PAR TLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PASTOR VILANOVA

(Translation)

My dissenting opinion concerns only points 4 and 5 (a) (ii) of the operative part of the judgment, in respect of which I cast the sole dissenting vote.

I have already criticised the fact of focusing on “ the main legal question ” (see paragraph 56 of the judgment) in my dissenting opinion in the case of Popov and Others v. Russia (no. 44560/11, 27 November 2018), to which I now refer. Other judges of the Court have also spoken out in the past against this judicial approach, which I consider erroneous (see, inter alia , the dissenting opinions of judges Bošnjak and Kūris in the case of Petukhov v. Ukraine (no. 2) (no. 41216/13, 12 March 2019), judges Nußberger and Ranzoni in Kuzmenko v. Ukraine (no. 49526/07, 9 March 2017), judge De Gaetano in Mariusz Lewandowski v. Poland (no. 66484/09, 3 July 2012), judge Mularoni in Kişmir v. Turkey (no. 27306/95, 31 May 2005), judges Tulkens, Spielmann and Laffranque in Stanev v. Bulgaria [GC] (no. 36760/06, ECHR 2012), and judges Rozakis, Bratza, Bonello, Loucaides and Jočienė in Draon v. France [GC] (no. 1513/03, 6 October 2005)).

The present judgment examines the applicants ’ complaint solely under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, but does not address their complaint under Article 6. This is a cause of concern, especially since the applicants complained of particularly serious violations, including a denial of access to the Court of Cassation, the unlawfulness of that court ’ s composition and, lastly, a breach of the principle of equality of arms (see paragraph 55 of the judgment). The fact of ignoring these grievances seems particularly problematic in that the Court itself had communicated no fewer than four questions on these specific points to the parties in 2009. A decade later, the majority finds these same issues to be secondary and no longer deserving of any examination. In my humble opinion, the Convention does not allow for a subjective sifting of the rights and freedoms recognised therein. The parties to the dispute deserve an objective examination (admittedly, more or less in-depth) of all the complaints raised by them. The legitimacy of a court lies essentially in the confidence that it inspires in the public. To sum up, I consider that the time has come for the Grand Chamber to take a decisive stand on this restrictive approach.