CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. My views differ from those of the majority not with regard to the outcome of the case, with which I agree, but with regard to the angle from which the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 1 has been examined.

I

2. The applicant was involved in two sets of proceedings: (i) administrative-law violation proceedings, in which he challenged the fine imposed on him (and the loss of his driving licence, a sanction which is not discussed in this opinion), and (ii) civil proceedings, in which he sought reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in the first set of proceedings. He complained about the outcome of the second set of proceedings, namely, the non-reimbursement of the legal costs he had incurred in the administrative-law violation proceedings. The majority have held that this complaint falls under the civil limb of Article 6, in view of the pecuniary, and therefore civil, nature of this claim, despite the fact that the administrative-law violation proceedings in question were of a criminal nature within the autonomous meaning of the said Article.

3. The applicant phrased his complaint as an allegation that there had been a violation of his “right to effectively defend himself, contrary to Article 6 § 1”, but, as rightly noted by the Chamber, he complained not about the fairness of the administrative-law violation proceedings, but rather about the fact that, after those proceedings had been terminated, his legal costs were not reimbursed. His “right to effectively defend himself”, as he perceived it, constitutes one aspect of his broader right of access to a court. The Chamber, to the extent that it has examined this case in terms of “access to a court”, has faithfully followed the Court’s case-law to the effect that, where, despite court decisions in their favour, applicants’ claims for reimbursement of their legal costs are refused, there has been a restriction on their right of access to a court. Plainly and simply, access to a court is inhibited if it is financially more disadvantageous to apply to a court than not to apply.

4. As convincingly demonstrated by such authors as Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, human beings tend to avoid risks; when faced with the need to make a decision in conditions of uncertainty, they prefer to choose a guaranteed “win” of smaller value over one of greater value, if the latter encompasses an element of risk. A high risk that legal costs might not be reimbursed may induce them to avoid the attendant feeling of insecurity by resigning themselves to a controllable loss, even if they perceive the situation as unjust.

5. It is only natural (not to mention guaranteed by the Convention) that an individual on whom a fine has been imposed by any authority or official may consider challenging this imposition in a court, alleging that it is unlawful. If this individual is able to prove the unlawfulness of the measure, he or she should be absolved from the obligation to pay the fine. In such a scenario that individual would consider it as only just that his or her legal costs be reimbursed (to the extent that they were reasonable). But if the potential litigant is uncertain about such reimbursement (far less certain of non -reimbursement), he or she will think twice before applying to a court and will have to choose between two options: either (i) to challenge the imposition of a fine or (ii) to leave things as they stand. The rational choice of one option over the other will depend on a weighing up of costs, as explained in numerous publications on the economic analysis of law and the psychology of decision-making. The first option would be chosen where legal costs, even if not reimbursed, are lower than the fine that is lifted, and the second option would be chosen where it would be financially disadvantageous for the individual to litigate, because the residual legal costs, that is, those costs which are either not reimbursed or remain payable after partial reimbursement, exceed the fine. In the latter scenario, success in court would still amount to a financial loss for the litigant and, if that loss is significant, this victory would be no more desirable than the Pyrrhic victory of a proverbial eccentric who “unexpectedly won” a contest to lean further than his competitors out of the window of a skyscraper. Needless to say, the rational choice falls on the second option if the potential applicant is certain that, under the applicable legislation and judicial practice, his legal costs will not be reimbursed.

What is decisive in favouring one choice over the other is the amount of financial loss which would be sustained in a case where the residual legal costs incurred by the litigant are higher than the fine. This is a “lose-lose” situation, and the rational choice between the two options is a bargain-basement one.

6. Speaking of the reimbursement of legal costs incurred in criminal proceedings, the Convention, for good or, more likely, for ill, allows for the above “lose-lose” situation. The Court has consistently held that the Convention does not grant a person who is charged with a criminal offence but is subsequently acquitted a right to reimbursement of costs incurred in criminal proceedings against him or her, however necessary those costs might have been (see Lutz v. Germany , 25 August 1987, § 59, Series A no. 123; Masson and Van Zon v. the Netherlands , 28 September 1995, § 49, Series A no. 327 ‑ A; Yassar Hussain v. the United Kingdom , no. 8866/04, § 20, ECHR 2006 ‑ III; Shimidzu and Berllaque v. the United Kingdom ((dec.), no. 648/06, 30 March 2010; Ashendon and Jones v. the United Kingdom (revision), nos. 35730/07 and 4285/08, § 49, 15 December 2011; and Allen v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 25424/09, § 98 (c), ECHR 2013).

