DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KJØLBRO

1. I agree with my colleagues that there has been a deprivation of property (see paragraph 28 of the judgment), that the interference was prescribed by law (see paragraph 29), and that it was designated to correct a mistake made by the authorities and thus pursued a legitimate aim (see paragraph 30). But I respectfully disagree with my colleagues that the interference did not comply with the requirement of proportionality (see paragraphs 35-43). For that reason, I voted against finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

2. As recognised by the majority, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 does not, in general, preclude the authorities from correcting mistakes made by them, even when correction of the mistake will interfere with a person ’ s propert y rights.

3. Thus, the fact that the applicant acted in good faith when she acquired the plot of land from the authorities and had a legitimate expectation that she would be able to retain and make use of the property in question does not, in itself, preclude correctio n of a mistake.

4. The applicant acquired the plot of land in 2000, and under domestic legislation it was a condition of sale that the plot of land be designated for residential use. In 2002, that is, a year and half after the acquisition, the authorities discovered that a mistake had been made, thus rendering the transfer unlawful, as the plot of land had not be used as residential land. Since the applicant disputed the authorities ’ assessment, court proceedings had to be instituted in order to have the transfer annulled. The court proceedings, at three levels, ended in 2006, that is, after a little more than three years. The transfer was annulled, the plot of land was returned to the State, and the applicant received back the sum she had paid for the lan d.

5. The fact that a mistake was made, discovered and corrected by the authorities cannot, as stated above, in itself constitute a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

6. Nor can the length of the court proceedings, which lasted only around three years, justify the finding of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

7. Equally, the fact that the applicant did not receive any compensation for pecuniary or non-pecuniary damage cannot justify finding a violation. Indeed, the applicant never claimed compensation for damages, either in the annulment proceedings or in separate civil proceedings. The applicant wished, first and foremost, to retain the plot of land that had been unlawfully transferred to her. Thus, the lack of payment of compensation for damages cannot, in the specific circumstances of the case, justify finding a violation o f Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.

8. Furthermore, the application is, in my view, distinguishable from Pyrantien ė v. Lithuania , no. 45092/07, 12 November 2013; Albergas and Arlauskas v. Lithuania , no. 17978/05, 27 May 2014; and Paplauskiene v. Lithuania , no. 31102/06, 14 October 2014 (not final), in which the Court did find a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. These cases differ from the present case on account of the excessive length of the periods in question and the lack of or insufficient compensation for damages resulting from the authorities ’ mistakes.

9. Therefore, in my view, the reasons given by the majority are not convincing, and the judgment will, in practice, make it very difficult for authorities to correct mistakes without violating Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, even if they react promptly and without unnecessary delays.