PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGHIDES

1 . In the present case, the applicant complained of: (a) a violation of Article 3 of the Convention due to acts of violence he had suffered at the hands of the police officer on duty, alleging that they amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of this provision; and (b) a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 3 on account of the extremely low amount of compensation awarded to him in the domestic proceedings.

2 . The judgment of the Court was unanimous as regards the first complaint in finding the applicant to be a “victim” of a breach of his rights under Article 3 and in finding a violation of that Article. Regarding the applicant ’ s second complaint, however, I am unable to join my eminent colleagues in finding that there has been no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3, for the reasons I will explain below.

3 . Voting, as the majority did, in favour of no violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 is, with all due respect, in direct contradiction with the following:

(a) The unanimous finding of the Court made in paragraph 32 of the judgment that the amount awarded to the applicant in domestic civil proceedings for non-pecuniary damage was “still far less than 5% of what [the Court] generally awards in comparable Russian cases”. It is to be noted in this connection, that the Court referred in the same paragraph of the judgment to four similar cases against Russia, where it awarded 20,000 euros (EUR) for non-pecuniary damage, and to another judgment again against Russia, where it awarded EUR 17,000. The Russian domestic courts in the present case awarded the applicant only 20,000 Russian roubles, the equivalent of approximately EUR 440. If one takes EUR 20,000 as the normal or ordinary amount of just satisfaction awarded by the Court, the amount of EUR 440 actually awarded by the domestic courts is only 2.2% of that normal amount. It is immaterial that the Court in the present case awarded only EUR 11,000, because that was the amount claimed by the applicant and the Court could not go beyond the claim. But even taking into account the amount actually awarded in the present case by the Court, and not the normal amount that it would otherwise have awarded, the compensation awarded by the domestic courts was still less than 5%, thus only 4%, of that actual award by the Court.

(b) The unanimous conclusion of the Court in paragraph 33 of the judgment that, since “the compensation awarded to the applicant by the domestic courts did not constitute sufficient redress ... [t]he applicant could still claim to be a ‘ victim ’ of a breach of his rights under Article 3 of the Convention”. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the Court reiterates that “in cases of wilful ill-treatment by State agents in breach of Article 3, in addition to acknowledging the violation, two measures are necessary to provide sufficient redress”. One is to conduct “a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible”. That was done in the present case. And the other measure is to award compensation for the damage sustained as a result of the ill-treatment. However, the amount of compensation awarded in the present case did not provide sufficient redress and that was why the Court unanimously considered the applicant to be a “victim” in terms of Article 3. With all due respect, while the Court rightly considers the applicant to be a “victim” of a violation of Article 3 for the above reason, it is unfortunate, in my view, that the majority nevertheless take a different approach as regards Article 13 and find no violation; despite the fact that the latter provision is the one which expressly and specifically deals with the necessity for everyone whose Convention rights are violated to have an effective remedy at the domestic level.

(c) The legal principle referred to with approval by the majority in paragraph 39 of the judgment, with reference to the relevant case-law of the Court, namely that “the remedy required by Article 13 must be ‘ effective ’ in practice as well as in law”. In my view, a remedy cannot be effective when it corresponds to an amount in respect of non-pecuniary damage which is, by the Court ’ s own admission, extremely low, and definitely does not meet the minimum standard laid down by the case-law of the Court.

4 . On the contrary, the above-mentioned unanimous findings of the Court, together with the legal principle of effectiveness of remedies restated in the judgment, support my approach that, in the present case, there has been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3 because the compensation awarded by the domestic courts for non-pecuniary damage was of an extremely low amount.

5 . I would not follow an approach which would render Article 13 devoid of purpose as well as making its letter an empty shell. One cannot speak of an effective national remedy when the compensation is far less than 5%, as it was in the present case, of what the Court in its case-law considers to be effective. Any other approach, apart from being contrary to the letter and aim of Article 13, would be contrary to the Convention ’ s scope and the principle of effectiveness, which is inherent in it, and which should be taken into account not only in interpreting and applying Convention provisions, but also in implementing them. If the meaning of effectiveness of a remedy in the sense of Article 13 is thus undermined, one cannot avoid ultimately reaching a conclusion which will undermine the entire Convention itself, which, by its nature, was intended to be effective as an international instrument for the protection of human rights.

6 . Lastly, any approach other than the one I have proposed would encourage the national authorities to award extremely low amounts for non-pecuniary damage, falling short of the standards of the Court ’ s case-law, since, by so doing, they would not be troubled by the prospect of being found liable for a violation of Article 13.

7 . For the above reasons, I conclude that there has also been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 3. I would propose an increased amount for the non-pecuniary damage sustained as a result of this additional violation; however, I will not do so, because it would mean going beyond the applicant ’ s request, thus disregarding the non ultra petita rule . The Court has awarded the applicant EUR 11,000, as he claimed, for both of his complaints.