PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON,

BINDSCHEDLER-ROBERT, MATSCHER, PALM AND FOIGHEL

Whilst we agree with the Court that there has been a violation of

Article 6 (art. 6) as regards Mrs Eriksson, we cannot agree with the

Court's conclusion on this point in respect of the daughter.

Lisa has not, herself, shown any interest whatsoever in reuniting with

her mother.  She has lived with her foster family almost since she was

born and she wants to stay with them.  Equally she has never sought to

have a review of the restrictions on access imposed in the present

case.  Even if Lisa, because of her young age, has not been able to

take any legal action herself, she would certainly have been able to

put to the social authorities, with which she had close contacts, any

requests she might have had.  Indeed there is nothing in the material

before the Court that shows anything else than that Lisa, however

reluctantly, agreed to see her mother but did not wish to have closer

contacts.

In these circumstances, it is not in our view established that Lisa

has suffered any detriment as a result of the lack of any court

remedy.  As she was thus not actually affected by the impugned

deficiency of the Swedish system, she cannot be considered a victim of

the violation of Article 6 (art. 6) alleged on her behalf (see, mutatis

mutandis, the Norris judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142,

pp. 15-16, paras. 30 and 33).

The reasoning above can to a certain degree be applied to argue for a

non-violation of Article 8 (art. 8).  But there is a clear distinction

between the two situations.  The opportunity for Lisa to be reunited

with her mother was undoubtedly taken away from her.  Thus there was

an interference with the respect due to her family life and a

violation of Article 8 (art. 8).