Published on 17 April 2023

FIFTH SECTION

Application no. 22637/16 TORGOVYY DIM KAMPUS KOTTON KLAB, TOV against Ukraine lodged on 12 April 2016 communicated on 28 March 2023

SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE

The application concerns the obligation of the applicant company to pay anti-dumping duties which were imposed retroactively on it two years after it had imported certain goods into Ukraine and sold them.

In the period during which the importations took place (April 2010 - February 2011), the regulation of 29 September 2009 imposing anti-dumping duties on the type of medical syringes the applicant imported had been under review by the domestic courts in unrelated proceedings and was thus suspended and, eventually, quashed.

Two years after these import operations, when the validity of the above regulation had been restored by the courts, the tax authorities, following an inspection, ordered the applicant company to pay the anti-dumping duties. This decision was confirmed by the domestic courts which stated that the authorities were not prevented to recover duties after the importations took place and that the suspension of the regulation during a certain period in the past did not mean it could not be applied later, when its validity was restored.

The final judgment was adopted by the High Administrative Court of Ukraine on 1 December 2015.

According to the applicant company, the domestic courts applied retroactively to its case a new approach to the above issues, established by the Supreme Court in 2014 in unrelated proceedings. It also contended that such a belated recovery of the duties payable on the goods that had been sold a long time ago prevented it from being able to compensate the duties by the increase in the price of the goods.

The applicant company complains that such approach taken by the domestic authorities upset the principles of legal certainty and good governance and resulted in its deprivation of property contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

QUESTIONS TO THE PARTIES

1. Has there been an interference with the applicant company’s peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1?

2. If so, was it lawful, in particular as regards the quality of the applicable legislation and/or the case law of the domestic courts?