DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1. To my regret, I am unable to agree with the majority ’ s finding that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention in the present case . In my opinion, Article 8 is not applicable and the complaint should have been declared incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.

2. The case concerns the effects caused on the applicant ’ s health by drinking contaminated water from the tap. The domestic courts found that the water distributing company had committed a wrongful act and ordered it to pay damages. The applicant is not satisfied with the amount awarded.

In her appeal to the Supreme Court of Justice, she invoked the constitutional right to a healthy environment in order to challenge the amount of the compensation awarded. It does not seem that at the domestic level she ever complained about an infringement of the right to respect for her private life.

This is therefore essentially a case about the right to compensation for a civil tort.

3. The majority considers that Article 8 of the Convention comes into play because the applicant ’ s “physical integrity has been affected by an unhealthy environment” (see paragraph 17 of the judgment).

It is true that the concept of private life covers the physical –and psychological- integrity of a person (see paragraph 15 of the judgment; see further, by way of example, X and Y v. the Netherlands , 26 March 1985, § 22, Series A no. 91; Pretty v. the United Kingdom , no. 2346/02, § 61, ECHR 2002 ‑ III; A, B and C v. Ireland [GC], no. 25579/05, § 212, ECHR 2010; and Nada v. Switzerland [GC], no. 10593/08 , § 151, ECHR 2012). However, I do not think that this means that any damage to a person ’ s health attracts the applicability of Article 8. For that provision to be applicable, I tend to believe that there should be repercussions on the affected person ’ s private life. It seems to me that in the present case no such repercussions have been put forward (compare, for example, Fadeyeva v. Russia , no. 55723/00, § 88, ECHR 2005 ‑ IV, where the applicant ’ s health had deteriorated as a result of her prolonged exposure to an unhealthy situation, thus making her vulnerable to certain health problems ).

It is also true that “ where an individual is directly and seriously affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8” (paragraph 15 of the judgment; see further, by way of example, Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 36022/97, § 96, ECHR 2003 ‑ VIII; Zammit Maempel v. Malta , no. 24202/10 , § 36, 22 November 2011; Bor v. Hungary , no. 50474/08, § 24, 18 June 2013; and Udovičić v. Croatia , no. 27310/09 , § 137, 24 April 2014 ). Again, in my opinion, not every damage that relates to the environment attracts the applicability of Article 8. For that provision to be applicable, there should be a situation of nuisance which affects the person in his or her private life (see Powell and Rayner v. the United Kingdom , 21 February 1990, § 40, Series A no. 172; López Ostra v. Spain , 9 December 1994, § 51, Series A no. 303 ‑ C; and TaÅŸkın and Others v. Turkey , no. 46117/99, § 113, ECHR 2004 ‑ X; see also Kyrtatos v. Greece , no. 41666/98, § 52, ECHR 2003 ‑ VI (extracts); and Ivan Atanasov v. Bulgaria , no. 12853/03 , § 66, 2 December 2010 ). Moreover, the nuisance must attain a certain minimum level ( Mileva and Others v. Bulgaria , nos. 43449/02 and 21475/04 , § 90, 25 November 2010; Zammit Maempel , cited above, § 37; Hardy and Maile v. the United Kingdom , no. 31965/07 , § 188, 14 February 2012; and Dzemyuk v. Ukraine , no. 42488/02 , § 77, 4 September 2014) . In the present case there has been only one incident, and it has not been demonstrated that the illness has affected the applicant in the quality of her private life, except for the period spent in the hospital (see paragraph 19 of the judgment). While I do not question that the applicant has been seriously ill, I do not see the effects on her private life.

4. To conclude, thanks to a very generous interpretation of the notion of private life, this case has been “upgraded” from an ordinary torts case to a case raising an issue under Article 8.

While I have sympathy for the applicant, from a purely legal poi nt of view I would have preferred a more restrained approach to the scope of application of Article 8.