PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA

                             (Translation)

1.    I regret that I must disagree with the majority as regards the

applicant's complaint - based on Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the

Convention - concerning the infringement of his right to an impartial

tribunal.  In my view, the facts of the case disclose a breach of that

Article (art. 6-1).

2.    The majority (paragraph 38 of the judgment) discern no ground for

legitimate suspicion in the fact that three of the seven members of the

disciplinary section of the National Council of the ordre des médecins,

which gave the final ruling on Dr Diennet's professional conduct and

imposed the penalty of disqualification from practising medicine for

three years, had taken part in the same section's earlier decision in

the same case.

3.    Such a conclusion is, in my opinion, contrary to the concept of

"objective" impartiality combined with the "doctrine of appearances"

that has been developed by the Court, in particular in the Piersack v.

Belgium judgment of 1 October 1982 (Series A no. 53, pp. 13-16,

paras. 28-32), the De Cubber v. Belgium judgment of 26 October 1984

(Series A no. 86, pp. 14-16, paras. 25-30) and the Hauschildt v.

Denmark judgment of 24 May 1989 (Series A no. 154, pp. 21-22,

paras. 46-52) (see Marc-André Eissen, Jurisprudence relative Ã

l'article 6 (art. 6) de la Convention, European Court of Human Rights,

1985, pp. 28-30).

4.    The circumstances described justified the applicant's fears as

to the impartiality of the tribunal which was to give the final ruling

on his professional conduct.  I reach this conclusion whether the

circumstances are analysed from the subjective point of view of the

tribunal members' attitude to a case they had already considered and

decided earlier or whether they are looked at from an objective point

of view, namely that the applicant's fears were justified in view of

"the appearances" of partiality on the part of a body three of whose

seven members had already tried and convicted him (see, among other

authorities, the De Cubber judgment, pp. 13-14, para. 24, and the

Hauschildt judgment, p. 21, para. 46, both previously cited).

5.    The fact that the second decision was almost a literal

reproduction of the first one - which can be explained by the fact that

the rapporteur of the disciplinary section as constituted to rehear the

case had been a member of the section as originally constituted - makes

this defect all the more obvious.  It is therefore not a question of

these three members of the section possibly being malevolent towards

Dr Diennet - who has never argued that they were - but of their

attitude to the case and their personal conviction as to the breaches

of professional ethics of which the applicant was accused.

6.    From the point of view of an objective test, the circumstances

described gave reason to doubt whether those three members could be

impartial in retrying Dr Diennet in respect of the same facts.  They

should have stood down, as the applicant was entitled to have fears as

to their impartiality in view of their detailed knowledge of the case

and the decision they had already given at an earlier stage.  The

impartiality of the tribunal could well appear questionable and "this

fear could be held to be objectively justified" (see the Hauschildt

judgment previously cited, p. 21, paras. 48-49, and the Thorgeir

Thorgeirson v. Iceland judgment of 25 June 1992, Series A no. 239,

p. 23, para. 51).

7.    The majority consider that the applicant's fears cannot be

regarded as having been "objectively justified" and they conclude that

there has been no breach.  They refer to the case of Ringeisen v.

Austria (judgment of 16 July 1971, Series A no. 13), whose facts were,

however, very different from those in the instant case.  The

proceedings taken by Mr Ringeisen were intended to secure approval for

a transfer of ownership of farmland and were therefore purely civil in

nature, whereas Dr Diennet had proceedings brought against him for

breaches of the medical profession's code of ethics.  The Court is thus

extending - without explanation - to disciplinary bodies a trend that

is fairly recent in its case-law (see the following judgments: Fey v.

Austria of 24 February 1993, Series A no. 255-A, p. 12, para. 30;

Padovani v. Italy of 26 February 1993, Series A no. 257-B, p. 20,

para. 27; Nortier v. the Netherlands of 24 August 1993, Series A

no. 267, pp. 15-16, paras. 31-37, with my concurring opinion,

pp. 18-19; and Saraiva de Carvalho v. Portugal of 22 April 1994,

Series A no. 286-B) and is difficult enough as it is to reconcile with

the earlier case-law as set forth in the Piersack, De Cubber,

Hauschildt and Thorgeir Thorgeirson judgments previously cited.  Yet

this case-law concerned only criminal courts which at the pre-trial

stage of a case ordered that a suspect should be held in detention and

subsequently - in most of the cases as a result of the chance

constitution of the courts or changes in the judicial staff - had to

rule on the relevant accused's guilt.

8.    The present case, however, has nothing to do with the taking of

pre-trial measures at an earlier stage of the proceedings but concerns

decisions already taken on the applicant's guilt in disciplinary

proceedings by judges required to rehear the case.  In my view, this

interpretation of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1) of the Convention in

respect of the right to an impartial tribunal makes our case-law on the

assessment of this vital component of a fair trial more uncertain.