JOINT PARTLY CONCURRING AND PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES RAIMONDI, KELLER AND KJØLBRO

1 . Like our colleagues, we voted for declaring the applicant ’ s complaint concerning the first set of proceedings (the employment proceedings) inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies (see paragraphs 31-32 of the judgment). In addition, the applicant a lso failed to comply with the 6 month rule in Article 35 of the Convention as regards these proceedings.

2 . However, unlike our colleagues who find the complaint about the second set of proceedings (the civil law proceedings) admissible (3 of them finding that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and 1 of them finding that there has been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention), we voted for declaring the second set of proceedings inadmissible as being incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae .

3 . As we find Article 6 § 1 inapplicable to the second set of proceedings, we voted (together with Judge Lemmens) for finding no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, but we do not share the views expressed in the Court ’ s judgment for a finding of no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see paragraphs 67-75 of the judgment). Furthermore, it goes without saying that we also disagree with the Court ’ s reasoning in paragraphs 39-55 (on the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention).

4 . In its judgment, the Court finds no violation of Article 6 of the Convention, as the applicant had access to a court which assessed the merits of his civil law claim (see paragraph 74 of the judgment). In our view, the Court ’ s assessment does not take sufficient account of the applicant ’ s complaint to the Court and the claim invoked by the applicant before the domestic courts.

5 . In our view, the applicant is not complaining that he did not have access to a court to have a ruling on whether his claim against his former employer, the Hungarian Calvinist Church, had to be decided on the basis of ecclesiastical law (thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts) or civil law (thereby falling within the jurisdiction of the domestic courts). Rather, the applicant is complaining that the domestic courts did not adjudicate the merits of his claim against the Hungarian Calvinist Church based on civil law (see paragraphs 3, 21 and 56 of the judgment). In other words, in the applicant ’ s view, he had a claim against the Hungarian Calvinist Church based on civil law which he vainly sought to have assessed on its merits by the domestic courts.

6 . It is not disputed that the applicant ’ s claim for payment of a sum of money was of a civil nature, and the question therefore arises whether the applicant, in the specific circumstances of the case, had a claim which was recognised by domestic law, at least on an arguable basis. In our view and as we explain below, that question has to be answered in the negative.

7 . In seeking to answer this question it is important to recall the Court ’ s case-law according to which Article 6 § 1 does not guarantee any particular content for (civil) “rights” in the substantive law of the Contracting States: the Court may not create through the in terpretation of Article 6 § 1 a substantive right which has no legal basis in the State concerned. Its guarantees extend only to rights which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law (see Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, § 117, ECHR 2005 ‑ X). Furthermore, in assessing whether there is a civil “right”, the starting-point must be the provisions of the relevant domestic law and their interpretation by the domestic courts (see Roche , cited above, § 120). In particular, this Court would need strong reasons to differ from the conclusion reached by those courts by substituting its own views for those of the national courts on a question of interpretation of domestic law and by finding, contrary to their view, that there was arguably a right recognised by domestic law (see Roche , cited above, § 120).

8 . The applicant had been serving as a pastor in the Hungarian Calvinist Church, but he had been suspended and subsequently removed from service. In the applicant ’ s view he had a claim against the Hungarian Calvinist Church following the dismissal. The question therefore arises whether the claim invoked by the applicant before the domestic courts was, at least on arguable grounds, recognised under Hungarian law.

9 . When the applicant took up the position of pastor in the Hungarian Calvinist Church, his rights and obligations as well as his remuneration were set out in the appointment letter issue d by the parish presbyters (see paragraph 7 of the judgment). Furthermore, the applicant ’ s suspension and removal as well as entitlement to service allowance were adjudicated by the ecclesiastical courts (see paragraph 8-9 of the judgment).

10 . As the applicant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the ecclesiastical proceedings and the compensation granted, he instituted employment proceedings before domestic courts (paragraphs 10-11 of the judgment). However, the Labour Court discontinued the proceedings as the court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the applicant ’ s claim. In the view of the Labour Court, the applicant ’ s service as a pastor was regulated by ecclesiastical rules, and not by labour law. Therefore, State courts had no jurisdiction to decide on the applicant ’ s claim. This ruling was upheld by the appeal court.

11 . As the applicant was dissatisfied with the ruling in the employment proceedings, he instituted a second set of proceedings this time basing his claim on civil law (paragraphs 12-15 of the judgment). The applicant based his pecuniary claim on provisions on enforcement of contracts and breach of contractual obligations (respectively Section 277(1) and 478(1) of the Civil Code). However, the civil-law proceedings were discontinued by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the applicant ’ s pastoral service relationship was not regulated by civil law, but by ecclesiastical law. As the applicant ’ s pastoral service relationship lacked a civil-law legal basis, the court could not examine the applicant ’ s claim arising out of the termination of the applicant ’ s pastoral service and adjudicating it on the merits. On the contrary, as indicated by the Supreme Court, the applicant could make a claim under the ecclesiastical law before the relevant bodies of the Calvinist Church.

12 . In addition, it follows clearly from the Constitutional Court ’ s decision from 2003 (see paragraph 19 of the judgment), adopted prior to the applicant ’ s dispute with the Hungarian Calvinist Church, that a person in the service of a church may only turn to a State court to have the dispute decided by the State court if the employment is based on State law. If the relationship is not governed by State law, but ecclesiastical law, the State courts lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.

13 . Therefore, having regard to the nature of applicant ’ s complaint (access to a court to have the merits of his claim decided), the basis for the applicant ’ s service as a pastor (an appointment letter issued by the parish presbyters) and domestic law as interpreted by the domestic courts both prior to the applicant ’ s dispute (the Constitutional Court ’ s decision from 2003) and during the proceedings instituted by the applicant (both the employment proceedings as well as the civil-law proceedings), the applicant ’ s dispute with the Hungarian Calvinist Church did not concern a right, that at least on arguable grounds was recognised under domestic law. Therefore, and as Article 6 cannot be interpreted as creating civil rights, that are not recognised under domestic law, the provision is incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae and should have been dismissed under Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.

14 . This would, in our view, have been fully in accordance with the Court ’ s case-law under Article 6 and more specifically with its case-law in cases concerning employment disputes between priests and churches regulated by ecclesiastical laws (see Dudová and Duda v. the Czech Republic ( dec. ), no. 40224/98, 30 January 2001; Ahtinen v. Finland , no. 48907/99, §§ 39-43, 23 September 2008; Baudler v. Germany ( dec. ), no. 38254/04, 6 December 2011; Roland Reuter v. Germany ( dec. ), no. 39775/04, 6 December 2011; and Dietrich Reuter v. Germany ( dec. ), nos. 32741/06 and 19568/09, 17 January 2012).

15 . We voted for declaring the applicant ’ s complaint under Article 14 of the Convention inadmissible. However, unlike our colleagues we do not find the complaint manifestly ill-founded, but rather incompatible with the Convention ratione materiae . As Article 6 of the Convention does not, in our view, apply, Article 14 of the Convention cannot be invoked either (see Petrovic v. Austria , 27 March 1998, § 22, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998 ‑ II, Haas v. the Netherlands , no. 36983/97, § 45, ECHR 2004 ‑ I, and Baka v. Hungary , no. 20261/12, § 117, 27 May 2014).