PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LEMMENS

1 . To my regret, I am unable to subscribe to the majority ’ s conclusion that Article 3 of the Convention would not be violated if the applicant were to be expelled to Turkey. [1]

My disagreement is based on a different understanding of the risk arising from his long-term mental illness (see paragraphs 46-50 of the judgment).

2. I am aware that the Court applies a very high threshold in cases where the risk incurred stems “from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of sufficient resources to deal with it in the receiving country” (see N. v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 26565/05, § 43, ECHR 2008). As the majority points out, in such situations an issue may arise under Article 3 “only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are compelling” (see paragraph 43 of the judgment, referring to D. v. the United Kingdom , 2 May 1997, § 54, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997 ‑ III; Bensaid v. the United Kingdom , no. 44599/98, § 40, ECHR 2001 ‑ I; and N. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 42).

The question is whether such compelling humanitarian grounds are present. The majority answers this question in the negative (see paragraph 50 of the judgment); I respectfully disagree.

3. The present case involves the removal of a person who is suffering from severe schizophrenia. It was on account of this illness that his prison sentence, for the murder of his wife, was stayed and he was sent to a closed psychiatric facility. The sentencing court explicitly accepted a plea of diminished responsibility (see paragraph 13 of the judgment). The applicant was later paroled on condition that he remain in a facility providing psychiatric care (paragraph 15 of the judgment).

Furthermore, the majority accepts that, according to expert reports, the applicant is unable to live on his own. He must continue to take psychotropic drugs on a regular basis and to undergo therapy, failing which he will suffer a relapse into hallucinations and psychotic delusions, in the course of which he may harm himself or other persons. Expulsion would lead to a deterioration of his condition, especially were he to be expelled to Turkey, where he feels persecuted. He is unable to distinguish his paranoid ideas from reality (see paragraphs 16 and 46 of the judgment).

The applicant ’ s situation is similar to that of the applicant in the Bensaid case (cited above). [2] However, there are two striking elements in the present case that distinguish it from the former case: the applicant left Turkey in 1988, that is, no less than 26 years ago (whereas Mr Bensaid had arrived in the United Kingdom some 11 years before the Court handed down its judgment), and he is unable to live on his own. The combination of these two factors gives reason to believe that, once back in his country of origin, the applicant will be completely helpless and unable to seek the necessary medical assistance on his own behalf. At first sight, the chances are therefore high that he will suffer a relapse into hallucinations and psychotic delusions, during which he may harm himself or other persons.

4. The majority considers that the circumstances in this case are not particularly exceptional, having regard to the fact that medical treatment for the applicant ’ s condition is generally available in specialised wards in the larger Turkish cities (see paragraph 47 of the judgment). This was also the ground relied upon by the Swiss Federal Court in rejecting the argument based on Article 3 (see paragraph 19).

I am afraid that this is a very theoretical assessment of the situation. On the basis of the description of the applicant ’ s condition, I consider it somewhat probable that the applicant will not be in a position to take advantage of any available medical treatment. What he needs is assistance, even supervision, so that he can be provided with (continuous) psychiatric care (compare paragraph 15 of the judgment).

In this respect, the respondent Government indicate that the competent Turkish authorities will be informed of the applicant ’ s state of health and that a list of the required medical treatment will be sent to these authorities (see paragraph 36 of the judgment). The majority is satisfied with this undertaking by the respondent Government (see paragraph 49).

In my opinion, such an undertaking is insufficient to remove the risk of ill-treatment in Turkey.

Although I am hesitant to use the term, I believe that the applicant, as a person suffering from severe schizophrenia and unable to live on his own, must be considered extremely vulnerable (see, mutatis mutandis , G. v. France , no. 27244/09, § 77, 23 February 2012). The applicant thus belongs to a category of persons requiring “special protection” (compare Oršuš and Others v. Croatia [GC], no. 15766/03, § 147, ECHR 2010; M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 251, ECHR 2011; and Tarakhel v. Switzerland [GC], no. 29217/12, § 118, ECHR 2014 (extracts)). With respect to such a person, I find it incumbent on the Swiss authorities to obtain some sort of assurances from the Turkish authorities that, on arrival in Turkey, the applicant will receive the special protection required by his condition (compare Tarakhel , cited above, § 120).

There is no indication, however, that the Turkish authorities – or anyone else – will take the applicant into their care (compare D. v. the United Kingdom , cited above, § 52). There is no guarantee that the applicant will receive treatment compatible with Article 3, not even through a statement of intent by the Turkish authorities or the putting in place of practical arrangements with them (compare, albeit in a very different context, ÄŒonka v. Belgium , no. 51564/99, § 83, ECHR 2002 ‑ I).

5. Having regard, on the one hand, to the applicant ’ s condition and his extended absence from his country of origin and, on the other, to the minimal concern by the Swiss authorities for the medical assistance to be effectively received by the applicant upon arrival in Turkey, I consider that the expulsion of the applicant would expose him to a real risk of being subjected to inhuman treatment. Accordingly, in the given circumstances, his expulsion would in my opinion amount to a violation of Article 3.

[1] I have no problem with the conclusion that there would be no breach of Article 2.

[2] For a (much) less serious case of mental illness (depression and anxiety disorders), see S.B. v. Finland ( dec. ), no. 17200/11, 24 June 2014.