JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES ZIEMELE AND NICOLAOU

We have voted with the majority but not without some hesitation.

In a case such as the present, Latvian law does not allow the use by the police of special restraint techniques against women (section 13 in fine of the Law on Police, see paragraph 26 of the judgment). Regrettably, the police officers who dealt with the matter at the scene did not act in conformity with the law in question. Although the applicant ’ s conduct made the situation difficult to manage and resolve, that did not absolve them from the obligation to abide by what the law required.

The State is entitled to adopt such a measure, which obviously addresses, in the domestic context, the particular vulnerability of women and seeks to safeguard their dignity. It can be seen as connected, inter alia , with the protection that Article 3 of the Convention accords to individuals against degrading treatment. Thus, the existence of the measure in question should seriously enter into the equation when one comes to consider the gravity of the treatment meted out to the applicant.

What the result may be is, of course, a matter of overall assessment; and, on this, we have finally concluded that there is no firm ground on the basis of which we should depart from the view taken by the majority.

SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE KALAYDJIEVA

In the present case the respondent Government did not contest the fact of use of physical force or the fact that the applicant sustained minor bodily injuries and anguish per se . In this regard I fail to agree with the conclusions of the majority (paragraph 57) that the applicant ’ s treatment did not reach the minimum level of severity required to fall within the scope of Article 3 of the Convention and that “there has, accordingly , been no violation of that Article” (paragraph 58).

The question whether the treatment sustained by the applicant in this case reached the “minimum level of severity” should be subject to an assessment, which (as noted in paragraph 52 ) “depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim (see, among many others, Farbtuhs v. Latvia , no. 4672/02, § 49, 2 December 2004, and Bazjaks v. Latvia , no. 71572/01, § 105, 19 October 2010).”

In so far as this assessment led the majority to conclude that the treatment sustained did not reach the “minimum level of severity”, this conclusion concerns first and foremost the applicability of Article 3 and should accordingly lead to a finding that the applicant ’ s complaint is manifestly ill-founded as falling outside the scope of the protection of this provision.

I agree with my colleagues ’ conclusion that there was no violation of Article 3 in the present case, not because the sustained treatment did not reach the “minimum level of severity” (a matter which was insufficiently examined), but because “the Court has previously recognised that a form of constraint applied by police officers may be justified where persons being controlled offer physical resistance or present a risk of violent behaviour (see Bērziņš v. Latvia , no. 25147/07, § 90, 25 February 2014 with further references).” The applicant did not deny her resistance or the fact that she had been let go as soon as she had stopped resisting. In these circumstances, and given the level of severity and short duration of the treatment sustained, there is little to convince me that the “recourse to physical force was not made strictly necessary by the applicant ’ s own conduct” such as to constitute an infringement of her right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention.