JOINT CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGES KELLER, PASTOR VILANOVA AND EL Ó SEGUI

71 . We fully agree with the majority in their finding of a violation of Article 3 (see paragraph 52 of the judgment) , although we cannot join them in their classification of the ill-treatment suffered by the applicant as inhuman and degrading treatment (see paragraphs 50-51 of the judgment ). For the reasons below, we consider that it should instead be classified as torture.

72 . Our case-law has primarily attached weight to two factors when classifying ill-treatment as torture. First, the Court has had regard to the “intensity” of the suffering (see Ireland v. the United Kingdom , 18 January 1978, § 167, Series A no. 25). Therefore, the special stigma of torture should be attached to “deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering” (see Aksoy v. Turkey , 18 December 1996, § 63, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI; Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 96, ECHR 1999 ‑ V; and Gäfgen v. Germany [GC], no. 22978/05, § 90, ECHR 2010). Second, the Court has noted the “purposive” element in torture, namely “ the aim, inter alia , of obtaining information, inflicting punishment or intimidating” (see Akkoç v. Turkey , nos. 22947/93 and 22948/93, § 115, ECHR 2000 ‑ X, and Gäfgen , cited above, § 90; see also Article 1 of the United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment).

73 . The Court has to balance these elements against each other in every particular case. Some forms of ill-treatment might not be sufficient to constitute torture by themselves, but might be so when attached to a particular purpose such as extracting information from a suspect. When the ill-treatment has been inflicted with the purpose of obtaining a confession, the Court has paid particular attention to that fact (see Aksoy , cited above, § 64; Dikme v. Turkey , no. 20869/92, §§ 95-96, ECHR 2000 ‑ VIII; Salman v. Turkey [GC], no. 21986/93, § 115, ECHR 2000 ‑ VII, in which the Court had regard not only to the “nature and degree of the ill-treatment” but also to the “strong inferences that [could] be drawn from the evidence that it [had] occurred during interrogation”; and Selmouni , cited above, § 98).

74 . We think this approach should have been followed in this case. It appears from the applicant ’ s account of the facts (which was found to be credible by the Court, see paragraph 42 of the judgment) that the aim of the ill-treatment was to obtain information from the applicant and force him to confess to his alleged crime (see paragraph 7 of the judgment ). This should be viewed in conjunction with the fact that the treatment he suffered was severe enough to place it, in our view, at the boundary of what constitutes torture: according to his account of events, he was kicked and punched several times all over his body (see paragraph 7 of the judgment ). The applicant ’ s account was confirmed by a forensic medical expert who noted, inter alia, the existence of eleven bruises on his back and a further nineteen on his chest and stomach (see paragraph 15 of the judgment ).

75 . The severity of this ill-treatment, viewed in the light of its purpose of extracting a confession, should have prompted the Court to classify it as torture under Article 3.