DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE FLOGAITIS

I believe that under the legal and factual circumstances of the present case, Greece should not be condemned. There are in this issue many and very difficult aspects, which need in - depth evaluation and careful answers.

Greece is a unique country in Europe in terms of its d iaspora around the world. Millions of Greeks migrated especially during the 20 th century to all continents. All of them but also their descendants may declare themselves as Greek nationals, given the fact that Greece practi s es jus sanguinis . Greeks have the right to have as many nationalities as they want, but for Greece they will always be Greek. It seems that Melbourne alone has more Australian citizens declaring themselves as Greeks than any Greek city other than Athens .

Organi s ing the electoral vote around the g lobe for a number of potential voters not lower than the number of voters in the country is not a simple task – in practical but also in political terms – especially in a country where the normal electoral process does not date back more than 35 years. International voting must guarantee the equality of vote and at the same time exclude fraud of any sort.

Greece introduced in to the Constitution the possibility for Greeks in the d iaspora to vote; an Act of Parliament, to be voted by a majority of two thirds , is to lay down the conditions . The two-thirds condition is due to the high importance of the vote of the d iaspora in national politics, because only an Act of Parliament with a wider support by Greek political forces could be the basis for a reform which will in practice give Greeks who left the country for ever, or even those who never visited the country, a determining role in future as regards decisions taken in Greece .

Greece has already made a first attempt to pass that Act of Parliament. Although the attempt failed, the political parties in Parliament demonstrated the wish to find a solution to the problem. Therefore, I will dissent from the majority opinion.

[1] Concerning the lack of reasoning, we cannot resist the temptation of quoting a particularly eloquent passage from the partly dissenting opinion of Judge Bonello annexed to the judgment in Aquilina v. Malta : “ The first time the Court appears to have resorted to this hapless formula was in the Golder case of 1975 ( Golder v. United Kingdom judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18). Disregarding its own practice that full reasoning should be given for all decisions, the Court failed to suggest one single reason why the finding should also double up as the remedy. Since then, propelled by the irresistible force of inertia, that formula has resurfaced regularly. In few of the many judgments which relied on it did the Court seem eager to upset the rule that it has to give neither reasons nor explanations.” According to Judge Bonello, this was the case in Nikolova v. Bulgaria ([GC)], no. 31195/96, ECHR 1999-II).