DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KJØLBRO

1 . In the view of the majority, there are objective reasons to call into question the impartiality of a judge deciding a civil dispute if the judge has close family ties with a trainee lawyer working in the law firm of the lawyer representing one party to the proceedings, even though the trainee lawyer has neither represented the party nor worked on the case.

2 . It is the first time that the Court has found a violation in such a situation, and the judgment is a significant further development of the Court ’ s case-law increasing the standards required of an impartial tribunal. Personally, I am not convinced of the necessity of adopting such a position or by the arguments for doing so.

3 . Even though the reasoning in the judgment is based on the specific circumstances of the present case, I am of the view that the finding of the Court will apply in general. Thus, in practice, the Court ’ s judgment will rule out the possibility of a judge deciding a civil dispute if a close relative of the judge is employed as a trainee lawyer in a law firm representing one party to the proceedings, even though the trainee lawyer has neither represented the party nor worked on the case.

4 . In assessing whether there are objective reasons to call into question the impartiality of Judge D.P., one has to look at the nature of the link between Judge D.P. and the applicant ’ s opponent in the civil proceedings, and also at the nature of the dispute to be decided in the civil proceedings.

5 . In my view, the link between Judge D.P. and the applicant ’ s opponent in the civil proceedings is rather remote and weak. Judge D.P. did not have any family ties with the applicant ’ s opponent in the civil proceedings. Nor had he at any point during the proceedings represented the applicant ’ s opponent as a lawyer (see, a contrario , Wettstein v. Switzerland , no. 33958/96, § 47, ECHR 2000 ‑ XII, and Mežnarić v. Croatia , no. 71615/01, § 34-37, 15 July 2005). Furthermore, he did not have any family ties with the lawyers representing the applicant ’ s opponent (see Micallef v. Malta [GC], no. 17056/06, §§ 100-05, ECHR 2009). Neither did he have any family ties with persons involved in or working on the case (see, for example, Steck-Risch and Others v. Liechtenstein , no. 63151/00, § 48, 19 May 2005, and Huseyn and Others v. Azerbaijan , nos. 35485/05 and 3 others, § 168, 26 July 2011). Judge D.P. was the father of N.P., who was a trainee lawyer in the law firm of the lawyers V.Lj. and Z.V. who represented M.R. in the civil proceedings, but N.P. had not been involved in the case in any manner. Thus, N.P. had not at any point during the proceedings represented M.R., nor had he in any way worked on the case.

6 . Having regard to the nature of the dispute between the applicant and M.R., which was a dispute over a will, there is nothing to suggest that Judge D.P. had a direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the proceedings (see, a contrario , Pétur Thór Sigurðsson v. Iceland , no. 39731/98, § 45, ECHR 2003 ‑ IV; Pescador Valero v. Spain , no. 62435/00, § 27, ECHR 2003 ‑ VII; Sacilor-Lormines v. France , no. 65411/01, §§ 64-70, ECHR 2006 ‑ XIII; Tocono and Profesorii PrometeiÅŸti v. Moldova , no. 32263/03, § 31, 26 June 2007; UTE Saur Vallnet v. Andorra , no. 16047/10, §§ 52-58, 29 May 2012; and Mitrov v. the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia , no. 45959/09, § 55, 2 June 2016). It seems rather theoretical and far-fetched to say that Judge D.P., in the processing or adjudication of the civil dispute, would have been influenced by the fact that his son was a trainee lawyer in the firm of lawyers representing the applicant ’ s opponent in the civil proceedings, and I find it difficult to say that the applicant ’ s fears in this regard are objectively justified.

7 . Therefore, having regard to the remoteness of the impugned link between Judge D.P. and the applicant ’ s opponent in the civil proceedings, the fact that N.P. had not been involved in the case in any manner, the fact that Judge D.P. was one of three judges deciding the case, and the fact that D.P. did not have any direct or indirect interest in the outcome of the civil proceedings, I do not find that Judge D.P. lacked objective impartiality.

8 . I also attach importance to the fact that the Court ’ s finding of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention in the present case may have implications, and cause practical difficulties, for smaller jurisdictions in particular (see Biagioli v. San Marino (dec.), no. 8162/13, § 80, 8 July 2014, and A.K. v. Liechtenstein , no. 38191/12, § 82-83, 9 July 2015).

9 . That being said, I recognise that a situation such as the one in the present case (a judge having family ties with a trainee lawyer who was not involved in the case but who works in a law firm representing a party to the proceedings) would in practice often be avoided and solved without any difficulties, as the judge would be replaced by a colleague without such family ties. However, that is not in itself sufficient basis for holding that there are objective reasons to call into question the impartiality of the judge. In other words, an issue that would often be solved in practice has now been amended into a legal obligation flowing from Article 6 of the Convention.

10 . According to my assessment of the case, the information about domestic practice (see paragraphs 19-21 of the judgment) was not decisive. When the Supreme Court decided the applicant ’ s case on 14 September 2011 (see paragraph 10 of the judgment), it emphasised the fact that the trainee lawyer “did not participate in any manner in the proceedings at issue”. Thus, the fact that the judge ’ s son was a trainee lawyer in the law firm representing the applicant ’ s opponent in the civil proceedings was not in itself sufficient to call into question the impartiality of the judge. A few years earlier, on 27 September 2005, the Supreme Court had adopted a decision (see paragraph 19 of the judgment) that may be read as being in contradiction with the Supreme Court ’ s decision in the applicant ’ s case. However, only a few months before the decision in the applicant ’ s case, on 11 June 2009, the Supreme Court had adopted a decision in which it emphasised the fact that the trainee lawyer had represented the other party to the proceedings, or in other words, that the trainee lawyer had participated in the proceedings (see paragraph 21 of the judgment). Therefore, the practice of the Supreme Court, to the extent that there may be any inconsistency, does not amount to a situation where a failure to comply with domestic requirements is sufficient to call into question the impartiality of a judge (see, for example, Pfeifer and Plankl v. Austria , 25 February 1992, § 36, Series A no. 227; Oberschlick v. Austria (no. 1) , 23 May 1991, § 50, Series A no. 204; and Mežnarić , cited above, § 27).