DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA

                             (Translation)

1.       For the reasons I have set out in my dissenting opinions in

the Silva Pontes v. Portugal (1) and Di Pede v. Italy (2) cases, I

consider that the Government's objection must be allowed, since the

proceedings on the merits ended in 1973 with a final judgment which

constitutes the relevant final decision for the purposes of the

six-month limit under Article 26 of the Convention (art. 26).  When

Mr and Mrs Zappia applied to the Commission in 1993 (twenty years

later!) the Commission did not have jurisdiction to deal with the

complaint relating to the length of the declaratory proceedings.

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1.  Judgment of 23 March 1994, Series A no. 286-A.

2.  Judgment of 26 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and

Decisions 1996-IV.

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2.       As regards the complaint concerning the excessive length of

the enforcement proceedings complained of by the applicants, I repeat

that, as these proceedings are separate from the proceedings on the

merits, even though they began on 5 December 1977 the

Strasbourg institutions have jurisdiction to deal with the complaint

under Article 6 of the Convention (art. 6) because they are still

pending.

3.       Given that I consider the Court to have jurisdiction to rule

on that complaint, limited - I repeat - to the enforcement proceedings,

I agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the majority to the effect

that there was a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention

(art. 6-1) in the case.  Unlike the position in the above-mentioned

Di Pede case, which concerned enforcement of an obligation to perform

a specific act, governed by Articles 612 and 613 of the

Italian Code of Civil Procedure, the present case concerns proceedings

to enforce payment of a sum specified in the final decision on the

merits, plus interest and the costs of the enforcement proceedings.

Under this procedure the same Italian Code of Civil Procedure

(see paragraph 12 of the judgment) not only requires the plaintiff to

institute proceedings - so that it is for a party to take the

initiative - but also places the courts under an obligation to rule on

the judgment creditor's claims.  In the present case the judge dealing

with the enforcement proceedings has still not reached any decision

(see paragraph 25 of the judgment).

4.       In my opinion, therefore, the applicants' contribution to the

delays they complained of in the enforcement proceedings does not

justify the judge's inactivity, or indeed negligence, as regards

bringing the proceedings to an end (see paragraph 25 of the judgment).

For that reason, I consider that the length of the enforcement

proceedings has exceeded the reasonable time required by Article 6

para. 1 (art. 6-1) and I voted against the award of any sum whatsoever

to the applicants for damages under Article 50 (art. 50).