PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MORENILLA

1.      I agree with the majority that the taking into care of the

applicant's daughter and the maintenance in force of the care decision

were "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of

paragraph 2 of Article 8 of the Convention (art. 8-2).  However, unlike

the majority, I find that the Norwegian administrative and judicial

authorities were entitled to think that it was "necessary" also to

deprive the applicant of her parental rights and access in respect of

the daughter.

2.      When judging the necessity of these measures, the Court should,

as rightly pointed out by the majority (see paragraph 64 of the

judgment), examine whether the reasons adduced by the domestic

authorities were "relevant and sufficient" in the light of the case as

a whole.  Moreover, regard should be had to the margin of appreciation

to be accorded to them in this area, which, in addition to those

reasons mentioned in paragraph 64 of the judgment, may be justified by

the changing structure of family life in many member States of the

Council of Europe (see Gomien, Harris and Zwaak, Law and Practice of

the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Social

Charter, Strasbourg 1996, pp. 242, 243).

        I share the majority's view that the authorities' discretion

in assessing the necessity of taking a child into care should be a wide

one but, unlike the majority, I see no valid justification for the

Court to exercise a stricter scrutiny of restrictions on parental

rights and access.  In my view, in respect of the latter kind of

measure too, the Court should avoid playing the role of a court of

appeal and should limit itself to reviewing whether the applicant's

interests were duly protected in the decision-making process and

whether the justifications adduced by the national authorities could

reasonably be made on the basis of the facts established by them.

3.      In the instant case, the decision-making process leading to the

decisions depriving the applicant of her parental rights and access

was, as also observed by the majority, beyond reproach.

        However, unlike the majority, I consider that the difficulties

which the child welfare authorities experienced with the applicant and

the risk of her disturbing the foster-home environment were such as to

exempt them from their normal duty under Article 8 (art. 8) to take

measures with a view to reuniting her and the daughter.  In serious

circumstances such as those which obtained in the instant case, where

the life, health and development of the child were at risk, society

must be able to intervene by taking such measures as are required in

order to protect the best interests of the child, even though it may

have the ultimate effect of disrupting in an irreversible manner the

natural bonds between the mother and the daughter.  Such interests were

paramount not only under the relevant domestic law

(see paragraphs 30-40 of the judgment) but also under Article 8 of the

Convention (art. 8) (see, for instance, the Keegan v. Ireland judgment

of 26 May 1994, Series A no. 290, pp. 20-21, para. 55; and the Olsson

v. Sweden (no. 2) judgment of 27 November 1992, Series A no. 250,

pp. 35-36, para. 90), which should be interpreted in the light of

Resolution (77) 33 on placement of children adopted by the Committee

of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 3 November 1977.

        Although I am aware of the serious consequences of the measures

for the applicant's family life, I consider that in the circumstances

the authorities were, having regard to their margin of appreciation,

entitled to think that it was necessary to deprive the applicant of her

parental rights and access in the context of a permanent placement of

the child in a foster home with a view to adoption.  In my opinion, in

reaching the contrary conclusion, the majority has based itself on

reasoning (see paragraphs 82-84 of the judgment) which amounts to a

reassessment of the evidence established by the Committee

(see paragraph 17) and the County Governor (see paragraph 22).

4.      For these reasons, I cannot follow the majority in finding that

the national authorities, by depriving the applicant of her parental

rights and access, "overstepped their margin of appreciation, thereby

violating the applicant's rights under Article 8 of the Convention

(art. 8)".