CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DAVID THóR BJöRGVINSSON

I have voted with the majority with some hesitation.

The defamation proceedings against the applicant were born out of the applicant ’ s statements made in her pleadings before the Szczecin District Court. Apparently the president of the Court, J.S., saw fit to forward the issue to the supervising judge of the Szczecin Regional Court who informed the Szczecin ‑ ÅžródmieÅ›cie Prosecutor of the applicant ’ s pleadings with the result that a public bill of indictment was issued against the applicant. She was later found guilty of defamation.

The reasons for my hesitations are the following.

Firstly , it is questionable whether it was at all appropriate for the president of the Szczecin District Court to take the initiative to have public defamation proceedings brought against a party to a dispute before his court for statements made in court pleadings. Interestingly, the case was only investigated as a defamation case. However, no investigation was conducted into the veracity of the allegations made by the applicant in her pleadings, which can only mean that nobody took them seriously enough to even suggest such an investigation. I do not imply that there was any basis for them whatsoever, but only that nobody took them seriously, and thus they would seem to be, in practical terms and albeit being intemperate, at least harmless to J.S . ’ s reputation.

Secondly , I do not agree that the statements were made in public, as they were made in civil court proceedings. Although such proceedings are public within the meaning of procedural law the overall effect of it for J.S. ’ s reputation certainly cannot be equated with material published in the media. Their possible harmful effect for J.S., if any, must be assessed in light of that fact.

Thirdly , the case raises the question as to whether defamation proceedings are at all the right tool to address inappropriate statements made in the context of court proceedings. I believe that these kinds of “procedural irregularities” are more appropriately dealt with within the framework of procedural rules on contempt of court and such, rather than resorting to independent defamation proceedings where Article 8 and Article 10 rights become the central issue. In any case, as reflected in the judgment, there seems to be ample support in the case ‑ law of this Court for the position taken in the judgment. This has for me, with some hesitation, tilted the balance in favour of finding no violation of Article 10 of the Convention.