JOINT PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES PINTO DE ALBUQUERQUE AND VEHABOVIĆ

1. We agree with the present judgment, except on a single point. We are unable to share the view of the majority of the Chamber that only half of the amount of pecuniary damage claimed should be awarded to the applicant company as a consequence of the finding of a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.

2. The penalty complained of by the applicant company was imposed by the Agency, which is an administrative authority. That same penalty was disputed by the applicant company before the Supreme Court, which refused to examine the proposed evidence by way of conducting an oral hearing and examining witnesses. This evidence was essential, since the offence in question had been observed by the Agency’s officers in person and their testimony was the sole basis for the applicant’s conviction. As a result the applicant company was fined 105,000 euros, which it paid (see paragraph 15 of the judgment).

3. In our view, the most appropriate form of redress in respect of Article 6 violations is the reopening of the proceedings, if requested by the applicant (see Navalnyy and Ofitserov v. Russia , nos. 46632/13 and 28671/14, § 136, 23 February 2016, and the separate opinion of Judge Pinto de Albuquerque, joined by Judges KarakaÅŸ, Sajó, Lazarova Trajkovska, Tsotsoria, Vehabović and KÅ«ris, in Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], no. 19867/12, 11 July 2017). The same principle applies to this case. In this regard, we find it highly problematic that Slovenian law does not allow for the reopening of the present proceedings (see paragraph 65 of the judgment). This is not in accordance with Recommendation (2000)2 of the Committee of Ministers on the re ‑ examination or reopening of certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, and hence Slovenian law lacks basic human rights safeguards in this regard.

4. As a matter of principle, whenever the Court finds a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and where no possibility exists for the reopening of the proceedings before the domestic authorities on the basis of that judgment, the full amount of pecuniary damage sustained by the applicant as a consequence of that violation should be paid, if requested.

5. It is true that the outcome of the proceedings might have been the same had there been no violation of Article 6. But we do not know that without the proceedings being reopened, which is not possible in the present case. Hence, the applicant company will not get full justice: on the one hand, it does not get a second chance to discuss the case while benefiting from the procedural guarantees of Article 6 and, on the other hand, it does not get full compensation for the amount of pecuniary damage sustained precisely on account of the violation of Article 6.

6. In any event, we find it unreasonable to regard the applicant company as having suffered a loss of real opportunities, as happened in those cases cited by the majority in paragraph 66 of the judgment ( Pélissier and Sassi v. France [GC], no. 25444/94, § 80, ECHR 1999 II; Destrehem v. France , no. 56651/00, § 52, 18 May 2004; and Miessen v. Belgium , no. 31517/12, § 78, 18 October 2016).

The present case must be distinguished from those cases. In Pelissier and Sassi the alleged pecuniary damage included a fine applied by the Aix ‑ en-Provence Court of Appeal, but also the time the applicants had spent, to the detriment of their work, defending what had been abnormally lengthy criminal proceedings, and the loss of profit and business opportunities as a result of the conviction. In Destrehem , the alleged pecuniary damage included the loss of employment and the loss of the possibility to sit the competition to become a public employee. In Miessen , the pecuniary damage related to the loss of a financial subsidy that the applicant had claimed but did not receive. In all the cases mentioned by the majority there was an element of loss of real opportunities, which was taken into consideration for the purposes of calculating the pecuniary damage.

In the present case, the applicant company was fined and the alleged pecuniary damage consisted exclusively in the amount of the unduly paid fine. There was no claim on the part of the applicant company regarding any future opportunities that it allegedly lost as a result of the Article 6 violation.

7. To sum up, we see no reasonable explanation for awarding compensation equal to only half of the sum that the applicant company paid to the authorities. Furthermore, we would invite the national authorities to consider the need to review the domestic law with regard to the re ‑ examination or reopening of cases at domestic level, including cases dealt with under the Administrative Disputes Act, following judgments of the European Court of Human Rights.