CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE MALINVERNI

1. I voted with all my colleagues in favour of finding a violation of Article 6 § 1 on account of the fact that the psychiatric experts appointed by the competent court to assess the necessity of the applicant ’ s involuntary confinement in a psychiatric hospital had been doctors employed by that hospital.

2. After the finding that the requirements of independence and impartiality enshrined in Article 6 apply only to judges and not to experts (see paragraph 62), the subsequent reasoning of the judgment is based entirely on the principle of the equality of arms (see paragraphs 62 to 69), leading to the Court ’ s conclusion that “by appointing the respondent ’ s employees as experts, the domestic courts placed the applicant at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the respondent hospital. Therefore, the principle of equality of arms has not been complied with” (paragraph 69).

3. One has the impression, however, when reading the relevant considerations in the judgment, that the real problem underlying the appointment of the experts is not so much a problem of equality of arms but one related to their independence and impartiality, as is in fact revealed by the Court ’ s use of the word “neutrality” in paragraphs 62 and 65.

4. I would thus personally have found it preferable if the line of reasoning had been developed around the question of the independence and impartiality of the experts. Admittedly, under Article 6 those two guarantees apply only to judges. However, in an area such as that which forms the subject matter of the present case, the opinion of experts is of such importance that it is practically binding on the judge. Would it therefore be unreasonable to require that the expert too, like the judge, should be independent and impartial?