II

7. As correctly reiterated in the judgment, the question whether there exists in a particular case a right to reimbursement of costs incurred in criminal proceedings must be answered solely with reference to domestic law.

8. In the present case, the respondent Government have demonstrated that important changes were introduced into Lithuanian legislation in 2022. However, even before those changes, Lithuanian statutory law was following the trend characteristic of a number of member States and already noted by the Court, to the effect that “compensation is essentially automatic following a finding of not guilty, the quashing of a conviction or the discontinuation of proceedings” (see Allen , cited above, § 76). At the same time, the Court has always presumed that it is within the margin of appreciation of member States to opt for, in its own words (ibid.) “compensation schemes”, which may be “far more generous” than those in other countries and it has never perceived that trend as an embodiment of Convention requirements (in Allen it found no violation of Article 6 § 2).

9. In Lithuania, reimbursement of legal costs incurred in criminal proceedings was possible even under the previous statutory regulations. It was, however, conditional, that is, dependent on whether or not the authorities’ or officials’ actions had been lawful. If they were unlawful, the imposed sanction had to be quashed and the litigant’s claim for reimbursement of legal costs had to be satisfied; if they were lawful, the unsuccessful litigant paid, irrespective of whether the sanction was maintained. In the present case the Chamber, like the domestic courts, did not discern anything unlawful in the actions of the police officials and other authorities, particularly given the applicant’s own substantial contribution to his predicament. I agree with this assessment.

10. The above-mentioned statutory amendments were adopted in the wake of the Constitutional Court’s ruling of 19 March 2021. The Constitutional Court held that one provision of the Code of Administrative Law Violations was not in compliance with the right of access to a court, guaranteed by the Constitution, in so far as it did not provide for reimbursement of legal costs to persons who had been acquitted. In 2017, that is, already after the events examined in the present case, the Code of Administrative Law Violations was replaced by the Code of Administrative Offences. The latter text referred to the Code of Criminal Procedure, which was to be applied, mutatis mutandis , in deciding on claims for reimbursement of legal costs. The Constitutional Court ex proprio motu also found unconstitutional the relevant provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because it too failed to provide for reimbursement of legal costs to persons who had been acquitted. As of 1 May 2022, persons acquitted in criminal proceedings, as well as persons in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings have been discontinued on the grounds that no such violation was committed, are entitled to have their legal costs reimbursed (to the extent that they were necessarily incurred and properly substantiated). It is no longer necessary for such litigants to demonstrate the unlawfulness of the authorities’ or officials’ actions.

11. The Constitutional Court relied heavily on the Court’s judgment in Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania (nos. 73579/17 and 14620/18, 18 February 2020). In that case, the applicants had received administrative fines for labour-law violations. They successfully challenged the fines before a court, but were refused reimbursement of their legal costs. The Court examined that case under the civil limb of Article 6 and found a violation of the applicants’ right of access to a court, particularly in view of the fact that their legal costs had been several times greater than the fines which had been annulled, with the result that the applicants were ultimately in a worse situation than they would have been without litigating.

12. At the same time, the Constitutional Court, although drawing heavily on Černius and Rinkevičius (cited above), made no distinction whatsoever in its 2021 ruling between legal costs incurred in civil and in criminal proceedings. The case under its examination concerned the contestation of a fine imposed for alleged driving under the influence of alcohol (and was thus comparable to the present case), which fell within the scope of the domestic law on administrative violations and which would fall under the criminal limb of Article 6. The Constitutional Court’s findings of unconstitutionality extended also to the legislation on criminal procedure, on account of the fact that, under the domestic legislation, claims for reimbursement of legal costs in cases concerning administrative-law violations were to be decided upon in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

13. Accordingly, the statutory amendments adopted in the wake of the Constitutional Court’s ruling expanded the possibilities for reimbursement of legal costs incurred in the most diverse types of criminal proceedings. These possibilities not only follow the above-mentioned trend but solidify it further, and even surpass it. However, as rightly reiterated by the Chamber, the Court’s task is not to express a view on whether or not the policy choices made domestically with regard to access to a court are appropriate, but to determine whether their choices in this area produce consequences that are compatible with the Convention. In my opinion, nothing in this judgment should be interpreted in such a way as to discourage the protection of the right of access to a court from being extended beyond Convention requirements.

