DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DEDOV

I regret that I cannot agree with the majority ’ s conclusion that there has been a violation of the substantive aspect of Article 2 of the Convention on account of the unjustified use of potential lethal force against the first applicant. In general, I follow the main reasoning of the separate opinion of Judge Wildhaber, joined by Judges Kovler and Mularoni, which was annexed to the Makaratzis judgment. Furthermore, the Court ’ s conclusion is premature as the criminal proceedings against the applicant have not been completed at the national level.

But the main question remains unresolved: should the Court encourage irresponsible and dangerous behavio u r? My response to this question is no. The use of lethal force was based on paragraph 2 of Article 2, in order to make a lawful arrest, as the applicant had refused to stop the car for a routine inspection. Moreover, the applicant was heavily drunk and was driving his car at excessive speed; he had mounted the pavement and endangered the life of a police officer, creating a situation in which the police officers had to fire in order to stop the car after he had already gone through the second roadblock (the authorities used two roadblocks as less extreme methods). Any warning shots would therefore have been ineffective; the applicant stopped the car only when he heard that the rear window had been shattered. Therefore, the use of force was absolutely necessary.

It is a common rule that a driving licence must be withdrawn if a certain level of alcohol has been found in the driver ’ s blood. That rule is not based on the particular circumstances of a particular driver ’ s behaviour, but on the general presumption that alcohol itself endangers the lives of others. In my view, the Court should treat such a risk as seriously as possible.