PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KOVLER

I cannot share the Court ’ s conclusion that it had little evidence to enable it to conclude “beyond reasonable doubt” that the applicant was subjected to any form of treatment prohibited by Article 3 of the Convention, as he alleged, and thus that there has been no violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive aspe ct.

During the final round of the hearings in his case, as during the proceedings as a whole, the applicant had insisted that he was innocent and reiterated that he had made his confession at the pre-trial stage because he had been beaten and threatened by the police (see paragraph 50). The applicant had been taken out of his cell during his administrative detention without the presence of his lawyer for the purpose of obtaining his confession. The fact that the so-called medical examination of the applicant on 7 October 2002 did not reveal any in jur ies on him is of no relevance in this case. The Court itself recognises that some forms of psychological and physical pressure do not leave any visible traces (see paragraph 102). Unfortunately, the Court has not paid enough attention to this fact. The logic behind my conclusions on this point is different from that of the majority.

First of all, I am more inclined to agree with the applicant ’ s argument that the very fact that he had been taken out of his cell in breach of the relevant regulation was proof of coercion. I am afraid that the applicant was taken out of his cell several times and it was not for a tea-party with investigators.

Secondly, as a result of the fourth round of court proceedings, the Kirovsk District Court judgment of 2 May 2006 stated that Mr Chumakov ’ s submission that he had given self–incriminating evidence and had written a “confession” under pressure from the police officers was confirmed by the register recording when administrative detainees were taken out of their cells. As an administrative detainee, the applicant was, according to the register, taken out of his cell three times on 2 and 4 October, which were the crucial dates of his “confession” to the crime. The District Court thus concluded that the “confession”, although written by Mr Chumakov, could not be considered a voluntary statement about the crime in question and consequently could not be considered admissible evidence. For me this is sufficient proof of psychological pressure as prohibited by Article 3 (see Gäfgen v. Germany [G.C.] , no. 22978/05, § 91, ECHR 2010). I would point out that the District Court ultimately acquitted the applicant and acknowledged his right to rehabilitation.