14. Still, it remains open whether or not the statutory amendments adopted by the Lithuanian parliament went even further than what was required by the Constitutional Court’s ruling. Be that as it may, it is not for the Strasbourg Court to provide any answer to that question.

What is essential is that the 2022 statutory amendments were introduced too late to be of any avail to the present applicant. The domestic proceedings at issue took place in 2014-19, and the application was lodged with the Court in August 2019. Although the statutory provisions which were applied in this case, providing for no reimbursement of legal costs to persons who had been acquitted, were subsequently found not to have been in compliance with the Constitution, under Lithuanian law (as interpreted by the Constitutional Court as far back as 2004) a legal instrument is presumed to be in compliance with the Constitution and therefore valid until such time as the Constitutional Court declares it otherwise.

III

15. In Article 6 § 1, only the “determination of [a person’s] civil rights and obligations” and “of any criminal charge” is mentioned. Other proceedings are left outside the ambit of this provision. Consequently, in order for the proceedings concerning reimbursement of legal costs to be examined by the Strasbourg Court, they must concern either the “determination of [one’s] civil rights and obligations” or “of any criminal charge”. If this condition is not met, the complaint should be declared incompatible ratione materiae with Convention provisions and therefore inadmissible. While at times this appears to be problematic (where the impugned measure concerns neither “civil rights and obligations”, nor a “criminal charge”), in many cases the issue under consideration oscillates only between these two poles, and the Court must determine whether the complaint under consideration falls under the civil or the criminal limb of Article 6. In the present case the issue is not whether Article 6 is applicable to the applicant’s complaint, but whether it is applicable under its civil or criminal limb.

16. The majority have held that the applicant’s complaint falls under the civil limb of Article 6, because its “core” concerned a pecuniary claim, which is civil in nature. This approach was decisive in qualifying the applicant’s complaint as one which must be examined under the civil limb of Article 6.

I disagree.

In my opinion, the applicant’s complaint should have been examined under the criminal limb of this Article.

The applicability of Article 6 under its criminal limb may be substantiated as follows.

17. While the applicant disagreed with the outcome of the civil proceedings, he did not allege that in those proceedings there had been any procedural shortcomings or that they had been unfair for any other reason (compare and contrast Topolovčan v. Croatia (dec.), no. 67405/10, §§ 14 and 22, 11 December 2012; Rupp v. Germany (dec.), nos. 60879/12 and 2 others, §§ 53-58, 17 November 2015; and Makrylakis v. Greece , no. 34812/15, §§ 27 and 48, 17 November 2022). The core of his complaint concerned the state of the domestic law at the material time, namely, the fact that it provided for only a limited possibility of reimbursement of the legal costs incurred by persons in respect of whom administrative-law violation proceedings had been discontinued. Accordingly, although I am mindful of the pecuniary aspect of the applicant’s complaint, the main issue arising in the present case relates to the applicant’s right to defend himself in the administrative-law violation proceedings and thus to his access to a court in that case. As a result, the question of whether the case falls to be examined under the civil or the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention has to be answered with reference to those proceedings (for a similar approach, see Černius and Rinkevičius v. Lithuania , cited above, § 50).

18. The offence imputed to the applicant, of driving under the influence of alcohol, was classified under domestic law as an administrative-law violation. The Court has previously considered different violations provided in the Lithuanian Code of Administrative Law Violations to fall either under the criminal limb of Article 6 (see Kuzmickaja v. Lithuania (dec.), no. 27968/03, 10 June 2008, and Balsytė-Lideikienė v. Lithuania , no. 72596/01, §§ 53-61, 4 November 2008; see also Šimkus v. Lithuania , no. 41788/11, §§ 41-45, 13 June 2017, which was examined under Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7) or under the civil limb of that Article (see Černius and Rinkevičius , cited above, § 50) on the basis of their nature and the applicable penalties.

