DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES JOÄŒIENÄ–, KARAKAÅž AND KELLER

We are not convinced that the manner in which the applicant was treated amounted to a deprivation of liberty.

According to the facts of the case, the applicant, who was a nurse, was distributing a leaflet during her working hours at the hospital. She was asked by a police officer whether she had permission from the hospital administration to distribute the said leaflet, of which he requested a copy. The applicant refused to give him one. She was invited by the officer to the hospital ’ s police office so that the leaflets could be examined. She refused and the officer pulled her arm. This act, while not reaching the threshold of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention, explains the redness in her arm.

The Chief Doctor of the hospital was informed about the incident, and the applicant remained in the hospital ’ s police office until the Chief Doctor and hospital director arrived. The Chief Doctor then sent the applicant back to her work area. Here it becomes clear that the applicant had not in fact been taken into detention. It is important to stress that she was able to leave the room on the order of the Chief Doctor; it was he, and not the police officer, who “released” her. She merely sat in a hospital room, used by the police, for a period of less than one hour until the Chief Doctor arrived. The applicant was not therefore deprived of her liberty in the meaning of Article 5 § 1.

We would point out that, under the Court ’ s established case-law, Article 5 § 1 is not concerned with mere restrictions on liberty of movement, which are governed by Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 (see H.M. v. Switzerland , no. 39187/98, § 40, ECHR 2002 ‑ II ; Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08 , § 225, ECHR 2012 ; Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, § 57, ECHR 2012) .

In order to determine whether someone has been “deprived of his liberty” within the meaning of Article 5 § 1, the starting point must be his or her concrete situation, and account must be taken of a whole range of criteria, such as the type, duration, effects and manner of implementation of the measure in question. The difference between deprivation and restriction of liberty is one of degree or intensity, and not of nature or substance (see Engel and Others v. the Netherlands , 8 June 1976, § 59, Series A no. 22 ; Guzzardi v. Italy , 6 November 1980, § 92-93 , Series A no. 39 ; Medvedyev and Others v. France [GC], no. 3394/03, § 73 , ECHR 2010; and Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 57).

Even if it is not excluded that Article 5 § 1 may apply to deprivations of liberty of a very short duration (see X v. Germany , no. 8819/79, Commission decision of 19 March 1981, Decisions and Reports (DR) 24, pp. 158, 161), the Convention organs ’ case-law shows that this provision was considered inapplicable in cases in which the applicants ’ stay in a police station lasted only a few hours and did not extend beyond the time strictly necessary to accomplish certain formalities (see Guenat v. Switzerland , no. 24722/94, Commission decision of 10 April 1995, Decisions and Reports (DR) 81, pp. 130, 134; Foka v. Turkey , no . 28940/95, § 75, 24 June 2008, and, a contrario Venskute v. Lithuania , no. 10645/08, § 74, 11 December 2012) or where the applicants waited in a courtyard for a relatively short period (see Pavlides and Georgakis v. Turkey , nos. 9130/09 and 9143/09, § 23, decision of 2 July 2013 ) or were subjected to kettling (see Austin and Others , cited above, § 68).

In all of these cases, the restrictive nature of the measures concerned was not sufficient to bring them within the scope of Article 5§1.

In the light of these considerations and the relatively short period during which the applicant waited in a room until the Chief Doctor arrived, we are of the opinion that she was not deprived of her liberty within the meaning of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention and that there has therefore been no violation of this provision.