PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PETTITI, JOINED BY

                      JUDGES MATSCHER* AND RUSSO

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* Except as regards the penultimate paragraph on page 46.

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                             (Translation)

        I did not vote with the majority of the Chamber for the non-

violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the European Convention on Human

Rights as regards the prohibition on removal and restrictions on

access (points 1 and 3 of the operative provisions).  I consider, on

the contrary, that there has been a serious violation of that

Article (art. 8) in respect both of the prohibition on removal and

of the restrictions on access after 1 July 1990, on the same lines

as the findings in the Olsson I judgment (see particularly

paragraph 81 which set out the reasons for concluding that Sweden

had failed to comply with Article 8 in that case) (art. 8).

        It appears clear that the social welfare officials did not

take all the steps that they should have done in the light of that

judgment with a view to promoting the exercise of the right of

access and the right to have the children to stay which would have

prepared the way for returning custody of the children to their

parents.

        Where the child has been separated from his parents over a

long period (as was the case here and this was a situation for which

the social welfare authorities bore some responsibility in respect

of the period covered by the Olsson I judgment), flexible and

sensitive measures must be taken.

        In order to put reflection on the Olsson II judgment more

clearly in context, it is helpful to recall the principal reasoning

of the Olsson I judgment (in which a violation was found by twelve

votes to three):

        "82.    There is nothing to suggest that the Swedish

        authorities did not act in good faith in implementing the

        care decision.  However, this does not suffice to render a

        measure 'necessary' in Convention terms ...: an objective

        standard has to be applied in this connection.  Examination

        of the Government's arguments suggests that it was partly

        administrative difficulties that prompted the authorities'

        decisions; yet, in so fundamental an area as respect for

        family life, such considerations cannot be allowed to play

        more than a secondary role.

        83.     In conclusion, in the respects indicated above and

        despite the applicants' unco-operative attitude ..., the

        measures taken in implementation of the care decision were

        not supported by 'sufficient' reasons justifying them as

        proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.  They were

        therefore, notwithstanding the domestic authorities' margin

        of appreciation, not 'necessary in a domestic society'."

        The Committee of Ministers confined itself to declaring that

the pecuniary awards made under Article 50 (art. 50) of the

Convention had been duly paid by the Government.

        For all the periods considered, the authorities should have

taken steps to ensure: the psychological preparation of the children

and the progressive organisation repeated at least each month of

meetings, at first short ones, if necessary even in the presence of

a psychologist; these meetings could subsequently have been extended

to a day, a weekend, a part of the holidays, under different

conditions to those obtaining for the five series of meetings

referred to in the judgment.  The aim would be to avoid a situation

in which the child, being conditioned by the foster family, adopted

a deliberately obstructive attitude to these visits, which evidently

posed a problem.  It would also have been helpful to make a greater

effort to prepare the parents for the progressive stages, making

allowance for their frustration, for a degree of maladroit

resistance on their part as well as for the difficulties arising

from the need to travel because of the unfortunate choice of the

foster families in terms of the geographical location of their home.

The most important thing was to take account of the parents'

persistent efforts to secure the return of their children, despite

all the obstacles, which confirmed their parental attachment and

their legitimate and consistent claim.  In my view, neither the

social welfare authorities nor the majority of the European Court

sitting as a Chamber gave sufficient weight to the strength and

extent of this attachment.  From 23 June 1987 to 16 June 1989, there

were only five actual meetings (see paragraph 29 of the judgment),

and then no more during the relevant period.

        It is true that since the Olsson I judgment these five

attempts at meetings have taken place; the results were

unsatisfactory but that could have been a temporary situation.

        However, in view of the large number of misunderstandings

which had built up over the years, these attempts had no chance of

succeeding without an adequate psychological preparation of the

parties concerned.  It is the duty of the social welfare

authorities, and this is one of the most elementary principles of

the methods of educative assistance practised in Europe, where this

type of conflict is frequent, to make specific arrangements.

        It is impossible to overcome in a matter of a few hours

years of mutual incomprehension.  Thousands of learned works by

judges, lawyers, doctors, psychiatrists or psychologists, have been

written on this subject.  The technique of using neutral ground for

meetings and progressive contacts is common, under judicial

supervision.  In any event it is always counterproductive for the

parents to have to meet their children on the home ground of the

foster family or in the latter's presence, because that often leads

to the failure of the attempt.

        The social welfare authorities displayed what was almost

contempt both for the national courts and the European Court.  It is

somewhat surprising that neither the courts nor the governmental

authorities managed to force the "imperialism" of the social

services to give ground.

        At no time did the social welfare authorities take the least

account of the love for their children that the parents sought to

express, a love that was demonstrated by the years of struggle in

proceedings to seek to obtain the return of the children and the

respect of their most sacred rights.

        Clearly, the Olsson parents' attitude was not always

helpful, particularly after 1989, and they must therefore bear a

part of the responsibility.  Yet one must not forget their despair

after the repeated failures with which they met even after the

favourable decisions of the European Court and the national courts

(see paragraph 53 et seq. of the present judgment).

        Adopting the tactics employed by their lawyers, which were

perhaps too extreme, they hardened their position, but legally they

had a number of valid reasons for doing so.  In any case, the

authorities were under a duty to exert a positive influence, by

showing understanding and making repeated interventions, instead of

reinforcing the differences.

        In this type of situation it is necessary to seek to

organise more and more meetings, to educate the children and the

parents, to defuse conflicts. It is unfair to give priority to the

obstinacy of the children and the foster families.

        In the same connection, the long delays between each

proceedings or intervention made the situation worse, whereas in

other States and in other jurisdictions, hearings would have been

held at shorter intervals by means of an urgent procedure before a

children's judge.  One is left with the impression that the

authorities were content to allow the intransigence of the parents

to strengthen the position of the social welfare authorities,

despite the fact that the latter had never disguised their

preference for the foster families, as if they sought to accord

greater weight to material comfort than to paternal and maternal

ties.

        Viewed from the outside this attitude towards the parents

may seem somewhat "inhuman".

        It is to be regretted that reference was not made to the

United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child so as to permit

the intervention of the children assisted by their lawyers, who

could have played a useful role as mediators.

        Whatever the case may be, the general and overall conduct of

the authorities was such that the parents are permanently separated

from their children, and this situation is now irreparable as a

result of the refusal to allow access, a right which is not even

refused to criminal parents in other countries.  The Olsson parents

have been definitively cut off from any family relationship.  It is

difficult to think of a more serious case of a violation of the

fundamental rights protected by Article 8 (art. 8).

        As I voted for the violation of the prohibition on removal

and the restriction on access before and after 1990, I also consider

that the Court should have examined the case under Article 53

(art. 53) and analysed the decision of the Committee of Ministers in

the light of the European Court's judgment in the first Olsson case.

        It is paradoxical that in the year of the implementation of

the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, which

stresses the importance of parent-child relations, there should have

been such a failure in the application of Article 8 (art. 8) of the

European Convention.