19. In this connection, as the majority does not fail to note, the Court has found in a number of previous cases that road-traffic offences punishable by fines or driving restrictions fell within the scope of the criminal limb of Article 6 of the Convention, irrespective of their classification under domestic law, in view of the general character of the legal provisions regulating such offences and the fact that the penalties served a purpose which was both deterrent and punitive. References are made to the relevant paragraphs of Lutz v. Germany , cited above; Malige v. France , 23 September 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ VII; Igor Pascari v. the Republic of Moldova , no. 25555/10, 30 August 2016; and Marčan v. Croatia , no. 40820/12, 10 July 2014, and the cases cited therein.

20. Similarly to these cases, the legal provision applied in the present case, that is, Article 126 § 4 of the Code of Administrative Law Violations, was directed at all citizens rather than a group possessing a special status, and its primary aims were punishment and deterrence, which are recognised as characteristic features of criminal penalties (see, mutatis mutandis , Šimkus , cited above, § 43, and the cases cited therein). Moreover, at the material time, driving under the influence of alcohol with a medium or high level of intoxication, the offence imputed to the applicant, was punishable by, inter alia , administrative detention. Although the applicant was not given the penalty of detention, what should have been decisive for determining the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1 is the potential penalty rather than that actually imposed (see Igor Pascari , cited above, § 22).

21. In the light of the foregoing, I am of the opinion that Article 6 § 1 should have been applied in the present case under its criminal limb.

IV

22. More generally, it is only logical that proceedings concerning the reimbursement of legal costs are inherently linked to the proceedings in which they were incurred. What is central for determining the nature of a first set of proceedings is the importance of what was at stake for the person who took part in them. And that was nothing other than a specific right which he or she considered to have been violated. The costs which such a person would incur and for which, if he or she won the case in a court, reimbursement would be requested are those related to the defence of that particular right. As mentioned, a rational potential litigant who is uncertain that those legal costs would not be lower than the damage sustained by him or her because of the alleged violation (let alone one who is certain that they will not be reimbursed) would refrain from applying to a court, in which case that particular right would remain undefended. The certainty of reimbursement of legal costs affects a potential litigant’s ability effectively to access a court – the court which decides on the right which he or she wished to defend in the original proceedings.

23. Thus, the Court’s finding that there has been a violation of the right of access to a court would mean that the right which has been violated is the right of access to a court in the original proceedings. It is this right which had to be secured by the reimbursement of legal costs, and not some “new”, autonomous right of access to a court regarding the reimbursement of legal costs. The point is that the right of access to a court regarding the reimbursement of legal costs has not been violated in any way, because the applicant had access to a court, to which he presented his pecuniary claim, and had made use of that right, albeit unsuccessfully.

24. As to the second set of proceedings, they do not occur “in and of themselves”, as if the applicant, with nothing better to do, seeks a dubious pleasure in litigating. The second set of proceedings are intrinsically related to and, thus, a “continuation” of the first set of proceedings, that is, the proceedings which concern the right asserted and defended by the applicant. They are not freestanding. Their nature is determined by the nature of the first proceedings.

25. To compare, when a criminal (in the autonomous meaning of Article 6) sanction imposed on an applicant is found to have violated his or her right of access to a court because a case was not decided within a reasonable time, or by a court or tribunal which was not impartial or not established by law, and so on, his or her claim for reimbursement of the legal costs incurred in those criminal proceedings is nothing other than a claim that the right of an access to a court in those criminal proceedings must be not inhibited, but instead secured. It would be preposterous to assert that, after the finding of a violation of his or her right as guaranteed by Article 6 under its criminal limb, this right somehow transforms itself into a “new” right to be defended under the civil limb of the same Article. It is unclear when and under what conditions such a metamorphosis could take place.

26. If the first set of proceedings concerned the “determination of [one’s] civil rights and obligations”, the right to have the legal costs incurred in those first proceedings reimbursed is intended to secure that right of access to a court in the “determination of [one’s] civil rights and obligations”. Consequently, the respective complaint should be examined under the civil limb of Article 6 § 1. This is the methodology that the Court not only employed, but also elucidated, in Černius and Rinkevičius (cited above, § 50).

However, if the first set of proceedings were criminal in the autonomous meaning of Article 6 § 1 (even if, as in the present case, they are not qualified as criminal under the domestic law), then the right to have the legal costs incurred in the first set of proceedings reimbursed is a “continuation” of the right of access to a court in the “determination ... of criminal charge”. Ergo , the respective complaint must be examined under the criminal limb of Article 6 § 1, because the right to have legal costs reimbursed is part of the right of access to a court, which otherwise may remain theoretical and illusory.

