JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES ZUPANČIČ AND DE GAETANO

We do not agree that the deportation of the applicant to Mogadishu in Somalia would not give rise to a violation of Article 3. On the contrary, we believe that on the basis of all the evidence she will, upon her forced return there, face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, if not worse.

Once again, unfortunately, both the Swedish courts and this Court have reached the same conclusion by examining under the microscope minor discrepancies or inconsistencies in the applicant ’ s statements – most of which have a reasonable explanation – while at the same time downplaying the general situation in the country of return that emerges from various international reports. We find this method unacceptable, as previously indicated in the separate opinions in K.A.B. v. Sweden (no. 886/11, 5 September 2013) and in J.K. and Others v. Sweden (no. 59166/12, 4 June 2015).

In the instant case the applicant, a single woman who has been living in Sweden for almost eight years and who has been absent from her country for longer, will not only be returned to an essentially dysfunctional society, but also to one that is positively hostile to her status and to what she has done these last ten years plus. Whatever family the applicant may still have in Mogadishu, especially male members, they will be equally, if not more, hostile. In Tarakhel v. Switzerland ([GC], no. 29217/12, ECHR 2014 (extracts)) this Court found that the reception facilities and accommodation conditions for the Tarakhel family in Italy would attain the threshold of severity required to come within the scope of the prohibition under Article 3. We therefore fail to see how in the applicant ’ s case her forced return to a situation which places her physical integrity and her life in manifest danger does not reach that threshold.

For these reasons we have voted against operative provision 2 of the judgment.