CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE KALAYDJIEVA

I fully share my colleagues ’ view that the present case is distinct from cases in which legal parentage was determined on the basis of a presumption in law regarding paternity within a married couple, or resulted from some form of deceit. Unlike these situations, the applicant in the present case arrived at his decision to undertake the responsibility of becoming the legal father of a child in full awareness of the circumstances and in pursuit of his own autonomous will as protected by Article 8 of the Convention. The notion of “private life” incorporates the right to respect for an individual ’ s decision to become or not to become a parent, and this embraces the decision to become a legal parent notwithstanding the biological origins of the child or embryo. In so far as the issue falls within the ambit and under the protection of Article 8, I can accept that the applicant ’ s complaints do not necessarily amount to an abuse of the right of petition (see paragraph 49 of the judgment). However, I have serious misgivings as to whether the “link between the applicant ’ s wish to have his earlier acknowledgment” revoked (paragraph 60) suffices to reasonably characterise the opening of proceedings at his own request as constituting “an interference” (paragraph 61) attributable to the authorities and not to his own wish.

In my understanding the crucial issue is in fact whether the authorities were under any positive obligation to act on the applicant ’ s request for re ‑ examination of his personal decision on the basis of data concerning the actual biological origins of the child, which, although freshly obtained, did not necessarily come as a surprise to him. Even if such an obligation existed (which I doubt), it appears quite obvious that in so far as this was done after a substantial period of established family links with the child, in these proceedings the domestic courts were clearly under an obligation not only to examine the applicant ’ s belated change of mind, but also to take into account and balance it against the child ’ s rights under Article 8 and to afford the latter the requisite protection. This is precisely what they did.

Similarly to the Court ’ s findings in the case of Evans v. the United Kingdom ([GC], no. 6339/05 , §§ 90-92, ECHR 2007 ‑ I) , I do not consider that the applicant ’ s right to respect for his initial decision to become a parent should be accorded greater weight than the child ’ s right to respect for his rights under Article 8, which attracts equal protection. The applicant ’ s right to respect for his private and family life under Article 8 cannot be interpreted as an obligation on the authorities to secure the pursuit of his subsequent personal preferences notwithstanding their obligation to respect the rights of others.

CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE DE GAETANO

I agree that in this case there has been no violation of Article 8.

Paternity in this case was not the result of some legal presumption. The applicant voluntarily chose to recogni s e the child when he knew perfectly well that there was a high probability that the child was not his. He acted deliberately (one could almost say recklessly). There was no deceit or other external pressure. In the circumstances I find it difficult to understand how the domestic courts ’ decisions refusing his challenge to his declaration of paternity can sensibly be understood as an “interference” with his right to respect for private life. Recognition of paternity by the husband, like a decision to adopt, is an act inherently intended to strengthen and preserve private and family life. To the best of my knowledge there exists no positive obligation on the part of the State to allow a person to retract such recognition at will, just as there is no positive obligation to allow a parent to terminate an adoption at will. That, to my mind, is the long and the short of it all.

Paragraphs 61 to 80 of the judgment are, in my view, simply gilding the (wrong) lily.