DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE DEDOV

With all due respect for the majority ’ s opinion, I am not in a position to find a violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb and, as a consequence, a violation of Article 6 of the Convention.

The circumstances of the applicant ’ s arrest (see paragraphs 6-11 of the judgment) show that he was one of four gang members armed with a shotgun and other weapons. After the group had entered the shop with intent to commit a robbery they were stopped by the police. Shots were fired, and as a consequence the applicant was arrested.

Assessing these circumstances as a whole, in this situation the police had to use force to overcome the applicant ’ s resistance and to apprehend him and the other gang members. Obviously, such use of force could not have been limited to pushing him down the stairs; however, the majority concentrated only on a single fall down the stairs as evidence of injuries.

The applicant ’ s allegations concerning torture are too vague to be taken into consideration. He first stated that he was beaten at the police station (paragraph 13), but then claimed that it had happened in the shop (paragraph 35).

He stated that he had been beaten with a view to obtaining a confession and that he had confessed (paragraph 10), and then that he was beaten again with the same purpose and, as a result of the ill-treatment, made a confession about the robbery (paragraph 13). I wonder why the confession was necessary if the applicant had been apprehended at the crime scene. Therefore, it is difficult to take into account his version of the events.

I also regret the fact that the majority automatically applied the Court ’ s previous rulings on the torture issue such as Labita v Italy (paragraph 63). In Labita the circumstances of the applicant ’ s arrest and ill-treatment were completely different: the applicant was not arrested at the crime scene and was allegedly ill-treated for a long period of time in prison without any purpose of obtaining a self-incriminating statement from him. Ultimately, in that case the Court did not find a violation of Article 3 under its substantive limb.

Also, according to the findings of the national court, before the arrest the applicant had two offences on his criminal record. He served his prison sentence from 1996 to 2003. After his release from prison he joined the gang and just two months later he was arrested. He was charged with two crimes: robbery in a shop and theft of paintings. At the hearings he pleaded not guilty (as to the attack on the shop, he stated that he had entered the shop without intent to robbery); however, his guilt was substantially confirmed by witnesses, victims, expert evidence and clues (masks, weapons, paintings), and he was ultimately convicted by the national court on some of the charges and acquitted on others. The gang operated for two years (2003-2004); there were six members participating in the robbery (against nine police officers), and one of them managed to escape arrest in the shop. These facts raise even more doubts in relation to possible reasons for ill-treatment and justify more strongly the use of force to stop the violence, which had lasted for two years.

What is more important for me in this case is the difficulty which the Court faces each time in applying the values of the Convention. One of these values is peaceful life. This value is so fragile and delicate that we should all feel responsible for maintaining the peace. If anyone takes up a shotgun or weapon with violent intent, this value is immediately placed at great risk. So, any such applicant should understand that the lives of others are in danger, that such danger is immeasurable because he may participate in killings, and that he may be injured or even killed as a result of the resistance to his unlawful violence ( subject to the conditions set out in paragraph 2 of Article 2 of the Convention). The use of force against the applicant during his arrest was a way of making him take responsibility for the lack of respect he had shown for peaceful life. Where risks of this kind are involved the State ’ s margin of appreciation should be broader.

The importance of protecting the peaceful life of society can be easily demonstrated by the definition of robbery under Article 162 of the Russian Criminal Code (which was not incorporated in the judgment): armed assault with intent to seize someone ’ s property, committed with the threat of violence dangerous to the life and health of others .