service provided to the appellant by its partners complies with the relevant national legislation and the codes of conduct of the lawyers’ profession, which impose an obligation of independence.

43 Lastly, in the light of the foregoing, the appellant submits that, in the present case, the aforementioned requirement of independence could only be infringed by a conflict of interest and external pressure or interference on the three lawyers whom the appellant appointed to represent it. As regards the possibility of a conflict of interest, it submits that, in the specific situation in which a lawyer who is a partner in a law firm represents that firm, it is not a conflict of interest but rather shared interests which prevail.

44 EUIPO, supported by the Commission, contends that the second ground of appeal must be rejected.

45 EUIPO contends, first of all, that, contrary to what the appellant argues, the General Court did not call into question, in the order under appeal, the fact that the lawyers instructed by that party were authorised to practise before the Italian courts.

46 Next, EUIPO notes that it is apparent from the wording of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union that a party must be ‘represented’, which means that that party is not authorised to act on its own behalf, but must use the services of a third party. This is confirmed by the context in which that provision must be interpreted, since a party and its representative cannot be the same person. In addition, EUIPO states that the objective of compulsory representation by a lawyer is, first, to prevent private parties from acting on their own behalf before the Courts and, second, to ensure that legal persons are defended by a representative who is sufficiently distant from them. The order under appeal is based primarily on the fact that since the lawyers instructed to represent the applicant before the General Court were its partners, they could not be regarded as independent third parties.

47 Lastly, EUIPO states that the requirement that a lawyer be independent must be interpreted, first, negatively in that it prohibits the existence of an employment relationship between a lawyer and his or her client and, second, positively, namely by reference to professional ethical obligations. That requirement is to be understood not as being the absence of any connection whatsoever between the lawyer and his or her client, but only of those connections which have a manifestly detrimental effect on his or her capacity to carry out the task of defending his or her client, while acting in that client’s interests to the greatest possible extent. In the present case, EUIPO contends that the status as partners of the three lawyers appointed to represent the law firm – the applicant before the General Court – means that they exercise considerable administrative and financial powers within that firm. That circumstance would clearly compromise the independence of those lawyers and would have a manifestly detrimental effect on their capacity to carry out their task, since the status of lawyer does not in itself confer on the appointed representative sufficient independence for the purposes of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

48 The Commission, intervening in support of EUIPO, also contends that it is apparent from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the representation before the Courts of a legal person by lawyers who are not sufficiently distant from that person and whose interests overlap with its own interests does not comply with the requirements of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. In the present case, the fact that the lawyers who signed the application initiating proceedings on behalf of the law firm – the applicant before the General Court – have the status of partners in that law firm implies that there is not a sufficient degree of separation between that party and its representatives.

Findings of the Court

49 It must be borne in mind that the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, applicable to the procedure before the General Court in accordance with Article 53 of that statute, lay down two separate and cumulative conditions as regards the representation before the Courts of the European Union of parties not covered by the first and second paragraphs of Article 19, known as ‘non-privileged’ parties. Under the first condition, laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19, those parties must be ‘represented by a lawyer’. Under the second condition, laid down in the fourth paragraph of that article, only a lawyer authorised to practise before a court of a Member State or of another State which is a party to the EEA Agreement may represent or assist a party before the Courts of the European Union.

The first part of the second ground of appeal, alleging an infringement of the fourth paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union

50 As regards the second cumulative condition relating to the validity of the representation of a non-privileged party before the Courts of the European Union, laid down in the fourth paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which concerns the authorisation of lawyers to practise before the courts of a Member State, the Court has already held that it is apparent from the wording of that provision that the meaning and scope of that condition must be interpreted by reference to the national law concerned (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 56, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited).

51 In the present case, it is common ground that the lawyers instructed by the applicant were authorised to practise before the Italian courts, in compliance with the national rules governing the matter.

