DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE MARUSTE

I, like some of my colleagues, found this case to be a borderline one in respect of sufficient reasons being given in the Supreme Court ruling.

It is important to bear in mind the subsidiary nature of the Convention system and the well-established doctrinal principle that the interpretation and application of domestic law are primarily the prerogative of the domestic judiciary. It is also clear from the rule-of-law principle that the requirement of legal certainty and predictability of judicial decisions falls under the protection of Article 6. It is indeed difficult in cases such as the one at hand to draw a clear line between the competences of two legal systems (domestic and international).

I am more inclined to leave greater freedom in such matters to the domestic authorities.

This view relies primarily on the above-mentioned general principle of subsidiarity, but also on the need to take into account the interests of judicial economy and local requirements. It is evident that domestic courts, especially Supreme Courts, are better placed than an international court to assess their workload and the need for shorter or longer explanations for their decisions, and to decide the manner in which instructions are to be given.

Secondly, the facts of the case show that this was not a case of major importance and that some reasons and instructions, although minimal, were nonetheless given (see paragraph 14 of the judgment). The validity of the applicable law was not challenged, and the Supreme Court found that the applicant ’ s reassignment had met the requirements set out in the relevant legislative provisions. It further held (gave instruction) that it had been sufficient for the employer to refer to one of the terms specified in the Collective Agreement. This ruling clearly cannot be considered either arbitrary or unreasonable. Should the Supreme Court have given more reasons? Perhaps, but it is not our duty to be a tutor or supervisor to Supreme Courts in how they fulfil their functions, unless the result is manifestly in contradiction with Convention requirements.

In so stating, I do not question the very concept of good administration of justice, which presupposes that courts will provide reasoning in their decisions and judgments and which, as indicated above, falls under the ambit of Article 6. The question here, however, is about scope. I believe that in this particular case the prerequisite justifying the intervention of an international court was not met.