CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SPANO

1. In paragraph 63, the Court finds it unnecessary to examine the applicant ’ s remaining complaints under Article 6 in light of its finding of a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c), in conjunction with Article 6 § 1, and its considerations in paragraph 71 that the most appropriate form of redress would be a retrial of the applicant. I write separately to highlight my reasons for agree ing with this conclusion.

2. As I have previously stated (see my concurring opinion in Ahmet Eryilmaz v. Turkey , 23501/07, 3 June 2014), when, as in this case, a person has been accused of a crime, taken into police custody for questioning and has made incriminating statements without a lawyer being present, his subsequent conviction at trial for a criminal offence must, in principle, be considered unsafe and a retrial is the appropriate response. That is the logic behind the seminal Grand Chamber judgment in Salduz v. Turkey ( [GC], 36391/02, ECHR 2008; see § 55, in fine ) . Hence, when the funda ­ mental fairness of criminal proceedings have been irremediably undermined due to a violation of this nature, there is no need, in general, for this Court to examine other complaints under Article 6 concerning the fairness of the same proceedings. My view on this issue is thus based on legal principle as well as on grounds of practical necessity.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

I voted with my colleagues on the findings with respect to Articles 3 and 6 § 3 (c) of the Convention. To my regret, however, I am unable to follow the majority in holding that there is no need to examine the remaining complaints raised under Article 6.

As indicated in paragraph 55 of the judgment, the applicant raised a number of complaints under Article 6. Apart from the complaint relating to a violation of the right to legal assistance, which the Court examined, he also raised complaints with respect to the lack of independence and impartiality of the domestic court, that court ’ s reliance on evidence obtained under duress, the unreasonable length of the proceedings, his inability to attend hearings during the first year of the proceedings, and his inability to hear and cross-examine witnesses against him.

The majority has decided that it is unnecessary to examine these other complaints for two reasons; first, because the Court has found a violation of Article 6 § 3 (c), and second, because there exists the possibility that the applicant will be retried following the finding of that violation (see paragraph 6 5 ). I do not find these reasons convincing. First, the complaint relating to the violation of the right to legal assistance is of a different nature to the other complaints. The finding of a violation of the right to legal assistance during the initial stage of the criminal proceedings does not necessarily imply that the applicant could not have had a trial before an independent and impartial tribunal, or a trial within a reasonable time. At least these two aspects of the right to a fair trial deserved, in my opinion, a separate examination. Second, it is not at all certain that the applicant will request a retrial (he is not obliged to do so), and even less that he will obtain one. However, what is certain is that at this stage he is unable to obtain just satisfaction in respect of the non-pecuniary damage allegedly caused by the violations that are the object of his additional complaints.

Although I can understand the practical reasons underlying the majority ’ s decision not to spend time and energy on examination of the additional complaints, I would have preferred that at least some of them be examined. I do not think that complicated reasoning would have been required to come to a conclusion on these complaints.