52 Accordingly, in holding, in paragraph 17 of the order under appeal, that the action at first instance had not been brought in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the General Court erred in law.

53 The first part of the second ground of appeal must, therefore, be upheld.

The second part of the second ground of appeal, alleging an infringement of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union

54 As regards the first cumulative condition relating to the validity of the representation of non-privileged parties before the Courts of the European Union, laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which consists of the obligation for those parties to be ‘represented by a lawyer’, according to settled case-law, as there is no reference in that provision to the law of the Member States, the concept of ‘lawyer’ must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union, taking into account not only the wording of that provision, but also its context and purpose (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 57, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 43).

55 In that connection, the Court has held, in the first place, that it is apparent from the wording of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in particular the use of the term ‘represented’, as well as from the context of that provision, that a ‘party’ as referred to therein, whatever that party’s standing, is not authorised to act on its own behalf before a Court of the European Union, but must use the services of a third party, who can only be a lawyer (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraphs 58 and 60, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraphs 44 and 45).

56 That interpretation is consistent with the objective of the condition laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which consists, on the one hand, in preventing private parties from acting on their own behalf before the Courts without using an intermediary and, on the other, in ensuring that legal persons are defended by a representative who is sufficiently distant from the legal person which he or she represents (judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 61, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 46).

57 In the second place, the Court has held that the task of representation incumbent on a ‘lawyer’, within the meaning of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, consists, above all, in protecting and defending the principal’s interests to the greatest possible extent, acting in full independence and in line with the law and professional rules and codes of conduct (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 62, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraphs 47).

58 As the Advocate General observed, in essence, in points 46 to 52 of his Opinion, it is apparent from the case-law of the Court that the first cumulative condition, laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which consists in the obligation for non-privileged parties to be ‘represented by a lawyer’, requires compliance with two requirements.

59 First, as is apparent from paragraph 55 above, that condition imposes on non-privileged parties a prohibition on ‘self-representation’ before the Courts of the European Union, that is to say, those parties may not under any circumstances represent themselves.

60 Given that no derogation from, or exception to, that prohibition is provided for by the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union or by the Rules of Procedure of the Court, the submission of an application signed by the applicant itself cannot in any circumstances be sufficient for the purpose of bringing an action before the Courts of the European Union, even if the applicant is a lawyer authorised to plead before a national court (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 59, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 44).

61 Second, that condition requires the representatives of non-privileged parties to comply with a requirement of independence, as is apparent from paragraph 57 above.

62 That requirement is determined both negatively and positively. Negatively, it is determined by the absence of any employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between the representative appointed by a party and that party. Positively, that requirement refers to professional rules and codes of conduct (see, to that effect, judgments of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 63, and of 14 July 2022, Universität Bremen v REA , C‑110/21 P, EU:C:2022:555, paragraph 49).

63 In addition, the requirement of independence is to be understood not as the lack of any connection whatsoever between the representative appointed by a party and that party, but only the lack of connections which have a manifestly detrimental effect on the representative’s capacity to carry out the task of representation required of him or her, as recalled in paragraph 57 above (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 64).

64 Any lawyer, irrespective of the form in which he or she practices his or her profession, authorised by the applicable laws, professional rules and codes of conduct, is, subject to what is set out in the following paragraph of the present judgment, presumed to satisfy the requirement of independence arising from the first cumulative condition laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

65 Nonetheless, as is apparent from paragraph 62 above, the requirement of independence, imposed on the representatives of non-privileged parties in the specific context of the foregoing provision, necessarily presupposes the absence of any employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination, between the party and the representative whom it has instructed. Consequently, the presumption of independence referred to in the preceding paragraph of the present judgment does not apply where there is such an employment relationship. That would be the case, in particular, if lawyers, who in accordance with the applicable national law practice their profession as employees of the law firm that employs them, were to represent that firm before the Courts of the European Union. The same would apply if in-house lawyers, who are members of the Bar of a Member State and entitled under the national law of that Member State to represent – before the national courts – the legal person to which they are bound by an employment relationship, were to represent that same person before the Courts of the European Union.

