DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KŪRIS

1. I do not agree with the majority that in the instant case there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. The Government is not given the least benefit of the doubt. As in some other cases involving agent provocateurs , only t he applicant is granted such benefit, whatever version he presents.

2. According to the Government ’ s submissions, on 24 June 2007 the applicant, having initially pleaded not guilty, admitted, in the presence of his lawyer, his “involvement in the criminal activity”, but changed his version at the trial stage by averring that the undercover agent “persuaded and determined him to carry out illegal activities” (and also that he had not received any money for being involved in trading drugs). The majority seem to be satisfied with this “explanation”. The Government might have erred in submitting that the applicant confessed to having been involved in the drug-deal. Be that as it may, the applicant was not a bystander, and he was approached by the agent not at random. The Government ’ s submissions are assessed critically, and those of the applicant should also be similarly assessed. Alas, they are not. All factual circumstances are assessed in favour of the applicant in a spirit of naïve, excessive legalism.

3. For instance, does the fact that “that the applicant had no criminal record” (see paragraph 45 of the judgment) prove anything? No. There is always a first time. If the Court is consistent in this attitude, to many of those from the criminal underworld the first time may never come.

4. Or is anything proved by the fact that “no drugs had been found in [the applicant ’ s] possession at any time before or during the undercover operation” (ibid.)? Again, no. An intermediary is an intermediary. His task is to bring people into contact. Which is what this intermediary did.

5. The applicant claimed that the “issue of incitement had not been properly examined in the domestic proceedings” (see paragraph 25). For the majority, the respondent State ’ s fault is that “the domestic courts did not adequately investigate the allegations of entrapment” (see paragraph 53). I am not persuaded by such a conclusion. In my opinion, the courts saw both sides. They balanced the parties ’ versions of events against each other. The police version outweighed that of the applicant – and for good reason. In the circumstances of the case, there were indeed very good reasons not to take the applicant ’ s version too uncritically , let alone at face value .

6. The applicant alleged that “he had never before been involved in drug transactions and that the authorities therefore had no reasonable suspicions against him at the moment when the undercover operation had been authorised” (see paragraph 25). Does anyone really believe this? The proof is in the pudding. The drug-trafficking took place. The suspicion was confirmed. It was reasonable.

7. Without entering into a longer argument, I only ask: what if the police had not performed the operation in question? Such inaction could have resulted in more drugs being sold to more people, maybe to minors, and possibly leading to lethal overdoses.

8. The majority declares that the Court is “mindful of the importance and the difficulties of the task of the investigating agents” (ibid.).

I wish that were so.