To reiterate, what is decisive for the angle from which the complaint regarding the reimbursement of legal costs must be examined is the nature of the first proceedings.

This is somewhat reminiscent of the Midas touch.

27. In Černius and Rinkevičius the applicants’ complaints were examined under the civil limb of Article 6 not because their “core” complaint concerned a pecuniary claim, but because the first set of proceedings were of a civil nature both under domestic law and according to the Court’s methodology. In that case the “pecuniary nature of the dispute” was not a decisive but an additional criterion for examining these complaints under the civil limb of that provision (ibid., § 50).

This was the touch of “civil King Midas”.

In contrast, the present case originated in administrative-law violation proceedings which are qualified as falling under the criminal limb of Article 6. The applicant’s claim regarding the second set of proceedings was not of a different nature from that in the first set of proceedings, even if it has a second, “weaker” and non-determinative aspect of being pecuniary in nature.

This should have been enough to put “criminal King Midas” to work.

One might wonder whether the majority have misunderstood Černius and Rinkevičius . Without going into this futile speculation, it is hard not to notice that, in the present case, the approach taken in Černius and Rinkevičius has been abandoned.

28. What have indeed been misunderstood by the majority are the two cases from which they have imported the idea that the “core” of the present applicant’s complaint is civil in nature. These two cases are Leuska and Others v. Estonia (no. 64734/11, 7 November 2017) and Kamenova v. Bulgaria (no. 62784/09, 12 July 2018). The essential difference between the present case on the one hand, and Leuska and Others and Kamenova on the other, is that the applicants in the latter two cases were not the persons against whom criminal charges had been brought and who had been acquitted or in respect of whom criminal proceedings had been discontinued. They were victims of the criminal activities of other persons. It is in that capacity that they had brought civil claims in criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of criminal offences.

Given that they are so different in this respect, these two cases are the least apt to be relied upon in the present case.

29. Moreover, in a number of jurisdictions claims for the reimbursement of legal costs may be lodged in the same, rather than in a separate, set of criminal proceedings.

It seems undisputed that the possibility of reimbursement of an applicant’s legal costs will affect his or her ability effectively to access the court deciding on his or her rights in single proceedings, so long as the costs are reimbursed within those first and sole set of proceedings and without the need to institute separate proceedings. Indeed, it would be very strange to hold that one part of the applicant’s claim, by which he or she challenges the measure imposed, constitutes an element of the right of access to a court which falls under the criminal limb of Article 6, whereas another part, by which it is requested that the legal costs necessary to defend oneself in those criminal proceedings be reimbursed, is an element of the same right which falls under the civil limb of the same Article.

It is difficult to see why the approach should be any different in those legal systems in which two sets of proceedings take place, because, as noted above, the second set of proceedings are intrinsically related to and thus a “continuation” of the first set of proceedings, and not something which occurs “in and of themselves” and are freestanding.

30. It appears that the majority have been mindful of the fact that splitting the right of access to a court into two parts, one being a right of access to a court proper, and the other a right not to be subjected to financial disincentives to apply to a court, is artificial. Thus, following Topolovčan (cited above, § 19), they have considered it important to point out that the outcome of the administrative-law violation proceedings, which fell within the scope of the criminal limb of Article 6, was the “decisive factor concerning the applicant’s pecuniary expectations”, therefore this “civil limb” of the proceedings remained “closely linked to the criminal limb”.

There are not a few similarities between Topolovčan and the instant case, just as there are some important structural differences. In both these cases there is what may be called a metamorphosis of “criminal” to “civil”. The question is, to what extent can such a metamorphosis be justified. Although there might have been some justification for it in Topolovčan (in particular because in that case, in contrast to the present one, the applicant had been found guilty of a criminal offence), I am not convinced that it is justified in the present case. On the contrary.

For what conclusion is to be drawn from the “decisive factor” and “close link [of the civil limb] to the criminal limb” theses? Do they mean that what has become “civil” is still a bit “criminal”? Or that whenever there is a pecuniary element, the criminal-law-related origins of a dispute no longer matter? If these dicta are not empty words, what constructive function do they perform in the Chamber’s reasoning?