66 Other than in cases where there is an employment relationship, characterised by the existence of a relationship of subordination between the party and the representative whom it has instructed, that presumption of independence applies and may be rebutted only where it is apparent from specific evidence that there are connections between the party and the representative which have a manifestly detrimental effect on that representative’s capacity to carry out his or her task by acting in his or her client’s interests to the greatest possible extent, or that that representative does not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 February 2020, Uniwersytet Wrocławski and Poland v REA , C‑515/17 P and C‑561/17 P, EU:C:2020:73, paragraph 64).

67 In the present case, the General Court held, in paragraph 16 of the order under appeal, that ‘the fact the lawyers are partners in the law firm which is the applicant in this case’ was ‘not compatible with the requirements of independence which they must meet in order to represent the applicant before the General Court’. It inferred from this, in paragraph 17 of that order, that ‘since the application initiating proceedings was signed by lawyers who are not independent third parties in relation to the applicant’, the action at first instance had not been brought in accordance with the third and fourth paragraphs of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court.

68 However, where lawyers have, in accordance with procedures that comply with the applicable laws, professional rules and codes of conduct, the status of partners in the law firm that they represent before the Courts of the European Union, that circumstance cannot in itself be regarded as incompatible with the requirement of independence. First, such a circumstance cannot be equated with that in which there is an employment relationship, within the meaning of the case-law referred to in paragraph 62 above. Second, in the absence of specific evidence establishing the existence of connections between the law firm and the partner whom it has appointed as its representative, which have a manifestly detrimental effect on that representative’s capacity to carry out his or her task of representation by acting in the interests of the party concerned to the greatest possible extent, or that that partner does not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable, the presumption of independence of the partner cannot be regarded as being rebutted.

69 Having thus misconstrued the scope of the requirement of independence arising from the first cumulative condition laid down in the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the General Court erred in law.

70 Lastly, it must be borne in mind that, according to settled case-law, any circumstance which relates to the admissibility of the action for annulment brought before the General Court, including that relating to the representation of a legal person by a lawyer for the purpose of bringing that action, is likely to constitute a matter of public policy which the Courts of the European Union are required to raise of their own motion (see, to that effect, judgment of 8 February 2024, Pilatus Bank v ECB , C‑256/22 P, EU:C:2024:125, paragraphs 34 and 36 and the case-law cited). The fact that such an action was not brought in accordance with the requirements laid down by the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, as interpreted by the case-law of the Court, constitutes such a circumstance.

71 However, the obligation on the Courts of the European Union to raise of their own motion a matter of public policy is without prejudice to respect for the rights of the defence. Consequently, as a rule, the Courts of the European Union cannot base their decisions on a plea raised of their own motion – even one involving a matter of public policy – without first having invited the parties to submit their observations on that plea (see, to that effect, judgment of 17 December 2009, Review M v EMEA , C‑197/09 RX‑II, EU:C:2009:804, paragraphs 40 to 42 and 57 and the case-law cited).

72 In the present case, it must be observed that the General Court confined itself to holding, in paragraphs 15 to 19 of the order under appeal, that the applicant was a law firm which had instructed three lawyers, who practised as partners within that firm, to represent it and to drawing the conclusion therefrom – misconceived in law – that those lawyers could not represent that firm in conditions compatible with Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, such incompatibility, moreover, not being capable, in the General Court’s view, of being remedied after the expiry of the time limit for bringing proceedings.

73 However, the General Court ought to have ascertained, possibly by having recourse to the measures of organisation of procedure provided for in Article 64 of its Rules of Procedure, first of all, whether there was an employment relationship between those three lawyers and the law firm, within the meaning of paragraph 65 above. In the absence of such an employment relationship, only specific evidence establishing that the connections between the law firm and the partners representing it were such as to have a manifestly detrimental effect on the partners’ capacity to carry out their task, or that those lawyers did not comply with the national professional rules and codes of conduct applicable, would have made it possible to conclude that there was a lack of independence for the purposes of the third paragraph of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union.

