PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES

I agree that there has been an unreasonable delay in the first set of proceedings in this case having regard in particular to the lack of any hearings for a period of three years and two months, a circumstance which the majority correctly took into account in finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, unlike the majority, I do not agree that there has been a violation of the same Article in respect of the second set of proceedings because no satisfactory reason has been given for attributing any unjustified delay to the judicial authorities of the respondent State.

The majority based its finding of a violation in the second set of proceedings on the overall length of the proceedings. In my opinion, this is not a sufficient criterion for finding a violation for undue delay by the respondent Government. In fact, it is contrary to the approach established by the case-law of the Court according to which the reasonableness of the length of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and with reference to the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute. Although the majority refers to this approach in paragraph 58 of the judgment and duly takes into account the lack of any hearing for a period of three years and two months in the first set of proceedings to justify finding a violation in respect of those proceedings, this approach is overlooked as regards the second set of proceedings.

I had occasion in two previous cases ( Erdős v. Hungary and Maczynski v. Poland , nos. 38937/97 and 43779/98) to point out that the overall length of the proceedings cannot by itself be considered a ground or factor for finding a breach of the obligation under Article 6 of the Convention to hold a hearing “within a reasonable time”. In the Erdős v. Hungary case I explained that:

“Such a breach can only be established if there are unreasonable delays in the proceedings attributable to the State. Proceedings may be protracted by the conduct of the applicant or by the complexity and general nature of the case. In such cases, even if the ‘overall length’ of the proceedings is excessive, no responsibility should be borne by any State organ so long as the latter did not contribute in any way to the prolongation of the duration of the proceedings.”

In the Maczynski v. Poland case I stressed that:

“... there is no absolute or objective limit to the length of time that can be taken. The question whether there has been a delay contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 cannot be decided in abstracto with reference only to the total length of the proceedings.”

To accept the overall length as a sufficient ground for finding a violation of the aforesaid obligation would in fact contradict the criteria established by the case-law. For if a decision finding a violation can be based exclusively on the overall length then there is no point in examining “the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant authorities”. In this case the majority took into account the conduct of the authorities in respect of the first set of proceedings but did not go further than looking at the overall length of the proceedings in respect of the second.

I conclude by repeating what the Court stated in Ciricosta and Viola v. Italy (judgment of 4 December 1995, Series A no. 337 - A, p. 10, § 28), in which the period in issue was more than 15 years for civil proceedings that were still pending at the time of the judgment:

“The Court reiterates in the first place that only delays attributable to the State may justify a finding of failure to comply with the ‘reasonable time’ requirement”.