DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE POWER JOINED BY JUDGE YUDKIVSKA

This case raises an issue in relation to the principle of subsidiarity and I voted against majority in its finding of a violation. I do not acquiesce in the proposition that regular delays are endemic in every system and must, of necessity, be tolerated. I accept the importanc e of administering justice in a manner that does not jeopardise its effectiveness and credibility (see Bottazzi v. Italy [GC], no. 34884/97, ECHR 1999 ‑ V).

There was, undoubtedly, considerable delay in this case. However, it is clear that the respondent state has readily acknowledged the delay and has relied upon this Court ’ s case law in its determination of just satisfaction. The proceedings in issue were highly contentious involving, as they did, a dispute over matrimonial property. They were also quite complex and involved three levels of jurisdiction at domestic level. Furthermore, the applicant ’ s former wife (the claimant) died and the proceedings were taken over by her husband. Subsequently, he also died and new parties were brought into the proceedings, some of whom were resident abroad. These objective facts contributed, inevitably, to the protracted length of the proceedings.

Apart from all these matters which were beyond anyone ’ s control, the applicant himself played a significant part in the overall delay. He was, of course, entitled to exercise his right to appeal on several occasions, which he did, but he cannot at the same time disregard the fact that these appeals had the effect of adding to the overall length of time which the proceedings took. The Court has frequently reiterate d that while applicant s are entitled to make use of their procedural rights, they must bear the consequences when this leads to delays (see, mutatis mutandis , the Buchholz v. Germany judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A no. 42, pp. 21-22, § 63).

Further delay was caused by the fact that the applicant was rather obstructive, refusing to allow court appointed assessors to determine the value of the matrimonial property. In addition to his difficulties with the assessors, he also had difficulties with his counsel and withdrew his instructions on various occasions. There is no evidence in the file that he ever brought an application before the domestic courts seeking to advance the litigation. Neither is there any evidence of protracted periods of delay (post-ratification) within the proceedings or long periods of inactivity for which the State could be held responsible. In the light of all the prevailing circumstances, the degree of culpability which falls upon the state for the alleged delay is greatly diminished.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the authorities of the Czech Republic have acknowledged that the proceedings were lengthy and have compensated the applicant in respect thereof. In awarding damages, they conducted a careful and thorough investigation into the proceedings in issue. Absent evidence of manifest unreasonableness in their evaluation, it is not, in my view, appropriate for this Court to interfere with the assessment of the relative weight to be given to the conduct of all concerned. Notwithstanding his clear contribution to the overall length of proceedings, the domestic authorities proceeded to award the applicant a significant sum in compensation.

After reviewing what the domestic tribunals have already done, this C ourt has decided to increase that award by a modest amount. I disagree, fundamentally, with the approach of the Chamber in this regard. Respect for subsidiarity requires this Court to satisfy itself that a genuine acknowledgment of a violation has occurred and that reasonable compensation therefore has been made. It is, in my view, neither appropriate nor prudent for this Court to re-assess the assessment and to ‘ top-up ’ an award made at domestic level in circumstances where, quite evidently, a careful appraisal of responsibilities for delay has been conducted and a reasonable sum of compensation has been granted in relation thereto.