CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE BOTOUCHAROVA

I support the Court ’ s conclusion and the principles on which it is based, as set out in paragraphs 56 ‑ 59 and 63 of the judgment . However, my approach in applying these principles to the particular facts of the case is somewhat different.

T he salient issue in the present case is whether the interference with the applicant ’ s freedom of association was a proportionate response of the authorities to the activities of the applicant party (see, as a recent example, Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others v. Turkey [GC], nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98, §§ 86 ‑ 105 , ECHR 2003 ‑ II ) . The answer to this question should be based on two main considerations.

The first of these is whether , having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, it was justified , in keeping with the principles set out in the Court ’ s case ‑ law, to have recourse to a measure as radical as the one employed here. As the Court has many times stressed, such a drastic measure requires very serious reasons by way of justification before it could be considered proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued; it would be warranted only in the most serious cases (see Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others , cited above, § 100, with further references ) . It should be noted in this connection that , prior to its dissolution , the applicant party had been registered, had existed for some time , and had participated in local elections , thus being a participant in the political life. Admittedly, d uring its existence the applicant party could have shown through its actions and public statements that i t merited to be declared unconstitutional and dissolved . However, it was for the national authorities to convincingly establish the need for such a measure. The Constitutional Court should thus have placed a heavier emphasis on UMO Ilinden – PIRIN ’ s behaviour on the political stage and the manner in which it participated in the democratic process. Had they done so, the outcome of the case could have been different.

The second consideration has to do with the Constitutional Court ’ s reasoning. Its analysis , which contained cogent arguments , did not h owever conclusively establish , on the basis of the available evidence , that there existed sufficient reasons to find that there was a genuine and serious risk that the means which the applicant party intended to use for achieving its aims would not be legal and democratic in every respect , as required by this Court ’ s case ‑ law (see Refah Partisi (the Welfare Party) and Others , cited above, § 98 ) .

For these reasons, it could be accepted that “there did not exist a pressing social need to order the applicant party ’ s dissolution and that the dissolution was thus not necessary in a democratic society, within the meaning of Article 11 of the Convention” (see paragraph 62 of the judgment) .

[1] . I n 1991 the f ormer Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia designated the yellow sixteen ‑ ray star symbol (the Vergina Sun , generally believed to belo ng to king Philip II of Macedonia ) as its national symbol, and displayed it on its flag . It was removed from the country’s flag in 1995.

[2] . Treaty, concluded between Bulgaria , Greece , Montenegro , Romania and Serbia on 10 August 1913 , which brought an end to the Second Balkan War (1913).

[3] 2 . The coalition then in power in Bulgaria .