DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE GARLICKI

I am not convinced that there has been a violation of Article 10 in this case. Unlike in the remaining Finnish cases decided today, in which press publications focused primarily upon Mr A. and information about Ms B. was presented as a background to A. ' s story, in the Jokitaipale and Others case at least two articles (“B. danced samba without A.” and “B. divorces her husband”) dealt primarily with the private life of Ms B.

It is clear that Mr A. was a politician (a public figure) and that the public may have had a legitimate interest in being informed about facts concerning his integrity and lifestyle. Imparting such information belongs to the function the press fulfils in a democratic society.

However, Ms B. was a private person and her entry into the realm of public matters was due only to her relationship with A., which led to the unfortunate incident of 4 December 1996. Since our “public figure” doctrine entitles the press to invade the private life of politicians, the press was allowed to provide complete information about those facts and had no alternative but to involve B. as well. So long as information concerning B. constituted an integral element of A. ' s story, she could not invoke Article 8 to protect her privacy. She knew that A. was a public figure and she must have been aware that their relationship might – sooner or later – arouse the interest of the press.

But all this did not transform Ms B. into a separate (autonomous) public figure. The application of the “public figure” doctrine to her private life was therefore limited to the facts and events concerning her relationship with A. The very fact that she had an affair with A. could not result in total forfeiture of her privacy. B. ' s arrest and conviction, while deserving press coverage, were at the same time not sufficient to deprive her of her status as a private person (see Sciacca v. Italy , no. 50774/99, § 29, ECHR 2005 I).

I agree with the judgment (see paragraph 72) that as long as the information about B. was only limited to facts which were inherently related to A. ' s story, she could not rely on protection of privacy. But the concept of “inherently related” information cannot give carte blanche to the press. Publication of articles (clips) whose titles mentioned B. exclusively and which focused on facts concerning her divorce or her samba dancing (without A. being present) cannot, in my opinion, be regarded as “inherently related” to Mr A. In consequence, they cannot be regarded as sufficiently covered either by the “public figure” doctrine or by the concept of “inherently related” information.

Therefore, I am of the opinion that the Finnish courts were right in deciding that those publications were of a kind to which the protection of private life was applicable in the first place.