DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE S ir J ohn FREELAND, joined by JUDGES Thór Vilhjálmsson and Mifsud bonnici

1 . We are unable to agree that the length of the proceedings with which the Court is concerned in this case meets the “reasonable time” requirement imposed by Article 6 of the Convention. Our reasons can be shortly stated.

2. As the Court notes in paragraph 44 of its judgment, almost the whole period falling within its jurisdiction ratione temporis – that is, the period from 1 May 1993 to 19 February 1997 – was essentially taken up with the search for a further expert with sufficient specialist qualifications, the view having initially been taken that an additional opinion on Mrs Proszak’s mental health was necessary after it had been established that there was disagreement between experts who gave evidence on 14 April 1992 and 8 June 1993 respectively, and Mrs Proszak having herself subsequently requested, in November 1993, an examination by an expert in the syndrome of former concentration camp prisoners.

3. It is understandable that further expert evidence should have been sought in the light of the conflict of testimony and, later, of Mrs Proszak’s request. It is also clear both that some delay was unavoidable because of the difficulties, beyond the control of the District Court, in finding a suitable expert and that failings of cooperation on the part of Mrs Proszak were a further source of delay. But, even if, as the Government pointed out and as the Court accepts in paragraph 33 of the judgment, the way a case proceeds under Polish civil procedure depends largely upon the parties, this does not dispense the courts from ensuring compliance with Article 6 as to the “reasonable time” requirement.

4. Given that responsibility, and given that we are not satisfied that the issues in dispute were particularly complex, it is our view that the District Court should have recognised much sooner that, despite the grounds which had existed for considering a further expert opinion to be desirable, such an opinion was not essential and that it could and should decide the case, as it eventually did on 16 May 1996, on the basis of an assessment by it of the material already before it. And although, as we have indicated, we accept that Mrs Proszak proved to be a difficult person for the District Court to deal with (perhaps not altogether surprisingly, in the light of her personal history as a concentration camp victim) and made some contribution to the delay, we do not consider that this should have prevented it from so proceeding.

5. We accordingly would find that there was a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in this case.

[1] . This summary by the registry does not bind the Court.

[2] Notes by the Registrar

. The case is numbered 2/1997/786/987. The first number is the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court in the relevant year (second number). The last two numbers indicate the case's position on the list of cases referred to the Court since its creation and on the list of the corresponding originating applications to the Commission.

[3] . Rules of Court B, which came into force on 2 October 1994, apply to all cases concerning States bound by Protocol No. 9.

[4] 1 .  Note by the Registrar. For practical reasons this annex will appear only with the printed version of the judgment (in Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997), but a copy of the Commission’s report is obtainable from the registry.