CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE WOJTYCZEK

I agree with the outcome in the instant case; however, I should like to introduce ce rtain nuances to the reasoning.

The difficulty of the case stems from the failure by the domestic authorities to establish the relevant factual circumstances. In such situations the Court must exercise particular caution in assessing the facts. Given the uncertainty as to the detailed course of events, it is especially difficult to establish the effects of the ill-treatment on the applicants (see paragraph 119). This should have been investigated by the domestic authorities. All the Court can state is that the applicants have an arguable claim under Article 3, which triggers the obligation to carry out an effective investigation. Furthermore, there is no doubt that the Romanian authorities did indeed fail to conduct an adequate investigation.

The judgment links the need to conduct a meaningful inquiry into the possibility of discrimination motiving the attack with the hostility prevailing against the LGBTI community in the respondent State (see paragraph 124). I am not persuaded by this argument. It may give the impression that the Court ’ s approach in discrimination cases can vary from State to State. Whatever the general situation in a specific country, if Article 3 is applicable then the national authorities have a duty to establish all of the circumstances which are relevant for criminal liability, including the motives of the perpetrators.

PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. I voted against point 3 of the operative part of the judgment. I disagree with the majority that the allegations other than those under Articles 3 and 14 (in so far as the complaint concerned the investigation into the allegations of ill-treatment) did not need to be examined. The issues raised by the applicant under Articles 8, 11 and 13, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14, should not have been summarily dismissed . At least some of them merited thorough scrutiny. Only one aspect of the alleged violation of Articles 3 and 14 was examined in the present case, while the alleged violation of Article 11 was not examined at all. By way of comparison, in Identoba v. Georgia (no. 73235/12, § 106, 12 May 2015), the Court found that “ the ... applicants ’ complaints under Article 8, made either separately or in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, as well as the specific repetition of their grievance about the ineffectiveness of the criminal investigation under Article 13” “merely [reiterate] the issues already thoroughly examined under the lex specialis – Articles 3 and 11, both read in conjunction with Article 14”. Based on this consideration, the Court declared that part of the application “manifestly ill ‑ founded” and rejected it pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention. One could say that the “reiteration” of certain complaints already examined under other heads does not at all, by itself, permit the conclusion that they are “ill-founded”, let alone “manifestly” so. But this issue pertains to that case and not to the present one. However, in the present case the majority limited itself to a mere statement that “the Court need not examine the remainder of [the] complaint”, but did not declare that part of the application “manifestly ill-founded”.

2. In my opinion, had that part of the application been examined, it is more likely than not that a violation would have been found in respect of at least some of the complaints under Articles 8, 11 and 13, taken separately or in conjunction with Article 14. And such a finding would have had a bearing on the amount of compensation for non-pecuniary damage awarded to the applicants.

Alternatively, when the Court concludes that there is “no need to examine” some part of the application, as in this case, these complaints cannot simply be disregarded, especially in the light of the unambiguous requirement of Article 45 § 1. I regret to observe that overly laconic reasons for the rejection of “remainders of complaints” have become a long ‑ standing practice of the Court, not only in cases where the need for such rejection is self-evident but also in cases where it would merit more explicit consideration. I believe that the present case clearly belongs to the latter category.

3. Having voted against point 3, I could not but vote against point 5 of the operative part of the judgment too.