74 Furthermore, in accordance with the case-law referred to in paragraph 71 above, the General Court ought, before ruling on that matter, to have invited the applicant to submit its observations, in order to ensure the effectiveness of its rights of defence.

75 Lastly, if it considered that the requirement of independence was not satisfied, the General Court ought, before declaring the action inadmissible, to have invited the applicant to appoint a new lawyer.

76 Indeed, in view of the seriousness of the consequences which follow from an infringement of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union for the applicant, namely the irremediable declaration of the inadmissibility of its action, it must, after being put in a position to know the evidence justifying, in the General Court’s view, a decision of inadmissibility and to express its views on that evidence, be able to appoint a new lawyer.

77 It follows, moreover, from Article 78(6) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court, read in conjunction with Article 51(2) to (4) thereof, that a party must not be penalised by the inadmissibility of its action – without having first been invited to put the situation in order – on the ground that its application does not satisfy the conditions set out in Article 78(1) to (5) of those rules of procedure. It is also apparent from Article 55(1) and (3) of those rules that the same is true in the case of conduct of a lawyer which is held to be incompatible with the dignity of the General Court or with the proper administration of justice during the proceedings. In such cases, those provisions guarantee the continuity of the proceedings, by providing, as the case may be, that the party concerned may produce the required documents or appoint a new representative, within a reasonable period set by the Registry.

78 It must also be noted that Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union does not lay down an exhaustive list of the circumstances in which an application may be put in order.

79 Moreover, the Court of Justice has already held, without this being precluded by Article 21 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, that it was appropriate to invite the appellant to put the appeal in order, where an appeal signed by the appellant himself had been submitted (see, to that effect, order of 5 December 1996, Lopes v Court of Justice , C‑174/96 P, EU:C:1996:473, paragraph 3).

80 Furthermore, as the Advocate General observed in point 108 of his Opinion, it is apparent from the current practice of the Member States that, where national law provides that the validity of a party’s procedural acts is called into question by a failure to comply with the rules concerning the requirement that that party’s representative be independent, that breach may, at the very least, be rectified in the course of the proceedings.

81 Consequently, the second part of the second ground of appeal and the second ground of appeal in its entirety must be upheld.

82 Accordingly, without it being necessary to examine the third ground of appeal, the order under appeal must be set aside.

The action before the General Court

83 In accordance with the first paragraph of Article 61 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union, the Court of Justice may, when quashing the decision of the General Court, itself give final judgment in the matter, where the state of the proceedings so permits, or refer the case back to the General Court for judgment.

84 In the present case, the Court of Justice has the necessary information to give final judgment on whether the action was brought in accordance with Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union and Article 51(1) of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court. It appears indeed that the action was brought, on behalf of the applicant, by lawyers who may be presumed, in accordance with what has been stated in paragraph 68 above, to have satisfied the requirement of independence for the purposes of Article 19 of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Since there is nothing in the file such as to rebut that presumption or even to cast doubt on whether the lawyers representing the applicant satisfy that requirement, it must be held that the action satisfies that requirement.

85 Since the state of the proceedings does not permit final judgment to be given as to the remainder, the case must be referred back to the General Court.

Costs

86 Since the case has been referred back to the General Court, the costs relating to the appeal proceedings must be reserved.

On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby:

1. Sets aside the order of the General Court of the European Union of 10 October 2022, Studio Legale Ughi e Nunziante v EUIPO – Nunziante and Ughi (UGHI E NUNZIANTE) (T ‑ 389/22, EU:T:2022:662);

2. Refers the case back to the General Court of the European Union;

3. Reserves the costs.

[Signatures]

* Language of the case: Italian.