CASE OF NURETTIN ALDEMIR AND OTHERS v. TURKEYJOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE S TÃœRMEN AND MULARONI
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Document date: December 18, 2007
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JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE S TÃœRMEN AND MULARONI
We regret that we are unable to share the majority ’ s opinion that there has been a violation of Article 11.
The case is about a demonstration organised by KESK (the Confederation of Public Employees ’ Trade Unions) in K z lay Square to protest against a draft bill which was before Parliament in 2001.
Law no. 2911 requires prior notification to organise demonstrations in public places and prohibits demonstrations in certain locations. We also learn from the facts of the case that the Governorship of Ankara issued a circular on 18 December 2000 providing guidelines on meetings and demonstrations to be held in Ankara . According to this circular, it was not permitted to hold demonstrations in K z lay Square . However, the case file does not contain the text of the circular which constitutes the legal basis for the interference by the security forces. In our opinion, it would have been more prudent to obtain the text of the circular before taking a decision.
The majority accept that the interference in the present case had a legal basis and pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting public safety (paragraph 39 of the judgment). Furthermore, they note, in compliance with the Court ’ s case-law ( see , for example Oya Ataman v. Turkey , no. 74552/01, ECHR 2006 ‑ ... ) , that it is not contrary to the spirit of Article 11 if, for reasons of public order and national security, a priori , a High C ontracting Party requires that the holding of meeting s be subject to authorisation (paragraph 42 of the judgment). They add that in view of the fact that any demonstration in a public place may cause a certain level of disruption to ordinary life, it is important that associations and other entities organising demonstrations, as actors in the democratic process, respect the rules governing that process by complying with the regulations in force (paragraph 43 of the judgment). We agree with such statements. We add that, as the majority recognise, at the material time no authorisation was required in the respondent State for the holding of public demonstrations. Only seventy-two hours ’ prior notification was necessary (ibid .).
H aving said the above, t he majority fail , rendering prior notification meaningless , to provide any guidelines as to the circumstances under which non-compliance with the regulations may justify intervention by the security forces.
The majority assert that there is no evidence that the demonstrators initially presented a danger to public order , apart from possibly blocking a particularly busy square in c entral Ankara (paragraph 45 of the judgment).
K z lay Square is the heart of Ankara , the capital of Turkey . Blocking the square means blocking the traffic along the four main arteries of the city,
leading to and from Ulus , Çankaya , Maltepe and Dikimevi . It also blocks the traffic to the Prime Minister ’ s office, the General Staff and Ministry of Defence and other ministries. Moreover, owing to the failure of the applicants to give prior notification, the authorities were deprived of the possibility of taking any measures that would minimise the disruption to public order and that would be required for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others, as provided for in Article 11 § 2 of the Convention.
The majority also assert that the demonstrators did not engage in acts of violence and that the forceful intervention of the security forces was therefore disproportionate. The facts of the case hardly justify such a conclusion. According to the facts of the case, the police officers warned the demonstrators that their action was contrary to the law and that they had to disperse. The demonstrators did not comply with the warning. They blocked the main street and tried to march to the Prime Minister ’ s office. The police officers were then compelled to use force, whereupon “the demonstrators attacked the security forces using pavement stones and sticks which caused the injury of seven police officers and the destruction of a police vehicle” (paragraph 9 of the judgment).
Furthermore, we observe that the applicants ’ complaint concerning the disproportionate use of force used against them is dismissed by the Court for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies ( see paragraphs 49 to 55 of the judgment).
Under such circumstances , where both sides resort to violence, it is impossible to assess whether the force used was proportiona te or not.
In view of all these considerations , we cannot come to the conclusion that there was a violation o f Article 11 of the Convention.