PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RYSSDAL AND PALM

1.  We have voted with our colleagues in finding no violation of Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1) in the present case but have based ourse lves on a different reasoning. We do not agree that the provision (art. 6-1) was applicable to the proceedings under consideration.

2.  The Criminal Damage Act 1978 lays down the conditions on which compensation may be paid by the Sta te for damage caused by crime. It is undisputed that, under this Act, compensation may be granted even if the perpetrator has not been convicted or identified. However, it is a condition that it be established that a crime has been committed.

3.  It is important to note that Mr Gustafson ’ s claim to the Criminal Damage Compensation Board concerned the same personal injury in respect of which he had previously sought compensation in the criminal proceedings against L. (see paragraphs 11-15 of the judgment).

Furthermore, in acquitting L. and rejecting the applicant ’ s compensation claim, the Court of Appeal laid stress on its finding that the applicant could not be regarded as a trustworthy person and that it followed from this that the information provided by him as to the events which had given rise to the charges against L. could not, in the absence of strong supporting evidence, ground his conviction (see paragraph 14 of the judgment). Thus, it transpires from the Court of Appeal ’ s judgment that that court did not find it established that the applicant was a victim of criminal offences, which was also the conclusion subsequently reached by the Board in two successive decisions (see paragraphs 16 and 19 of the judgment).

4.  In our view, the above findings clearly suggest that the applicant ’ s attempt to pursue his application before the Board, without invoking any relevant evidence which had not been adduced before the District Court or the Court of Appeal, could not be regarded as involving the determination of a serious and genuine dispute for the purposes of Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6 ‑ 1). Accordingly, Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6-1) was not applicable in the applicant ’ s case and has therefore not been violated.

[1] The case is numbered 113/1995/619/709. The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

[2] Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, apply to all cases concerning the States bound by Protocol No. 9 (P9).

[3] For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-IV), but a copy of the Commission's report is obtainable from the registry.

[4] Paragraph 38 of the judgment.

[5] See also my separate opinion in the Pudas v. Sweden case, 27 October 1987, Series A no. 125-A, p. 21, and in the Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden case, 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 24.

[6] See his separate opinion in the Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom case, 28 May 1985, Series A no. 93, p. 27, and also his separate opinion, joined by Mr Macdonald, in the case of Lithgow and Others v. the United Kingdom , 8 July 1986, Series A no. 102, p. 80.

[7] Moreira de Azevedo v. Portugal judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 189, p. 16, para . 66.   See also my concurring opinion in the Kraska v. Switzerland case, 19 April 1993, Series A no. 254-B, p. 54.

[8] Paragraph 48 of the judgment.

[9] Paragraphs 11, 13 and 14 of the judgment.

[10] Paragraphs 16, 17 and 19 of the judgment.