PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE RANZONI

1 . In a ccord ance with Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention , the Court may at any stage of the proceedings decide to strike an application out of its list of cases where the circumstances lead to the conclusion that the matter has been resolved. To my mind, this provision should have been applied to the third applicant in the present case.

2 . In its principal judgment ( Beinarovič and Others v. Lithuania , nos. 70520/10 and 2 others, 12 June 2018) the Court held , inter alia , that there had been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention in respect of the third applicant in view of the fact that her property rights had still not been fully restored. It considered that the question of the application of Article 41 of the Convention was not ready for decision as regards pecuniary damage and therefore reserved that question (see paragraphs 2 and 4 of the present judgment).

3 . Subsequently, the relevant domestic authorities asked the third applicant to indicate her preferred form of restitution. She had been given three options: (1) she could be assigned one hectare of land in the area of Vaidotai ; (2) she could be assigned a plot of land or forest in a rural area equal in value to the land held previously; or (3) she could be provided with monetary compensation in the amount of 1,157 euros (EUR) . In her reply, she observed that there was no vacant land in the area of Vaidotai and that it was unlikely that she would be allocated a new plot in the Vilnius Region. Therefore, she wished for her property rights to be restored by means of monetary compensation (see paragraph 12 of the present judgment).

4 . The authorities made an offer for compensation amounting to EUR 1,157, which the third applicant accepted without any indication that she disputed the specifi ed amount or that her acceptance only referred to the question of compensation in principle , but not to the amount offered. She neither requested , nor tried to negotiate , a higher amount.

5 . Against this background, I cannot help but notice that the third applicant at domestic level accepted the authorities’ offer of compensation in the amount of EUR 1,157 and that the matter has thus been resolved.

6 . The majority, in holding that the third applicant had not been deprived of her victim status, first referred to and distinguished the case of A.F. v. the United Kingdom ( ( dec. ), no. 7674/08, § 21, 20 May 2014 – see paragraph 15 of the judgment). However, I fail to see the relevance of that decision, taken in a different context, to the situation in the present case.

7 . Secondly, the majority refer red to case-law stating that an applicant’s victim status may depend on the level of compensation awarded (see paragraph 15). While I agree with this case-law, it is not applicable to the present context. None of the cases of Scordino v. Italy (no. 1) ( [GC], no. 36813/97, ECHR 2006 ‑ V ) , PaplauskienÄ— v. Lithuania (no. 31102/06 , 14 October 2014 ) or Bykova and Others v. Lithuania ([Committee], no. 66042/10, 18 December 2018 ) concerned applicants who had accepted the compensation offered. Instead, t hey relate d to situations where amounts of compensation had been awarded in domestic decisions with which the applicants had clearly disagreed by using domestic remedies. In contrast, the third applicant in the instant case did accept the compensation offered.

8 . What is more, in the above - mentioned cases the Court held that the amounts of compensation awarded had been “manifestly unreasonable” or “manifestly insufficient”. For example, in Scordino the award amounted to only 10% of the sum usually awarded by the Court, and in Bykova and Others the compensation was more than four times lower than its indexed value. In the present case, however, the award offered (EUR 1,157) amounted to 90% of the indexed value (EUR 1,282), which cannot be regarded as “manifestly” unreasonable with in the meaning of the Court’s case-law.

9 . Consequently, to my mind, the third applicant’s acceptance of the compensation offered should have been validated. The matter would thus have been resolved, and her application should have been struck out of the list pursuant to Article 37 § 1 (b) of the Convention.