I fail to see any.

V

31. On 25 January 2024, while this opinion was still in the process of being written, the Court (sitting as a different Chamber) delivered its decision in the case of Rousounidou v. Cyprus ((dec.), no. 38744/21, 12 December 2023). In that case criminal proceedings were brought against the applicant, but the charges were dismissed by a court because the prosecution had failed to make out a prima facie case against her.

Specifically, the Court found that the issue of the domestic courts’ inability to award costs following the applicant’s acquittal did not fall under the notion of a “criminal charge” within the autonomous meaning of Article 6 § 1 and, further, that the civil limb was inapplicable ratione materiae because the Cypriot legal framework did not recognise a right to recover costs from public funds for a person acquitted in a summary trial.

32. In Rousounidou , although the first set of proceedings were criminal, the applicability of the criminal limb of Article 6 was dismissed (by a majority) on the grounds that the question of reimbursement of legal costs did not concern the determination of a criminal charge, without any explanation as to why it was the second and not the first set of proceedings which should have determined the limb of applicability of Article 6. In this regard, Rousounidou found some support in two earlier cases, namely, Mamič v. Slovenia (no. 2) (no. 75778/01, 27 July 2006, where the criminal proceedings against the applicant had been discontinued on account of being time-barred, and no violation of Article 6 § 1 was found), and Topolovčan (cited above), wherein it is similarly stated that the reimbursement of legal costs does not concern the determination of a criminal charge. Be that as it may, neither Rousounidou , nor Mamič (no. 2) , nor Topolovčan contain any explanation of the chosen approach.

To compare and contrast, in Černius and Rinkevičius the Chamber unanimously accepted that the applicable limb of Article 6 had to be determined with regard to the nature of the main proceedings.

Rousounidou is a new manifestation of the lack of consistency in the Court’s case-law on the reimbursement of legal costs as regards the question of how the applicable limb of Article 6 is to be determined.

33. The present judgment diverges from the line of reasoning taken in Černius and Rinkevičius . However, in one regrettable respect it follows in the steps of Rousounidou , namely, in that it provides no convincing explanation as to the methodology underpinning the approach in which it is the second and not the first proceedings which determine the limb of applicability of Article 6, although the second set of proceedings are intrinsically linked to the first set of proceedings.

In addition, the present judgment obfuscates that methodological basis (assuming that it exists) by, in particular, repeating the “decisive factor” and “close link [of the civil limb] to the criminal limb” dicta from Topolovčan (cited above).

34. In the Court’s own words, “while it is not formally bound to follow any of its previous judgments, it is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases” (see Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, § 70, Reports 2001-I, and Herrmann v. Germany [GC], no. 9300/07, § 78, 26 June 2012).

I wonder what “good reason” has trumped in the present case, as well as in Rousounidou , over the commitment not to depart from precedents in previous cases, in particular from Černius and Rinkevičius .

35. For, to sum up, as things now stand there are at least three lines of reasoning in the Court’s case-law concerning claims for reimbursement of legal costs incurred in civil or criminal proceedings, all of them reconfirmed within a four-year period:

(i) the Černius and Rinkevičius line of reasoning, according to which a complaint concerning the non-reimbursement of legal costs is seen as intrinsically related to the first set of proceedings and is examined under the same limb of Article 6 as that under which the first set of proceedings fall;

(ii) the Rousouinidou line of reasoning, according to which such a complaint is always seen as a pecuniary claim and is therefore “civil” in nature, and is examined under the civil limb of Article 6, no matter the nature of the first set of proceedings and irrespective of whether there had been only one set of proceedings, or more;

(iii) the Topolovčan , or perhaps from now on the Topolovčan-Jakutavičius , line of reasoning, which is the most obscure, because a complaint concerning the non-reimbursement of legal costs is examined under the civil limb of Article 6; at the same time, however, it is pointed out that it has a “close link” to the first, criminal, set of proceedings because the outcome of the criminal proceedings (or, as in the present case, administrative-law violation proceedings, which fall within the scope of the criminal limb of Article 6) was the “decisive factor concerning the applicant’s pecuniary expectations”, whatever purpose this proviso may serve (if any).

It is high time to have a consistent case-law, isn’t it? And a consequential one, too.