CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE WALSH

The Swedish legislation in question does not exclude the p ossibility of public hearings. A public hearing was not refused as it was never asked fo r. In fact every oral hearing is in practice a public hearing. The applicant had waived an oral hearing in addition to no t asking for a public hearing. In my view he had in effect waived a public hearing. Additionally it is to be noted that under Swedish law all such case files and the decisions thereon are available to the public (see the Sutter v. Switzerland judgment of 22 February 1984, Series A no. 74, p. 6).

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE MEYER

(Translation)

1.  With much regret I have to dissociate myself from the Court ’ s reasoning concerning the applicability of Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6-1).

The Court once again puts the cart before the horse in stating that the "right" at issue must be one "which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law", that the "dispute must be genuine and serious", and that "the outcome of the proceedings must be directly decisiv e for the right in question" [4] .

These points are among the ones that fall to be decided by the domestic courts. In the present case this was done, as described in the judgment, by the Criminal Damage Compensation Board.

Every person asserting a right is entitled to have that right determined in the domestic legal order by a tribunal satisfying the requirements associated with the proper administration of justice. For the purposes of Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1), it is for that tribunal, not for our Court, to consider whether or not the right in question is "arguable", whether or not the dispute is "serious and genuine" and whether or not the outcome of the proceedings is "directly decisive for the right in que stion". The only task for our Court is to check whether or not the person concerned had access to such a tribunal and whether or not that tribunal did comply with the said requirements [5] .

In so far as the judgment requires that the right in question be one "recognised under domestic law", I would, as Mr Lagergren did twelve years ago, observe that the applicability of Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6-1) does not depend on whether or not an asserted "privilege or interest" is classified or described in the domestic legal system as a "civil right" or a "right" at all, and that it is indeed not acceptable that, in relation to one and the same factual situation, the issue be determined differently in different States, or at different ti mes within the same State [6] . The fact that an asserted "right" does not appear to be recognised under domestic law does not deprive the person asserting it of his or her right to have his or her case heard in accordance with the principles laid down in Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6-1).

There can, of course, be no doubt that in the present case the "right" asserted was a "civil" right.

Any right which a citizen ( civis ) may feel entitled to assert, either under national law or under supranational or international law, has indeed to be considered as a "civil" right within the meaning of Article 6 para . 1 of the Convention (art. 6-1), which enshrines a right which is so prominent that "there can be no justification for inte rpreting [it] restrictively" [7] .

These are my reasons for finding that Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6-1) was applicable in the present case.

2.  The Court reiterates in the present judgment that Article 6 para . 1 (art. 6-1) "does not guarantee a righ t of appeal" [8] .

I can accept that "in the particular circumstances of this case" there was no need for an appeal.

There may, however, be other "circumstances", in which, in view of the seriousness of what was at stake, or for some other reason, the right to a fair trial must be deemed to imply a right of appeal.

In the present case what was at stake was of some importance.

However, the decisions of the Criminal Damage Compensation Board concerning the applicant ’ s claim themselves came after those taken by the District Court and by the Court of Appeal in respect of the same claim and the same questions of law and fact [9] . Before the Board the applicant had sought to obtain from the State what he had not obtained from L. i n the ordinary courts. Moreover, the Board, after its initial decision to reject the claim, had reconsidered it at the applicant ’ s request [10] .

The applicant ’ s claim for compensation was thus examined by three different tribunals and even twice by one of them. There was no need for a further appeal.